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Abstract
This thesis studies the institutional investor background in order to under-
stand the working of hedge fund activism: how institutional investors affect hedge
fund activists target selection and how activists share information and build alliances
through social connections to achieve their goals.
Chapter 2 utilizes a rich literature on institutional investors’ governance roles
and develops simple measures of institutional discontent expressed through holding,
trading and voice channels, to predict hedge fund activism target selection. Discon-
tent expressed through all three channels leads to subsequent targeting. Medium
sized dissatisfied owners and sellers seem to be the main driving force, and insti-
tutions’ discretionary disagreements on management compensation and governance
related proposals have the highest explanatory power among other voice channels.
Activists are more likely to gain higher announcement returns and threaten to take
hostile actions against management with more discontented institutional investors in
the target companies. Discontented institutions are more likely to vote pro-activist
in the subsequent annual meetings after campaigns.
Chapter 3 uses a social network framework to study information dissem-
ination during activist campaigns. Actively managed funds whose managers are
socially connected to the lead activist are more likely to increase their ownership
in the target firms around the activist disclosure. In the cross sectional analysis,
we find that the effect is stronger if the activists have better track records and if
the ties are established via club membership, charity works, and other small circles.
Connected institutions also earn significantly higher announcement returns relative
to non-connected funds. The presence of connected institutions contributes to the
activist’s campaign success. Additional tests are performed to rule out alternative
explanations such as fund manager ability or similarity in portfolio choices.
Chapter 4 goes one step further to study alliance building among activist
investors and institutional investors during the campaign period. A socially con-
nected institution is 1.1 percentage points more likely to increase its ownership in
the target firm during the campaign period, compared to funds that are not socially
connected to the activist. We use a subsample that includes all institutions subject
to M&As before activism events to identify plausibly exogenous shocks to social con-
nections and find similar results. Furthermore, connected institutions also perform
significantly better on their investments than non-connected institutions and they
ix
are more likely to vote pro-activist in routine proposals, especially director election
proposals. The effect is stronger if connected institutions also purchase target stocks
during a campaign.
The thesis contributes to the literature by developing measures of revealed
institutional governance preference based on theoretical and survey evidence in the
literature. It also uncovers a channel through which hedge fund activists share
information and build alliances and push for corporate changes facilitated by mutual
benefits amongst their fellow institutional allies.
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
The playing field of corporate governance is ever-changing, from the merger waves
in the eighties and nineties followed by the emergence of shareholder activism dom-
inated by large mutual funds and pension funds, to today. The huge yet puzzling
success of hedge fund activism fascinates both industry and academia, and raises
concerns about the nature and the prevalence of agency problem embedded deep in
the making of a firm. The phenomenon of hedge fund activism is a recent develop-
ment in corporate governance, but there have already been debates on fundamental
issues such as activists’ real intentions, their effectiveness, and potential long term
and external consequences. Nonetheless, the headline news of corporate battles,
such as Icahn versus Herbalife, and Bill Ackmans’ loss of $4.6 billion dollars on
Valeant, opens up windows for people to peep into the world of investing and gov-
ernance. Regardless of the never ending debates on welfare, we have learnt once
more about corporate governance, and to a large extent how it affects shareholder
values from the hundreds of campaigns each year. But we know very little about
the working of a campaign, how activists select target companies and how they gain
supports from other shareholders. This thesis tries to understand how institutional
investors matter in the case of target selection and alliance building by the hedge
fund activists.
Hedge fund activism is different from its predecessor governance form (take
over and shareholder activism by mutual funds and pension funds) in that activists
only acquire around 5% target firm stock (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008)
whereas a takeover bid requires at least 50% ownership, and generally hedge funds
have fewer investing restrictions than mutual funds or pension funds (Brav, Jiang,
Kim, 2010). Hedge funds can short sell and utilize various finance derivatives; they
are also less regulated by the SEC whereas mutual funds and pension funds can
only invest in limited pools of securities and have a more comprehensive disclosure
requirement. Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010) also argue that hedge fund managers
do not suffer from conflict of interest as much as mutual fund managers with their
invested companies. All these features make it interesting to examine how activist
hedge funds select campaign targets and subsequently how they pursue their goals.
So far the literature on hedge fund activism is expanding rapidly. Most pa-
pers focus on the ex post performance of target firms. It is well documented that,
1
upon announcement, the share price of target companies jumps about 6% during
the 20-day window (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009;
Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi, 2008; Clifford, 2008; Becht, Franks, Grant, and
Wagner, 2015). Both Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) and Klein and Zur
(2009) have characterized targeted companies to be small and value stocks with
a high concentration of institutional investors. There is a small body of litera-
ture on the role of institutional investors and hedge fund activism. Gantchev and
Jotikasthira (2016) found that institutional selling facilitates activist block build-
ing and Appel, Gomley and Keim (2016) found that passive ownership influences
campaign outcome. Wong (2016) documented excessive abnormal trading volumes
before campaign announcements and suggested evidence related to the wolf pack
activism theory built by Brav, Dasgupta, and Mathews (2016). A recent paper by
Kedia, Starks and Wang (2016) proxies for pro-activist institutions using evidence
on past voting and campaign support. Brav, Jiang, and Li (2017) estimate jointly
how institutional investors vote in proxy contests and how activists target firms in
proxy contests.
The fruitful research findings help us to understand the economics behind
hedge fund activism. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), a large shareholder
will not intervene as it bares all costs of the campaigns but only shares a fraction of
the benefits. Only when the benefit exceeds the cost will the shareholder intervene.
In chapter 2, we model the revealed governance preference of institutional investors
based on Edmans (2009), Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), and McCahery, Sautner
and Starks (2016), and proxy for institutional dissatisfaction by aggregating annual
voting outcomes, ownerships that experience negative holding period returns, and
exited ownerships due to poor holding period performances. We find that the re-
vealed dissatisfaction of institutional shareholders can predict subsequent activism
targeting on a quarterly frequency. A 1 percentage point institutional ownership
exited due to loss increases the probability of subsequent targeting by 10 percent.
Voice expressed by voting against management in routine compensation and gover-
nance related proposals are more likely to predict subsequent targeting than other
voice channels. With a dissatisfied shareholder base, the activists may face a lower
cost of persuading shareholders to support them. In the cross sectional analysis
of activism targets, we find activists are more likely to use the threat of a lawsuit
and shareholder proposal when there are more dissatisfied owners. The higher the
concentration of dissatisfied ownership, the higher the perceived success of activists
based on announcement returns is. We further look for direct evidence to sup-
port the conjecture that dissatisfied owners are more likely to support activist by
investigating how the dissatisfied owners vote during the campaign year and find
the institutions that experienced negative holding period returns up to campaign
announcement are more likely to vote against management in subsequent annual
voting in management sponsored proposals, and especially compensation related
proposals.
In chapter 3, we study specifically an information channel through which
activists may communicate with institutional investors and, based on mutual bene-
fits, how they rely on this alliance of socially connected institutions to achieve their
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goals. We find that institutions that are socially connected to the activist via their
top personnel are more likely to increase their portfolio weights as well as owner-
ship in target stocks around the campaign quarter. Social connections between the
top personnel are established before the campaign quarter but remain active when
both still serve top roles in their institutions. We strictly require that both the two
personnel studied, worked, or belonged to the same organization in the past with
an overlapped period of time as the establishment of a social tie, and present our
results by separating institutions into mutual funds, non-activist hedge funds and
non-campaign activists, and find that the results are similar in all three groups. A
connection leads to the likelihood of increasing portfolio weights of target stocks by
2.9% percent while the unconditional probability for an increase in the target stock
is 3.8%. In the cross sectional analysis, we find that the effect is stronger if the ac-
tivists have better track records and if the ties are established via club membership,
charity works, and other small circles. We rule out alternative explanations such
as skills by separating ties established via elite school attendance, and in a placebo
test on activists’ non-target stocks, we rule out similar investment styles and port-
folio choices. We investigate institutional trading before public announcements of
campaigns to look for evidence of information sharing between socially connected
institutions, and both the quarterly 13F reports and Ancerno transaction data sup-
port the information channel hypothesis. To investigate the economics behind our
findings, we look for mutual benefits for both the activists and the institutions. We
find that, on average, connected institutions earn monthly 1.56 percentage point
higher returns on target stocks during a campaign quarter. More interestingly, we
find that activists are more likely to succeed proxied by achieving at least one stated
goal in their campaign, gaining board seats and earning higher announcement re-
turns, in the presence of connected institutions. This chapter studies in detail how
the activist may utilize the social connections among institutional investors as an
information dissemination channel to build an alliance for their campaigns and such
an alliance is based on mutual benefits. It is the first and only paper pinning down
the exact channels of information sharing and alliance building.
Chapter 4 takes a step further to study the alliance building among activist
investors and institutional investors during the campaign period. We find that ac-
tively managed institutions whose managers are socially connected to the activist
tend to increase their stakes in the target firm during the activist’s campaign. More
specifically, a connected institution is 1.1 percentage points more likely to increase
its ownership in the target firm, compared to funds that are not socially connected
to the activist. When examining three types of social connections — school ties,
employment ties and other ties — we find that school ties positively affect connected
institutions’ propensity to trade the target stock during a campaign (the incremen-
tal probability is 36%), whereas employment or other ties are associated with a
higher incremental probability of trading, potentially attributed to ties established
in more recent years or the close-knit nature of the connections, such as club mem-
bership and charity work. To address endogeneity, we follow He and Huang (2017)
to use mergers and acquisitions (“M&As”) among financial institutions as plausibly
exogenous shocks to social connections. By using a subsample that includes all insti-
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tutions subject to M&As before activism events, we find that a connected institution
is 1.7 percentage points more likely to raise stakes in a target firm (the incremental
probability is 47%). This is qualitatively similar to our main analysis. Connected
institutions also perform significantly better on their investment than non-connected
institutions, generating a risk-adjusted long-short portfolio return of 0.42% to 0.51%
per month. Finally, we explore how higher success rates are achieved when target
firms are held by more connected institutions. We find that connected institu-
tions’ votes against management proposals (management-sponsored directors) are
0.9 (1.3) percentage points more than those by non-connected funds, representing
an increase of 9% (13%) in the disapproval rate. Furthermore, connected institu-
tions that purchase target stocks during a campaign are more likely to challenge
management in shareholder meetings, which presumably will benefit them more if
campaigns are successful. We also confirm that the effects exist only for meetings
during activist campaigns, but not for meetings after outcome dates. The chapter
studies specifically alliance building during the campaign period based on social ties
among activists and institutional investors. It also utilizes mergers and acquisitions
among financial institutions as exogenous shocks to social connections and connects
institutional trading and voting during activism campaigns.
In summary, the thesis empirically examines the institutional investor en-
vironment of activism target selection, information sharing, and alliance building
of hedge fund activists through past social connections. Institutional investors are
important players in corporate governance and with the introduction of various cor-
porate defence tools such as poison pills, a clever and effective way of utilising and
aligning with them is a key part in campaign success. The characterization of in-
stitutional voting and trading may further shed light on new external governance
measures and the trade-offs of exiting or remaining to wait for activists may induce
further theory development. The social network channel of information sharing and
alliance building may be of interest to policy making when investigating activists’
joint actions against firms without disclosure.
4
Chapter 2
The selection of target
companies
2.1 Introduction
Shareholder activism has seen its rises and falls in the past three decades and the
landscape is rapidly changing, from the early corporate raiders who swept the board-
rooms and dominated several M&A waves, to pension funds and mutual funds striv-
ing for entrenched management to change, to recently groups of hedge fund activists
tactically pushing changes in every aspect of governance and operations of public
and private entities on a global scale. Their force seems unstoppable yet their success
lacks explanations, and we know little about their next targets. As the landscape
changes, the players remain. The old mutual funds and pension funds are still the
dominate forces of institutional investors and their power behind the board room
cannot be ignored. This paper investigates the institutional investor background to
relate it to activist target selection by developing measures drawn from the theoret-
ical models in Edmans (2009) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) and survey findings
in McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2016).
The literature of institutional investors’ roles in governance is fruitful. Voice
is the traditional channel through which advice and discipline can be exerted by
shareholders through annual meetings, private meetings and media channels (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1986; Edmans and Holderness, 2017; Brav and Mattews, 2011). Edmans
(2009) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) innovatively modelled trading or the threat
of exit as an effective mechanism in disciplining management. McCahery, Sautner
and Starks (2016) recently surveyed institutional investors’ governance preferences
and showed that value-oriented institutional investors do use both mechanisms in
the real world: the most common means to express voice is through annual vot-
ing against management, and exit usually happens after poor stock performance.
Apart from voice and exit, the silent owners are also an important governance force
as modelled in Hirschman’s (1972) theoretical framework of exit, voice and loyalty.
This paper is based on these theoretical models as well as survey results to construct
proxies for voice, exit and remaining to capture institutional investors’ revealed pref-
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erences and to investigate whether hedge fund activists pick up such signals when
targeting stocks.
More specifically, we model institutional investor backgrounds of firms through
their annual voting behaviours and their trading and holding on the firms. These
measures are observable across all institutional holders and there are several rea-
sons why activists will pick up their signals. Firstly, institutions’ voting and trading
reflect both the fundamentals of the companies as well as investors’ perceptions.
Trading itself contains information, which is different from raw fundamentals from
company accounting reports, but rather is processed through either sophisticated
algorithms or through experiences and research. Secondly, activists usually target
companies with governance issues but generally have a good fundamental perfor-
mance (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009). Governance
quality is very hard to observe and traditional measures, such E-index (Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Ferrell, 2008) or G-index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) are almost
static. The literature has shown that disagreement with management and their sell-
ing due to company poor performance from institutional investors are important
channels through which they exert governance. Both trading and voting data are
more frequent and observable than existing firms’ internal governance measures.
Thirdly, activists generally only have a small fraction of shares in a company: their
reliance on existing shareholders is unquestionable. Institutional holders tend to
have large ownership, and compared with retail owners, they are the group that
activists will aim to build an alliance with. Selecting companies with dissatisfied
holders will gain them more popularity and give them a higher chance and more
negotiating power in tackling management.
We first proxy for dissatisfied owners based on each institution’s holding
period returns and find that institutional dissatisfaction predicts activist target se-
lection in the following quarter. Institutional dissatisfaction is measured in terms of
ownership as well as the proportion of owners. Adding the dimension of dissatisfac-
tion has more power than simple institutional ownership measure. It indicates that
a 1 percentage point increase in the dissatisfied ownership in the present quarter
will lead to a 0.012 percentage point increase in the probability of being targeted
in the next quarter. The frequency of (unconditional mean) targeting is 0.007 per
quarter. The magnitude is 1.5 times the effect of total institutional ownership in the
baseline model. When we further decompose dissatisfied owners in terms of their
stake size, we find that the medium sized owners matter the most, i.e. those between
0.5%-2% ownership owners. There has been no specific theoretical justification for
this range but Noe (2002) finds small owners are the most active in exerting gover-
nance. We can conjecture that these are influential owners but their stakes are also
not big enough to trigger another SEC filing or a campaign. As any cut-off points
to capture influential institutions are arbitrary, we use an alternative measure of
dissatisfied above-the-average owners and find similar results.
As is documented in the survey by McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2016),
institutions often use actual exit as a means to express their dissatisfaction with
companies especially after losses. We thus model both exit and dissatisfied exit to
predict activism targeting. We define an exit if the institution sells all its stakes
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in the company and makes no purchase in the following quarter. For dissatisfied
exit, we check if the institution has made a negative holding period return up to
its exit. To differentiate our paper from Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2016) and
avoid proxying for stock liquidity, we measure exit in the lagged quarter, i.e., for
each quarter of interest, the exit is measured at the quarter prior to it. Thus by
construction, the institutions in the exit group and those in the existing owners’
group are mutually exclusive. We therefore include total institutional ownership
as a control variable in the baseline model. We find that institutional exit has
a substantial impact on activism targeting: 1 percentage point ownership exited is
associated with a 0.042 percentage point increase in the likelihood of targeting while
the unconditional mean of targeting is 0.007. More importantly, when we include
dissatisfied exited ownership, the coefficient is 0.065 and is statistically significant
at 1%. Its magnitude is 1.5 times that of the simple exit measure: 1 percentage
point dissatisfied ownership exited is associated with about 10% increase in the
likelihood of being targeted. Similar to the prior investigation, when we classify
influential institutions using their stake sizes, we find that the 0.5%-2% of sellers
predict targeting better. We conjecture that their selling of medium sized stakes
may help activist stake building and signal to the market, but their stake is still not
big enough to make a huge reverse impact on price to impede their selling in the
first place. To reduce the problem of arbitrary cut-off points, we also use the large
dissatisfied sellers and find similar results.
Finally we use institutions’ past voting records to measure directly their
disagreement with management during annual voting. As is documented in the
literature, institutional investors reply on third party consultancy extensively to
vote on proposals (Cotter, Palmiter, and Thomas, 2010; Chio, Fisch, and Kaham,
2009). The main service provider is institutional shareholder service (ISS). We thus
use a more rigorous measure to capture institutions’ disagreement at their own
discretion even if ISS recommends to vote with management. We find that the
more dissatisfied institutions revealed the past voting, the more likely the company
is to be targeted. When we decompose voting into different categories similar to Li
(2016) we find that management compensation related dissatisfaction has the most
power among all in predicting subsequent activism targeting. A 1 percentage point
increase in the number of dissatisfied voters in relative to total voters is associated
with a 0.012 percentage increase in the probability of subsequent quarter targeting.
When combining both three measures we find all of them have power to
predict activism targeting and the magnitude remains similar to that from separate
analyses. So far, we have studied target selection ex ante. Based on the conjecture
that dissatisfied owners can be the potential allies or are easier to persuade for the
activists, we study ex post how the existence of dissatisfied owners affect activists’
tactics and success.
To study the cross-section of activists’ tactics after targeting, we find that
when the target has a large dissatisfied owner base, the activists tend to threaten
more often to sue management, submit shareholder proposals or other hostile ac-
tions. Since the nature of the firm should be the first order determinant for cam-
paigns, we don’t find our variables have power in predicting activists’ agendas such
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as seeking board representation, submitting proposals, or issuing a takeover bid. To
validate our conjecture that the more dissatisfied owners, the more likely the ac-
tivists may gain support from them, we use announcement return as an indicator of
investors’ perceived success of campaigns. We find that 1 percentage point increase
in the dissatisfied ownership before a campaign is associated with a 0.029 (0.041)
basis point increase in the market adjusted returns during the 10 (20) days around
the announcement. The returns are not reversed in the following quarter. Finally
we show direct evidence how dissatisfied owners vote in the annual meetings during
activism campaigns and we find that they tend to me more pro-activist especially
in management sponsored compensation related proposals.
Our results are obtained after controlling for time and firm (or industry)
fixed effects and a set of firm-level variables. We include all COMPUSTAT firms
and model activism targeting on a quarterly basis. We contribute to the literature by
modelling the revealed institutional governance preferences and relate them to the
likelihood of activism targeting. In the hedge fund activism literature, emphases
were mainly on the outcomes of campaigns. Most authors have found positive
market reaction upon campaign announcement (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas,
2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi, 2008; Clifford, 2008;
Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner, 2015). Klein and Zur (2011) investigated how
hedge fund activism affects creditors while Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2015) and Brav,
Jiang, Ma, and Tian (2017) drew attention to production and innovation. However,
the debate is on-going in the industry. The focus on campaign target selection
has only been developed recently. Appel, Gomley and Keim (2016) investigated
how the existence of passive investors influence campaign outcome. Gantchev and
Jotikasthira (2016) used institutional trading volume to predict activism targeting
and they found institutional selling provides the activist liquidity. Our paper is
different from theirs in that we focus on the governance implication of exit and thus
measure exit at the pre-announcement quarter instead of contemporaneous trading
volume.
In a recent working paper by Kedia, Starks and Wang (2016), the authors use
institutional investors’ voting patterns and past support to the activist as proxies for
activism-friendly institutions and find a positive association of market reaction upon
activism and subsequent firm value increase with the existence of these institution.
Our paper is different from it in that we measure the discontent of existing share-
holders by focusing on their trading and especially selling in the target companies.
Their model classifies institutional holders using the portfolio turnover measure in
Bushee (1998). As campaign length is over a few quarters and campaign aim and
main players often alter. In Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), the median
of campaign length is 369 days and the 25% percentile is 169 days. We also place
more emphasis on target selection instead of long term outcome. We further explore
in detail how institutional ownership size may influence activism. Both papers com-
plement each other by drawing attention to the institutional background of firms
being a crucial point for activism targeting.
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2.2 Literature review and hypotheses development
2.2.1 Hedge fund activism
In recent years, hedge fund activism has become so successful that it has gained sub-
stantial industrial as well as academic interest. Early papers have documented this
phenomenon and concluded that activists on average gain abnormal returns upon
their campaign announcement (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008; Klein and
Zur, 2009), as well as improve target firm performance in the long run, improve
innovation, and product market competitiveness (Becht, Brav, Jiang, and Kim,
2015; Aslan and Kumar, 2016). Researchers have also investigated the institutional
investor background of target firms: Appel, Gomley and Keim (2016) studied the
presence of passive holders using a discontinuity design in index inclusion/exclusion.
Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2016) found that institutional selling that provides liq-
uidity induces activist block building. Kedia, Starks and Wang (2016) proxied for
pro-activist institutions using evidence on past voting and campaign support. Brav,
Jiang, and Li (2017) estimate jointly how institutional investors vote in proxy con-
tests and how activists target firms in proxy contests. In terms of answering how
the activists interact with other institutional holders, Brav, Dasgupta, and Math-
ews (2017) modeled implicit coordination and He and Tao (2017) studied activists’
alliance building through social connections. Wong (2017) used abnormal trading
volume as proxy for wolf packing formation during campaign announcement. All
these papers have the flavour that the institutional shareholders are a non-negligible
force for the activist. In this paper we are trying to capture the institutional char-
acteristics based on their revealed governance preference of the target company and
investigate how they are associated with targeting decisions.
2.2.2 Governance through holdings
Institutional ownership has long been used as a proxy for external governance force.
An earlier study by Bushee (1998) classified institutions into “transient, dedicated,
and quasi-indexes” in terms of their pasting trading behaviour. A strand of litera-
ture recognizes the presence of passive ownership as an important governance force
(Romano, 1993; Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998; Appel, Gormley, and Keim,
2016) due to their block size as well as the fact that easy exit is not possible for
certain institutional investors such as index funds. The traditional measure of insti-
tutional governance using institutional ownership assumes that the bigger the block
size is, the more influence the holder exerts. However, identification is difficult as in-
stitutional ownership may well be associated with other variables that will influence
governance outcome. Also Noe (2002) found that there is no monotonic relation-
ship between stake size and activism. To tackle the endogeneity problem, several
authors have used index inclusion and exclusion to study the causal effect of exoge-
nous institutional ownership change on firm outcomes (Appel, Gormley, and Keim,
2016; Chang, Hong, and Liskovich, 2015). Recently more direct survey evidence has
confirmed institutional shareholders’ governance preferences. Brown, Call, Clement,
and Sharp’s (2017) survey on investor relation officers showed that large institutions
9
such as mutual funds are likely to be granted access to management, and institu-
tional holders with large stakes are more likely to receive private call-backs than
analysts after company public disclosure events (i.e., conference calls). The purpose
of the call-backs is to “convey their company’s message” (Brown, Call, Clement,
and Sharp, 2017). Interestingly, the IR officers also point out that hedge funds are
unlikely to gain access to management as they can short sell stocks.
This supports our view that hedge fund activists may utilize various channels
to gather information on companies including investigating their institutional hold-
ers’ base. Prior literature on hedge fund activism has all documented that, holding
else equal, the more institutional ownership there is in a firm, the higher the like-
lihood that the activist will target this firm (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas,
2008; Klein and Zur, 2009). However, the heterogeneity among institutional holders
is ignored in this setting. Naturally, if the existing shareholders are dissatisfied with
their portfolio companies due to poor stock performance, they will be more likely
to support an activist shareholder in making changes. Thus we hypothesize that
hedge fund activists are more likely to target firms with more dissatisfied institu-
tional owners. To provide further evidence that activists selectively target such firms
with dissatisfied owners as they may be the potential supporters, we further proxy
for activists’ perceived success using announcement returns, and study whether dis-
satisfied owners are more likely to vote pro-activist in the annual meetings during
campaigns.
2.2.3 Active governance through trading
For their influence on corporate governance through trading, the theoretical devel-
opment started in Edmans (2009) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2009). Both argue
that the force of true governance comes from the threat of blockholder exit and
Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) further noted that the credibility of exit depends on
the nature of the agency problem and the information structure. Blockholders’
exit in these models will exert downward pressure on the stock price, which hurts
management through its equity interest in the firm. Management therefore wants
to make sure its actions are such that blockholders are willing to stay with the
firm. Dasgupta and Piacentino (2015) further introduced the agency problem from
the blockholder side and their model showed that the incentive structure for fund
managers may impede them to exit, making their threat of exit less credible or ef-
fective. In McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2016), the authors surveyed institutional
investors and tried to provide direct evidence on institutional preference of trading
as governance mechanism. They found that both exit and threat of exit are used
by institutional shareholders and the actual exit usually comes after poor perfor-
mance of the firm. As threat of exit for governance purposes is unobservable, we
use actual exit and actual exit due to loss to proxy for governance through trading.
Empirically, the actual institutional exit is often associated with unobserved vari-
ables that may also affect governance outcome, thus making it difficult to establish
causality. Early papers found association with institutional exit with subsequent
CEO replacement (Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 2003). More recently, several papers
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have used quasi-experimental design to empirically test the threat of exit hypothe-
sis. Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2013) used foreign financial crises which led to
liquidity decreases in the US, and US stock market decimalization which increases
liquidity to model for the liquidity-sensitivity of firms. The presence of large share-
holder in liquidity-sensitive firms are more likely to exert credibility of exit and thus
their performance in terms of Tobin’s Q decreases more during liquidity shocks.
In our paper, instead of studying the governance outcome of institutional
trading, we base our work on the prior literature and take their trading, especially
exiting due to poor performance, as a signal of shareholder dissatisfaction. This has
several advantages. Firstly the trading is continuous and reported on a quarterly
basis which is much higher frequency than conventional measures such as G-index
or E-index to signal governance quality. Secondly, institutional trading (or exiting)
contains information not only associated with company fundamentals but also the
institution’s perception of its prospects. Thirdly, we focus on institutional trad-
ing instead of trading volumes in that institutional investors as a whole are more
governance-oriented than retail investors and their consensus movement is more in-
formative than that of retail investors. As selling can be due to various reasons, to
be consistent with the survey evidence, we focus on studying the signal of dissat-
isfied exit. We hypothesize that the more dissatisfied sellers of a company are, the
more likely the activist will target it.
2.2.4 Active governance through voice
Active governance through voice takes various forms: annual voting, shareholder
days, private meetings, and so on. McCahery, Sautner and Starks’ (2011) survey
listed these specific channels their sample institutions have undertaken. The most
frequent form is to vote against management at the annual meeting, followed by
discussing with the executive board and supervisory board, submitting shareholder
proposals, initiating lawsuits against managers, and publicly criticizing executive
board members (McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 2011).
Among all the channels, voting is most common and can be widely observed.
During annual meetings, shareholders directly exert their rights and make decisions
on firms’ strategy, governance, executive compensation and other issues. Their votes
reveal their preference on various aspects of the running of the firm and their sat-
isfaction of the in-charge management and board. By comparing their votes and
management recommendations, we can easily measure shareholders’ disagreement
with management and use it as a proxy for shareholder discontent. Other voice
channels, especially private meetings and actual discussions, are unobservable. We
thus take voting as the main voice channel. We hypothesize that the more institu-
tions that disagree with the company management during the annual meeting, the
more likely the activist will target this company.
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Figure 2.1: Hedge fund campaigns from 2004 to 2014
This figure plots the number of campaigns issued by hedge funds activists from 2004 to 2014
and the number of unique activists. They are aligned with the left axis. Total number of
firms in the control sample from the same period are plotted according to the right axis.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Hedge fund activism campaigns
Hedge fund activism is defined in Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) as
when an investor acquires 5% or more of a publicly traded firm with the intention
to influence its operation, strategy or management. A Schedule 13D is required to
be filed to the SEC within 10 days of exceeding 5% ownership where the activist is
required to disclose their purpose of transaction in item 4. We obtain hedge fund
activism data from Schedule 13D filings and SharkRepellent which also contains
campaigns that are announced in the media without the lead activist exceeding 5%
ownership. Our comprehensive list of campaigns launched by activist hedge funds
spans 1994 to 2014. Our sample starts in 2004 after matching with ISS voting
analytics. We manually collect the following information: the activist’s filing date
or press release date, the activist’s name and its ownership in the target company
at disclosure, the tactics the activist uses, and the name and CUSIP of the target
firm. A detailed definition and description of tactics can be found in sub section
2.8.1 when we investigate campaigns at cross section.
Our campaign sample starts with 3,101 unique activism events from fiscal
year 1994 to 2014. Since the annual voting data range from 2004 to 2014, by merging
with them, we reduce the sample period from quarter ending 30 June 2004 to quarter
ending 31 March 2015. There are initially 2,144 campaigns with 465 unique activists
during this period and the sample is reduced to 1,021 unique campaigns with 286
unique activists after it is merged with ISS voting analytics, CRSP, Compustat, and
the Thomson Reuters institutional ownership database. After teasing out missing
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values, negative book values and over-100% institutional aggregated ownership, we
obtain the final sample with 874 (892) target-quarter pairs (unique campaigns) with
257 unique activists.
We take all COMPUSTAT firms with data available in the ISS voting analyt-
ics database, CRSP, and the Thomson Reuters institutional ownership database as
the control sample. All our variables are constructed on a firm-quarter basis. Figure
2.1 plots the fiscal frequency of activist campaigns and the number of unique lead
activists from 2004 to 2014. They are aligned with the left axis. Total number of
firms in the control sample from the same period are plotted according to the right
axis. Consistent with past papers on hedge fund activism, campaign activity peaked
in 2007 (He and Tao, 2017), before dropping significantly during the financial crisis
and then increased in more recent years. On average the occurrence of activism
campaign is 3.4% annually and 0.7% quarterly.
We present the summary statistics of a set of company characteristics of tar-
get firms in comparisons to that of controls firms in Table 2.1. For both samples,
we report mean, standard deviation and median of the quarterly reported market
capitalization (MV), book-to-market (BM), dividend yield, past returns, Amihuld
illiquitidy (Amihud, 2002) and E-index in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008). Col-
umn (1) and (2) are correspondent to the target and control sample respectively.
Column (3) reports the difference and t-statistics between the two samples. Consis-
tent with past literature that target firms are significantly smaller than control firms,
have a higher book-to-market ratio, pay less dividend, and underperform during the
quarter before targeting. There is no significant difference between the target and
the control sample in terms of governance quality measured as E-index.
2.3.2 Institutional ownership
We obtain ownership data from Thomson Reuters 13F institutional ownership database.
Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, investment firms with over $100
million of US equities are required to report their US equity holdings in a Form
13F within 45 days of calendar quarter ending March 31, June 30, September 30
and December 31. Thus our institutional trading measures are on a quarterly ba-
sis. We obtain the following information: the reporting quarter end, the identity
of the institutional holders, the stock information including the CUSIP, the name,
the number of shares outstanding, the end of quarter share price, and the total
number of shares of the company they hold. We delete companies with institutional
ownership over 100% which may be due to data error. For companies without end
of quarter share price and shares outstanding reported in 13F, we match them with
CRSP and COMPUSTAT to obtain the information.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of firm fundamentals
This table reports the characteristics of fundamentals of sample firms. Column (1) presents
the means, standard deviations, and medians of characteristics for the target companies.
Column (2) reports the means, standard deviations, and medians of characteristics for the
firms in the control sample which covers all COMPUSTAT firms with data available on
CRSP, ISS voting analytics, and 13F database. Column (3) reports the differences between
the target and control sample. MV is the market value of equity measured in billions of
dollars. B/M is book value of equity divided by market value of equity. Dividend yield
is (common dividend + preferred dividend)/(market value of common stock + book value
of preferred stock). Past return is the buy-and-hold stock quarterly return. Illiquidity is
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure computed as quarterly average (using daily data) of
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√|ret|/dollar trading volume. E-index is the entrenchment index based on six provi-
sions in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrel (2008) and the higher the index value, the more en-
trenched the management. The rest of the variables are campaign related and reported for
target companies only. Takeover = 1 if the activist issues a takeover bid. Threat = 1 when
the activist threat to sue the management or submit shareholder proposals. Boardrep = 1
when the activist seeks position on the board of directors and pro = 1 if the activist actually
submit shareholder proposal to the target companies. Return [−5,+5] (Return [−10,+10])
is the cumulative abnormal return during the [−5,+5] ([−10,+10]) trading day window
around campaign announcement and emph Return [−2,+60] is the long term cumulative
abnormal returns from two trading days prior to announcement till a quarter afterwards. ∗,
∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
VARIABLES Target sample Control sample Comparison 
 Mean 
(1a) 
SD 
(1b) 
Median 
(1c) 
Mean 
(2a) 
SD 
(2b) 
Median 
(2c) 
Difference 
(3a) 
t-statistics 
(3b) 
MV ($ billions) 1.719 4.139 0.412 4.939 13.109 0.884 3.219*** 7.23 
BM 0.779 0.593 0.638 0.659 0.528 0.536 -0.120*** -6.68 
Dividend yield 0.002 0.004 0 0.004 0.006 0 0.002*** 9.15 
Past return -0.035 0.202 -0.039 0.005 0.188 -0.005 0.040*** 6.28 
Illiquidity 0.152 0.246 0.075 0.127 0.242 0.053 -0.025** -2.97 
E_index 2.957 1.351 3 2.953 1.393 3 -0.004 -0.05 
takeover 0.034 0.180 0      
threat 0.112 0.316 0      
boardrep 0.209 0.406 0      
pro 0.141 0.348 0      
Ret [-5,+5] 0.041 0.107 0.032      
Ret [-10,+10] 0.043 0.148 0.032      
Ret [-2,+60] 0.027 0.205 0.020      
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2.4 Dissatisfied owners
2.4.1 Measures
Our measure of institution dissatisfaction is not a simple company performance
measure as different institutions purchase and sell the companies at different times
and the actual gain and loss is dependent on the timing. We measure dissatisfied
institution based on the basis adjusted price developed in Frazzini (2006). For each
institution j and its portfolio company i at quarter end t, we compute:
Basis adjusted pricei,j,t =
∑t
n=0 Si,j,t−n,tPi,t−n∑t
n=0 Si,j,t−n,t
(2.1)
In the equation, Si,j,t−n,t is the number of shares at quarter end t held by
the institution j in the company i which had been initially purchased at quarter end
t−n.Pi,t−n is the share price of company i at the initial purchase quarter end t−n.
We require that Si,j,t−n,t > 0 for n = 0, 1, , t, which means continuous holding from
quarter end t− n to t.
Intuitively, shares of a company owned at each quarter end are treated as
inventories with end of quarter share price as a proxy for its unit value. Based on a
first-in-first-out principle, at the end of each quarter, we calculate the average unit
price from all past holdings history and compare this bases adjusted price with the
actual end of quarter share price. For each quarter end t, company i and institution
j, we define:
Dissatisfactioni,j,t =
{
1 if Basis adjusted pricei,j,t < Pi,t
0 if Basis adjusted pricei,j,t >= Pi,t
(2.2)
where Pi,t is the share price of company i at quarter end t.
One thing to notice, in order to calculate basis adjusted price, we require
that the ownership exist for at least two consecutive quarters. Since we do not
observe the exact time in a quarter when the stakes are acquired, we cannot easily
classify dissatisfied owners if they only acquire the shares for less than one quarter.
We address this problem by classifying them into Dissatisfaction = 0 group and
argue that these new owners, on average, should not determine the institutional
governance profile of companies. New holders may not have as much information on
the company as other long term holders: this information can be soft information
such as access to management and so on. As is shown in McCahery, Sautner and
Starks (2016), long term holders engage more with companies and intervene more
intensively than short term owners. Thus short term owners, their existence and
trading may not matter as much as long term holders to the activist.
Next we aggregate individual institutional dissatisfaction to the firm level.
First we aggregate the total dissatisfied ownership:
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Dissatisfied ownershipi,t =
J∑
j=1
dissatisfactioni,j,t × ownershipi,j,t (2.3)
We also create an alternative proxy to capture the proportion of dissatisfied
owners of all owners:
% Dissatisfied ownersi,t =
∑J
j=1 dissatisfactioni,j,t
J
(2.4)
where J is the total number of institutional holders.
As is shown both in theory and in empirical work, the stake size does not
necessarily matter linearly in exerting governance power (Noe, 2002), instead of
studying all institutional holders, we impose some restrictions on their ownership
stakes. The dummy variable Iφi,j,t = 1 for fund j’s stake in company i at the end
of quarter t if it satisfies certain restrictions φ. We explore different restrictions by
setting the minimum ownerships (φ) to be included in the sample as 0.5%, 2%, 5%,
and 10% respectively. Thus we modify the two measures as:
> φ dissatisfied ownershipi,t =
J∑
j=1
dissatisfactioni,j,t × ownershipi,j,t × Iφi,j,t (2.5)
> φ% dissatisfied ownersi,t =
∑J
j=1 dissatisfactioni,j,t × Iφi,j,t
J
(2.6)
2.4.2 Summary statistics of (dissatisfied) owners
We report a summary of institutional ownership in Table 2.2. Panel A reports
ownership as the proportion of shares held by institutional investors and panel B
reports the fraction of certain institutional owners out of all institutional owners.
Panels (A1) and (B1) measure all institutional owners and panels (A2) and (B2)
report dissatisfied institutional owners only. Column (1) and (2) presents the mean,
standard deviation, and medium of characteristics for the target sample and control
sample respectively. Column (3) reports the difference and t-statistics between them.
O total (O neg) is the total (dissatisfied) institutional ownership. O φ (O neg φ) is
the aggregated (dissatisfied) institutional ownership if the (dissatisfied) institution
hold more than φ shares of the company (defined in equation 2.5). PO φ (PO neg φ)
is the proportion of (dissatisfied) institutional owners with more than φ shares of
the company out of total number of institutional investors (defined in equation 2.6).
φ equals to 0.5%, 2%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics of institutional ownership
This table reports the characteristics of institutional ownership of sample firms. Panel A
reports ownership as the proportion of shares held by institutional investors and panel B
reports the fractions of certain institutional owners out of all institutional owners. Panel
(A1) and (B1) measures all institutional owners and panel (A2) and (B2) reports dissat-
isfied institutional owners only. The definition of dissatisfied institutional owners can be
found in equation 2.2. Column (1) presents the means, standard deviations, and medians
of characteristics for the target companies. Column (2) reports the means, standard devi-
ations, and medians of characteristics for the firms in the control sample which covers all
COMPUSTAT firms with data available on CRSP, ISS voting analytics, and 13F database.
Column (3) reports the differences between the target and control sample. O total (O neg)
is the total (dissatisfied) institutional ownership. O φ (O neg φ) is the aggregated (dissat-
isfied) institutional ownership if the (dissatisfied) institution hold more than φ shares of
the company defined in equation 2.5. PO φ (PO neg φ) is the proportion of (dissatisfied)
institutional owners with more than φ shares of the company out of total number of insti-
tutional investors defined in equation 2.6. φ equals to 0.5%, 2%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
O neg large is defined in equation 2.7 as the aggregated large dissatisfied institutional own-
ership. PO neg large is defined in equation 2.8 as the proportion of large (owners more
than average) dissatisfied owners out of all institutional owners. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: owners (ownership) 
VARIABLES Target Control Comparison 
 
A1: Owner 
Mean 
(1a) 
SD 
(1b) 
Median 
(1c) 
Mean 
(2a) 
SD 
(2b) 
Median 
(2c) 
Difference 
(3a) 
t-statistics 
(3b) 
O_total 0.694 0.211 0.736 0.634 0.243 0.686 -0.061*** -7.33 
O_0.5% 0.602 0.187 0.632 0.525 0.214 0.553 -0.077*** -10.60 
O_2% 0.445 0.160 0.457 0.366 0.176 0.372 -0.079*** -13.10 
O_5% 0.240 0.141 0.231 0.190 0.142 0.175 -0.050*** -10.35 
O_10% 0.0778 0.106 0 0.0631 0.106 0 -0.015*** -4.07 
         
A2: Dissatisfied owner Mean SD Median Mean SD Median difference t-statistics 
O_neg 0.350 0.294 0.324 0.243 0.269 0.137 -0.107*** -11.68 
O_neg_0.5% 0.310 0.267 0.277 0.207 0.236 0.108 -0.104*** -12.88 
O_neg _2% 0.238 0.219 0.191 0.151 0.186 0.063 -0.088*** -13.80 
O_neg _5% 0.136 0.152 0.083 0.081 0.125 0 -0.055*** -12.84 
O_neg _10% 0.047 0.090 0 0.028 0.076 0 -0.018*** -7.03 
O_neg_large 0.300 0.256 0.271 0.208 0.234 0.112 -0.092*** -11.48 
         
Panel B: owners (number %) 
B1: Owner Mean SD Median Mean SD Median difference t-statistics 
PO_0.5% 0.263 0.114 0.260 0.204 0.109 0.201 -0.059*** -15.84 
PO _2% 0.108 0.066 0.100 0.075 0.057 0.064 -0.034*** -17.42 
PO_5% 0.039 0.037 0.028 0.024 0.028 0.016 -0.015*** -15.39 
PO_10% 0.008 0.015 0 0.005 0.012 0 -0.003*** -6.99 
         
B2: Dissatisfied owner Mean SD Median Mean SD Median difference t-statistics 
PO_neg 0.467 0.339 0.542 0.364 0.335 0.305 -0.103*** -9.06 
PO_neg_0.5% 0.140 0.127 0.124 0.087 0.105 0.043 -0.053*** -14.82 
PO_neg _2% 0.062 0.068 0.043 0.035 0.050 0.011 -0.028*** -16.11 
PO_neg _5% 0.024 0.034 0.009 0.012 0.023 0 -0.012*** -14.97 
PO_neg _10% 0.005 0.013 0 0.003 0.009 0 -0.003*** -8.63 
PO_neg_large 0.111 0.090 0.114 0.082 0.085 0.057 -0.030*** -10.35 
 
On average, the total institutional ownership of the campaign sample is
69.4%, 6.1 percentage points higher than that of the control sample. This is consis-
tent with the literature, that activists tend to target companies with a higher con-
centration of institutional ownership. When we only consider the aggregated owner-
17
ship that exceeds a certain threshold (> φ ownershipi,t =
∑J
j=1 ownershipi,j,t× Iφi,j,t
where Iφi,j,t = 1 if ownershipi,j,t > φ, and φ = 0.5%, 2%, 5%, and10% respectively),
all measures of the target companies are significantly higher than those of the con-
trol sample. Interestingly, it seems that the difference of total ownership between
target and control samples is mostly from the lower end of the thresholds: the dif-
ference of aggregated ownership from over 0.5%-owners (2%-owners) between the
target and control group is 7.7% (7.9%), higher than the 6.1% difference when we
consider all owners regardless of stake size. These medium sized holders with 0.5%
to 2% ownership are the main driving force behind the difference in institutional
ownership between the target and control sample and may be the main potential
allies or supporters the activists need to rely on. This is reasonable in that the
activists’ stakes are relatively larger and their medium sized stakes are influential
but will not be big enough to de-incentivize activists’ costly campaigns. This can
also be shown in the ratio of the number of large owners relative to the number
of total instuitional owners. There are 0.059% (0.034%) owners of over 0.5% (2%)
ownership of the target companies, significantly higher than the control group. The
difference becomes much smaller when we increase the threshold. It shows that
there is a majority of institutional owners with ownership between 0.5% to 2% who
are driving the total ownership difference between the target sample and control
sample.
When comparing our main variable, the dissatisfied ownership, between the
target and control sample, we find that the difference is 10.7 percentage points and
is statistically significant. The ratio of dissatisfied owners to total owners is also
significantly higher in target companies. Almost half (46.7%) of the institutional
owners in the target company before the campaign quarter experienced negative
holding period return while that of the control sample is 36.4%. When we further
restrict to large dissatisfied owners with different cut-off points, we find the signifi-
cant difference in terms of ownership as well as the fraction of owners exists across
all ownership size groups. Consistent with the previous findings, the difference in
the dissatisfied ownership between the target and control samples also comes from
medium sized owners with between 0.5% to 2% ownership. Interestingly, in terms
of the number of dissatisfied owners, it seems that there are more small dissatisfied
owners (ownership less than 0.5%) as the difference of the proportion of dissatisfied
over 0.5%-owners out of total owners between the target and control sample is 0.053
while that without ownership restriction is 0.103.
Since the ownership threshold seems to be arbitrary, we also calculate the
average institutional ownership in company i at the end of quarter t and only include
those exceeding the average. In this specification, IAi,j,t = 1if ownershipi,j,t >=
ownershipi,t and we modify the two measures as:
Large dissatisfied ownershipi,t =
J∑
j=1
dissatisfactioni,j,t × ownershipi,j,t × IAi,j,t
(2.7)
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%Large dissatisfied ownersi,t =
∑J
j=1 dissatisfactioni,j,t × IAi,j,t
J
(2.8)
The summary statistics of large dissatisfied owners are also presented in table
2.2 where O neg large as defined in equation 2.7 is the aggregated large dissatisfied
institutional ownership and PO neg large as defined in equation 2.8 is the propor-
tion of large (owners more than average) dissatisfied owners out of all institutional
owners.The difference of large dissatisfied ownership between the target and control
sample is 0.092 and is statistically significant at 1%, similar to that when we use
all institutions regardless of their stakes. In terms of the proportions, 11.1% of all
owners in the target companies are large and dissatisfied ones compared with 8.2%
in the control sample. The 3.1% difference between them is still smaller than 10.3%
when using all dissatisfied owners, which further confirms that the target firms have
more small owners (stake <0.5%) in terms of numbers than the control firms.
The simple decomposition of ownership in terms of dissatisfaction and stake
size has revealed that target firms have a higher concentration of dissatisfied institu-
tional holders. Medium sized dissatisfied owners (ownerships between 0.5% to 2%)
are the driving force of ownership difference while, in numbers, there are more small
sized dissatisfied owners (ownerships less than 0.5%) concentrated in target firms
before a campaign announcement.
2.4.3 Regression results for dissatisfied owners
Are activists more likely to target companies with more dissatisfied in-
stitutional owners?
In this sub section, we investigate whether the existence of dissatisfied owners affect
activists’ target selection by running the following regression:
Targeti,t+1 = α+ β × dissatisfied ownersi,t + γ × Zi,t + θt + δi + εi,t (2.9)
Targeti,t+1 = 1 if company i is targeted during the quarter that ends at t+1.
Zi,t is a set of firm controls measured at the end of the quarter t, including the
logarithm of market capitalization, book-to-market value, dividend yield, E-index,
stock return and Amihuld illiquidity (Amihuld, 2002). For our main variable of
interest, dissatisfied ownersi,t, we use two different specifications discussed in the
previous subsection and the results are discussed in the next paragraph. We also
include firm (industry) fixed effect δi and time fixed effect θt.
To explore how different decomposition of institutional ownership is asso-
ciated with subsequent activism targeting, we present the regression coefficient in
Table 2.3. Columns (1) to (5) report the results for baseline models using different
specifications of institutional owners and columns (6) to (10) report the results for
different specifications of dissatisfied owners. O rest is the difference between total
institutional ownership and certain ownership decomposition. For example, in col-
19
umn (1) O rest is the difference between O total and O 0.5%. All other independent
variables are as defined in Table 2.1 and 2.2. In each column we report coefficients
and their clustered standard errors.
Table 2.3: An analysis of institutional owners and target selection
This table applies a linear probability model to examine how different institutional ownership
decomposition, especially how dissatisfied ownership, predicts the activist target selection.
O rest is the difference between total institutional ownership and certain ownership decom-
position. For example, in column (1) O rest is the difference between O total and O 0.5%.
All other independent variables are as defined in Table 2.1 and 2.2. In each column we
report coefficients and their clustered standard errors. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES target target target target target target target target target target 
           
O_total 0.008***          
 (0.003)          
O_rest  0.005 0.002 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.007** 0.008*** 
  (0.014) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
O_0.5%  0.008***         
  (0.003)         
O_2%   0.010***        
   (0.003)        
O_5%    0.000       
    (0.004)       
O_10%     -0.000      
     (0.005)      
O_neg      0.012***     
      (0.003)     
O_neg_0.5%       0.012***    
       (0.003)    
O_neg_2%        0.014***   
        (0.004)   
O_neg_5%         0.012***  
         (0.004)  
O_neg_10%          0.007 
          (0.006) 
LogMV -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BM 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dividend  -0.140* -0.140* -0.141* -0.138* -0.142* -0.155** -0.154** -0.151** -0.143* -0.140* 
yield (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) 
Past return -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Illiquidity -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005* -0.005** -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* -0.005** -0.005** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
           
Observations 116,412 116,412 116,412 116,412 116,412 116,412 116,412 116,412 116,412 116,412 
R-squared 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Qtr FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
 
Consistent with the literature (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008;
Klein and Zur, 2009), the baseline model in column (1) shows that activists tend
to target small, value firms with poor past performance and good liquidity (this
is different from what is shown in the summary statistics table as we impose firm
and time fixed effects). The positive significant coefficient of total ownership shows
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that the higher the total institutional ownership, the more likely the company is to
be a target. This is consistent with our summary statistics and previous literature
(Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008). When we restrict to large institutional
ownership using different cut-off points (ownership over 0.5%, 2%, 5%, and 10% re-
spectively), the coefficient on ownership become both statistically and economically
insignificant for over-5% and over-10% owners, while it remains similar to that of
the baseline model for over-0.5% and over-2% owners. This is consistent with the
findings in the previous subsection that activists tend to target firms with more
institutional ownership and it comes from many medium-sized stake holders rather
than from large owners. More importantly, when we include dissatisfied ownership
in column (6), the coefficient of the rest of institutional ownership becomes smaller
and significant at 10%. The coefficient of dissatisfied ownership is 0.012 and signifi-
cant at 1%. The magnitude is 1.5 times the effect of total institutional ownership in
the baseline model. When we decompose dissatisfied ownership further into differ-
ent size-cut-off points from columns (7) to (10), the effect of dissatisfied ownership
persists in all specifications apart from over-10% dissatisfied owners’ group.
Drawn from the findings in the exploratory stage in the previous paragraph,
we present the main results of how dissatisfied ownership affects targeting selection
in Table 2.4. In panel A, we use measures of dissatisfied owners as fractions of shares
while panel B uses the proportion of certain institutions out of all institutions. In
column (1) of each panel, we use all dissatisfied owners and in column (2) we restrict
to large owners whose ownership exceeds the average. In each specification, we also
include E-index as a governance quality measure and the sample size is reduced
substantially due to data availability but the results remain unchanged. We include
firm (industry) fixed effect and time fixed effects. The coefficients on (large) dissat-
isfied ownership and the fraction of (large) owners are both statistically significant
and economically meaningful. A 1 percentage point increase in the (large) dissatis-
fied ownership in the present quarter will lead to the increase in the probability of
being targeted by 0.016 (0.017) percentage points in the next quarter (columns (1b)
and (2b)). As the unconditional mean of targeting is 0.007, 1 standard deviation
increase of the fraction of (large) dissatisfied owners leads to the increase in the
targeting probability by 24% (25%).
Table 2.4: An analysis of dissatisfied institutional owners and target selection
This table applies a linear probability model to examine how (large) dissatisfied institutional
ownership predicts the activist target selection. Panel A measures dissatisfaction from
owners as fraction of shares while panel B uses the proportion of certain institutions out
of all institutional investors. O rest is the difference between total institutional ownership
and certain ownership decomposition. For example, in panel A, column (1a) O rest is the
difference between total institutional ownership and O neg. All other independent variables
are as defined in Table 2.1 and 2.2. In each column we report coefficients and we report
coefficients and their clustered standard errors. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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 Panel A: aggregated dissatisfied ownership 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) 
VARIABLES target target target target target target target target 
         
O_neg 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.013***     
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)     
O_neg_large     0.013*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 
     (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
LogMV -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
BM 0.002* 0.004*** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.002* 0.004*** 0.006** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Dividend yield -0.155** -0.134*** -0.135 -0.126* -0.154** -0.133*** -0.135 -0.126* 
 (0.076) (0.047) (0.089) (0.068) (0.076) (0.047) (0.089) (0.068) 
Past return -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Illiquidity -0.005* -0.000 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005* -0.000 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.011) (0.003) 
O_rest 0.005* 0.010*** 0.007 0.008*** 0.006* 0.010*** 0.007 0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) 
E_index   0.001*** 0.000   0.001*** 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 116,412 116,412 59,101 59,101 116,412 116,412 59,101 59,101 
R-squared 0.065 0.008 0.069 0.008 0.065 0.008 0.069 0.008 
Firm FE Y  Y  Y  Y  
Industry FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Qtr FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
 
 Panel B: proportions of dissatisfied owners 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) 
VARIABLES target target target target target target target target 
         
PO_neg 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004***     
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)     
PO_neg_large     0.020*** 0.019*** 0.031*** 0.022*** 
     (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
LogMV -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
BM 0.002* 0.004*** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.002* 0.004*** 0.006** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Dividend yield -0.161** -0.132*** -0.145 -0.128* -0.155** -0.129*** -0.139 -0.122* 
 (0.076) (0.047) (0.089) (0.068) (0.075) (0.047) (0.089) (0.068) 
Past return -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Illiquidity -0.005** -0.001 -0.008 -0.005 -0.006** -0.001 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.011) (0.003) 
E_index   0.001*** 0.000   0.001*** 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.000) 
O_total 0.008** 0.013*** 0.009* 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.009* 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) 
         
         
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 116,412 116,412 59,101 59,101 116,412 116,412 59,101 59,101 
R-squared 0.065 0.008 0.069 0.008 0.065 0.008 0.069 0.008 
Firm FE Y  Y  Y  Y  
Ind FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Qtr FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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2.5 Dissatisfied sellers
2.5.1 Measures
A few theoretical papers (Edmans, 2009; Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Dasgupta
and Piacentino, 2015) have established that institutional exit or threat of exit is also
an effective way of institutional investors exerting external governance. According
to McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2016), a majority of institutional holders have
exited due to poor performance and they have also documented that the number
of institutions that exited is as important as the amount of ownership sold for the
threat of exit to be effective. As selling can be due to various reasons such as
portfolio rebalancing, we concentrate on total exit due to dissatisfied performance.
For each quarter end t, we define fund j as a seller if it exits all its ownership of
company i at the end of quarter t− 1 and holds 0 shares at quarter ending t:
Total exiti,j,t =
{
1 if ownershipi,j,t−1 = ownershipi,j,t = 0 and ownershipi,j,t−2 > 0
0 otherwise
(2.10)
For each company i at the end of each quarter t, we first calculate:
Sold dissatisfied ownershipi,t =
J∑
j=1
total exiti,j,t × dissatisfactioni,j,t−2 × ownershipi,j,t−2
(2.11)
And according to McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2016), institutional in-
vestors regard selling by other institutions for the same reason as imposing more
threat of exit on companies, we thus calculate the alternative proxy to capture the
group pressure:
% Dissatisfied sellersi,t =
∑J
j=1 total exiti,j,t × dissatisfactioni,j,t∑J
j=1 total exiti,j,t
(2.12)
We emphasize that the sample of sellers is mutually exclusive from that of
owners by construction, as we require the sale happen before the quarter t thus the
ownership of sellers is 0 throughout quarter t.
Stake size also matters in the effect of exit or threat of exit: the larger the
size, the bigger the price impact, and thus the disciplinary effect, but if the size
is too big, selling becomes difficult and the negative price impact due to illiquidity
increases the cost of selling. Thus we impose the same restrictions on sellers’ stakes.
The dummy variable Iφi,j,t = 1 if fund j’s stake sold in company i at the end of
quarter t− 1 satisfies certain restrictions φ. We set the minimum stake (φ) sold to
be included in the sample as 0.5%, 2%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Thus we modify
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the two measures as:
> φ sold dissatisfied ownershipi,t =
J∑
j=1
total exiti,j,t × dissatisfactioni,j,t × ownershipi,j,t × Iφi,j,t
(2.13)
> φ% dissatisfied sellersi,t =
∑J
j=1 total exiti,j,t × dissatisfactioni,j,t × Iφi,j,t∑J
j=1 total exiti,j,t
(2.14)
2.5.2 Summary statistics of (dissatisfied) sellers
To be consistent with the previous analysis, we report both sold ownership and sold
dissatisfied ownership with different threshold cut-off points in Table 2.5. Panel A
reports sold ownership as the proportion of shares and panel B reports the fraction
of certain institutional sellers out of all institutional sellers. Panels (A1) and (B1)
report all institutional sellers and panel (A2) and (B2) report only dissatisfied insti-
tutional sellers. Columns (1) and (2) present the means, standard deviations, and
medians of characteristics for the target sample and control sample. Column (3)
reports the difference and t-statistics between the target and control sample. S φ
(S neg φ) is the aggregated (dissatisfied) institutional ownership sold if the (dis-
satisfied) institution holds more than φ shares of the company (defined in equation
2.13). PS φ (PS neg φ) is the proportion of (dissatisfied) institutional sellers with
over φ shares of the company out of total number of institutional sellers (defined in
equation 2.14). φ equals to 0.5%, 2%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics of institutional sellers
This table reports the characteristics of institutional sellers of sample firms. Panel A reports
sold ownership as the proportion of shares and panel B reports the fractions of certain
institutional sellers out of all institutional sellers. At the quarter end t, a seller is defined as
the institution which has sold all its ownership before the quarter starts and the ownership
remain 0 during the quarter (equation 2.10). Panels (A1) and (B1) report all institutional
sellers and panels (A2) and (B2) report only dissatisfied institutional sellers. The definition
of dissatisfaction can be found in equation (2). Column (1) presents the means, standard
deviations, and medians of characteristics for the target companies. Column (2) reports the
means, standard deviations, and medians of characteristics for the firms in the control sample
which covers all COMPUSTAT firms with data available on CRSP, ISS voting analytics, and
13F database. Column (3) reports the differences between the target and control samples.
S total (S neg) is the total (dissatisfied) institutional ownership sold. S φ (S neg φ) is the
aggregated (dissatisfied) institutional ownership sold if the (dissatisfied) institution holds
more than φ shares of the company. S neg large is defined in equation 2.15 as the aggregated
large dissatisfied institutional ownership sold if the institution owns more than the average.
PS φ (PS neg φ) is the proportion of (dissatisfied) institutional sellers with over φ shares
of the company out of total number of institutional sellers. PS neg large is defined in
equation 2.16 as the proportion of large dissatisfied sellers out of all institutional sellers. φ
equals to 0.5%, 2%, 5%, and 10% respectively. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: sellers (units measured in ownership) 
VARIABLES Target Control Comparison 
 
A1: Sellers 
Mean 
(1a) 
SD 
(1b) 
Median 
(1c) 
Mean 
(2a) 
SD 
(2b) 
Median 
(2c) 
Difference 
(3a) 
t-statistics 
(3b) 
S_total 0.064 0.068 0.047 0.043 0.046 0.029 -0.022*** -13.64 
S_0.5% 0.048 0.061 0.030 0.029 0.042 0.016 -0.018*** -12.88 
S_2% 0.026 0.049 0 0.015 0.034 0 -0.011*** -9.75 
S_5% 0.011 0.036 0 0.006 0.025 0 -0.005*** -5.51 
S_10% 0.001 0.015 0 0.001 0.016 0 -0.000 -0.19 
         
A2: Dissatisfied sellers Mean SD Median Mean SD Median difference t-statistics 
S_neg 0.027 0.043 0.010 0.014 0.029 0.002 -0.013*** -12.97 
S_neg_0.5% 0.021 0.040 0 0.010 0.026 0 -0.011*** -12.02 
S_neg _2% 0.012 0.034 0 0.006 0.021 0 -0.007*** -8.99 
S_neg _5% 0.005 0.026 0 0.002 0.016 0 -0.003*** -5.03 
S_neg _10% 0.001 0.011 0 0.001 0.010 0 -0.000 -0.88 
S_neg_large 0.019 0.038 0 0.010 0.025 0 -0.009*** -10.72 
         
Panel B: sellers (number %) 
B1: Sellers Mean SD Median Mean SD Median difference t-statistics 
PS_0.5% 0.145 0.132 0.120 0.098 0.114 0.067 -0.047*** -12.11 
PS_2% 0.038 0.072 0 0.022 0.056 0 -0.016*** -8.49 
PS_5% 0.008 0.030 0 0.005 0.026 0 -0.003*** -3.41 
PS_10% 0.000 0.005 0 0.001 0.010 0 0.000 0.39 
         
B2: Dissatisfied sellers Mean SD Median Mean SD Median difference t-statistics 
PS_neg 0.350 0.297 0.357 0.268 0.284 0.174 -0.082*** -8.47 
PS_neg_0.5% 0.064 0.095 0 0.034 0.075 0 -0.030*** -11.84 
PS_neg _2% 0.019 0.049 0 0.009 0.037 0 -0.010*** -7.72 
PS_neg _5% 0.004 0.024 0 0.002 0.018 0 -0.002*** -3.71 
PS_neg _10% 0.000 0.005 0 0.000 0.007 0 -0.000 -0.39 
PS_neg_large 0.049 0.072 0 0.031 0.062 0 -0.018*** -8.60 
 
On average, the total exited ownership of the campaign sample is 6.4%,
while that of the control sample is 4.3%, the difference is statistically significant
at 1%. When we only consider the aggregated ownership sold if it exceeds certain
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threshold (Large sold ownershipi,t =
∑J
j=1 total exiti,j,t×ownershipi,j,t×Iφi,j,t where
Iφi,j,t = 1 if ownershipi,j,t > φ, and φ = 0.5%, 2%, 5%, and10% respectively), all the
target companies’ large exited ownership is higher than that of the control sample
and statistically significant apart from the over-10% sellers. By comparing the
magnitude of the difference between the target and control sample for different cut-
off points, it seems that it is the lower bound (0.5% to 2%) sellers who are driving
the difference. This becomes more obvious when we look at the ratio of large sellers
to all sellers. 14.5% (9.8%) of all sellers are those who had ownership over 0.5%
in the target sample (control sample), while over-2% sellers only count for 3.8%
(2.2%) of all sellers. This is consistent with the price impact theory that investors
tend not to sell large stakes due to the adverse price impact. By comparing the
sellers of different stake sizes, it seems that the medium-sized (0.5%-2%) sellers
drive the difference in ownership sold between the target and control samples. This
is plausible in that these sellers were relatively large holders and their exiting can
signal for the future prospect of the company but their stakes were also not large
enough to make excess price impact adversely impede their selling decision.
When comparing our main variable, the dissatisfied sold ownership, between
the target and control sample, we find that there is 1.3% more dissatisfied own-
ership sold before the targeting quarter than the other quarters. The difference is
statistically significant. In correspondence, 35.0% (26.8%) of all sellers for the target
sample (control sample) are dissatisfied sellers. When we further restrict to large
dissatisfied ownership sold with different cut-off points to investigate the impact of
stake sizes, we find similar significant differences between the target and control
samples across all groups apart from the over-10% group. Consistent with the pre-
vious findings, the difference in the dissatisfied sold ownership between the target
and control sample also comes from medium size stakes (between 0.5% to 2%). The
difference of dissatisfied ownership sold if the seller has over 0.5% stakes between
the target and control sample is 1.1%, close to that without size constraints and is
statistically significant. This can also be seen in analysing the portion of dissatisfied
sellers with different stake sizes. In the control sample, only 3.4% of all sellers had
owned more than 0.5% ownership and sold all their stakes due to dissatisfaction,
while 26.8% of all sellers regardless their stake size sold their stakes due to satisfac-
tion. However, in the target sample, there are 6.39% of all sellers who had owned
more than 0.5% ownership and exited due to dissatisfaction while the portion of all
dissatisfied sellers regardless of stake is 35.0%. The comparisons using different own-
ership threshold shows that sold ownership size does matter and since the threshold
seems to be arbitrary, we also calculate the average institutional ownership exited
in company i at the end of quarter t and only include those exceed the average.
In this specification, IAi,j,t = 1if exited ownershipi,j,t >= exited ownershipi,t and we
modify the two measures as:
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Large sold dissatisfied ownershipi,t =
J∑
j=1
total exiti,j,t × dissatisfactioni,j,t × ownershipi,j,t × IAi,j,t
(2.15)
% large dissatisfied sellersi,t =
∑J
j=1 total exiti,j,t × dissatisfactioni,j,t × IAi,j,t
J
(2.16)
The summary statistics are also presented in Table 2.5. S neg large is de-
fined in equation 2.15 as the aggregated large dissatisfied institutional ownership
sold if the institution owns more than the average. PS neg large is defined in equa-
tion 2.16 as the proportion of large dissatisfied sellers out of all institutional sellers.
On average, the large dissatisfied ownership sold in the target firm is 0.9 percentage
points higher than that in the control firm which takes almost half of the difference
of total sold ownership regardless of dissatisfaction between target and control sam-
ple. 4.9% of all sellers in the target sample are dissatisfied and large sellers while
that in the control sample is 3.1%. This shows that there is a concentration of small
sellers in the target companies in terms of numbers.
2.5.3 Regression results for dissatisfied sellers
Are activists more likely to pick up signals from dissatisfied sellers?
Institutional investors often use exit as means of governance if their stock perfor-
mance is dissatisfying and we investigate whether activists can pick up these signals
to target companies. The regression specification is as follows:
Targeti,t+1 = α+ β × dissatisfied sellersi,t + γ × Zi,t + θt + δi + εi,t (2.17)
Targeti,t+1 = 1 if company i is targeted during the quarter that ends at
t + 1. Zi,t is a set of firm controls discussed in the previous subsection and δi is
firm (industry) fixed effect and we also include time fixed effect θt. Our variable
of interest, dissatisfied sellersi,t, is calculated based on institutions that had already
exited (sold all their stakes) at the beginning of quarter t and remain non-owners
throughout the quarter. By construction, this measure will capture the institutional
selling one quarter prior to targeting. Due to the time difference between selling and
targeting we argue that our measure is not the liquidity measure upon targeting.
We use Amihuld (2002) illiquidity during the quarter to measure liquidity.
We first explore how different decomposition of sold institutional ownership
is associated with subsequent activism targeting, and we present the regression
coefficient in Table 2.6. Columns (1) to (5) report the results for baseline models
using different specifications of exited institutional ownerships and columns (6) to
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(10) report the results for different specifications of exited dissatisfied ownership
only. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 2.6: An analysis of institutional sellers and target selection
This table applies a linear probability model to examine how different decompositions of
institutional sellers, especially dissatisfied sellers, predict the activist target selection. All
independent variables are as defined in Table 2.1 and 2.5. In each column we report coeffi-
cients and their clustered standard errors. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES target target target target target target target target target target 
           
S_total 0.042***          
 (0.011)          
S_0.5%  0.038***         
  (0.011)         
S_2%   0.033**        
   (0.013)        
S_5%    0.021       
    (0.016)       
S_10%     -0.013      
     (0.016)      
S_neg      0.065***     
      (0.015)     
S_neg_0.5%       0.059***    
       (0.017)    
S_neg_2%        0.045**   
        (0.021)   
S_neg_5%         0.030  
         (0.028)  
S_neg_10%          -0.000 
          (0.031) 
LogMV -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BM 0.002* 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.002* 0.002* 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dividend  -0.139* -0.139* -0.140* -0.140* -0.140* -0.151** -0.146* -0.143* -0.141* -0.140* 
yield (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) 
Past return -0.003* -0.003** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Illiquidity -0.004* -0.005* -0.005* -0.005** -0.006** -0.004 -0.005* -0.005** -0.005** -0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
O_total 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
           
Observations 116,412 116,412 116,412 116,412 116,412 116,412 116,412 116,412 116,412 116,412 
R-squared 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Qtr FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  
 
The baseline model in column (1) shows that, even after controlling for total
ownership, institutional exit has a great impact on activism targeting: 1 percentage
point ownership sold is associated with 0.042 percentage point increase in the likeli-
hood of targeting while the unconditional mean of targeting is 0.007. Interestingly,
when we restrict to sold ownership using different cut-off points (sold ownership over
0.5%, 2%, 5%, and 10% respectively) the coefficient is only statistically significant at
5% for over-5% and over-2% sellers and the magnitude decreases. This is consistent
with the findings in the previous subsection that medium sized (0.5% to 2%) sellers
28
matter instead of large sellers.
More importantly, when we include dissatisfied exited ownership, the coef-
ficient on total sold dissatisfied ownershipi,t is 0.065 and statistically significant at
1%. Its magnitude is more than 1.5 times that of the simple exit measure: 1 per-
centage point ownership exited is associated almost 10% increase in the likelihood
of being targeted. When we study the effect of different sizes of dissatisfied stakes
exited, we find the coefficient is both statistically and economically significant for
over-0.5% and over-2% dissatisfied sellers but insignificant for over-5% and over-10%
ones. These evidence show that dissatisfied sellers are a better measure than pure
exiting, and medium-sized dissatisfied sellers matter most.
To avoid the arbitrary selection of size cut-off points, we present the main re-
sults in Table 2.7. Panel A measures dissatisfaction from sellers as fraction of shares
sold while panel B uses the proportion of certain sellers out of all institutional sell-
ers. In column (1) of each panel, we use all dissatisfied sellers and in column (2)
we restrict to large sellers whose ownership exceeds the average. In each specifica-
tion, we also include E-index as governance quality measure, and the sample size
is reduced substantially due to data availability but the results remain unchanged.
We include firm (industry) fixed effect and time fixed effects. The coefficients on
(large) dissatisfied ownership sold and the fraction of (large) sellers are both sta-
tistically significant and economically meaningful, even after controlling for total
institutional ownership. 1 percentage point increase in the (large) dissatisfied sold
ownership in the present quarter is associated with a 0.078 (0.072) percentage point
increase in the likelihood of subsequent targeting, which is equivalent to increasing
the probability of being targeted by (9.7%) 10.5%. 1 standard deviation increase of
the fraction of (large) sellers out of total sellers leads to the subsequent targeting
probability increase by (24.7%) 25.5%.
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Table 2.7: An analysis of dissatisfied institutional sellers and target selection
This table applies a linear probability model to examine how (large) dissatisfied institutional
sellers predict the activist target selection. Panel A measures dissatisfaction from sellers as
a fraction of shares sold while panel B uses the proportion of certain sellers out of all
institutional sellers. All independent variables are as defined in Table 2.1 and 2.5. In each
column we report coefficients and we report coefficients and their clustered standard errors.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 Panel A: aggregated dissatisfied exited ownership 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) 
VARIABLES target target target target target target target target 
         
S_neg 0.065*** 0.078*** 0.068*** 0.079***     
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) (0.021)     
S_neg_large     0.058*** 0.072*** 0.061** 0.075*** 
     (0.017) (0.016) (0.026) (0.023) 
LogMV -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003** -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
BM 0.002* 0.003*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.002* 0.004*** 0.006** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Dividend yield -0.151** -0.121*** -0.130 -0.112* -0.147* -0.121** -0.128 -0.113* 
 (0.076) (0.047) (0.089) (0.068) (0.076) (0.047) (0.089) (0.068) 
Past return -0.004** -0.004** -0.003 -0.003 -0.004** -0.004*** -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Illiquidity -0.004 0.000 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004* -0.000 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.010) (0.003) 
O_total 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.009* 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.009* 0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) 
E_index   0.001*** 0.000   0.001*** 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 116,412 116,412 59,101 59,101 116,412 116,412 59,101 59,101 
R-squared 0.065 0.008 0.069 0.008 0.065 0.008 0.069 0.008 
Firm FE Y  Y  Y  Y  
Ind FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Qtr FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
 
 Panel B: proportions of dissatisfied owners and sellers 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) 
VARIABLES target target target target target target target target 
         
PS_neg 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006***     
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)     
PS_neg_large     0.019*** 0.024*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 
     (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.012) 
LogMV -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
BM 0.002 0.004*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.002* 0.004*** 0.006** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Dividend yield -0.166** -0.139*** -0.155* -0.139** -0.149** -0.125*** -0.134 -0.120* 
 (0.076) (0.047) (0.089) (0.068) (0.076) (0.047) (0.089) (0.068) 
Past return -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004** -0.005*** -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Illiquidity -0.005** -0.001 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005* -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.011) (0.003) 
O_total 0.008** 0.012*** 0.009* 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.009* 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) 
E-index   0.001** 0.000   0.001*** 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.000) 
         
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 116,412 116,412 59,101 59,101 116,412 116,412 59,101 59,101 
R-squared 0.065 0.008 0.069 0.008 0.065 0.008 0.069 0.008 
Firm FE Y  Y  Y  Y  
Ind FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Qtr FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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2.6 Different voices
2.6.1 Measure
Apart from trading, the traditional channel through which institutional investors
exert governance or express their (dis)satisfaction is through voice (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1986; Brav and Mattews, 2011). More than half of the respondents in McC-
ahery, Sautner and Starks (2016) reported voting against management as a channel
of voice. During the annual meeting or special meeting, registered shareholders will
need to vote for regular issues such as electing the Board of Directors and approving
management compensation, as well as non-regular issues such as change of corpo-
rate strategies and mergers and acquisitions, and shareholder sponsored proposals.
Proxy advisors such as Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS) and Glass Lewis will
also conduct independent research and make recommendations for each proposal.
Large investment houses such as pension funds and mutual funds, or those who hold
a diversified portfolio of companies, usually rely heavily on their services (Cotter,
Palmiter, and Thomas, 2010; Chio, Fisch, and Kaham, 2010).
We use the ISS Voting Analytics database from 2004 to 2014 whichit covers
all Russell 3000 companies and keeps the voting records from mutual funds. This
dataset provides us with the following information: the meeting date, company
name and its ticker, fund name and fund family name, the sponsor of the proposal
(management or shareholder), the detailed description of the proposal, the vote the
fund casts, ISS recommendation and management recommendation. The majority
of the companies use a plurality voting system for director elections where share-
holders can vote “For”, “Withhold” or “Abstain” while ISS and management will
recommend “For” or “Withhold”. Under majority voting rule, ISS and management
will recommend “For” or “Against” (Li, 2016).
We first fuzzy match the company names with COMPUSTAT and then
manually check the accuracy. This step gives us 4,710 unique firms with infor-
mation on COMPUSTAT during the sample period. As the frequency of annual
meetings is yearly but our main variables are constructed on a quarterly basis, we
take (1) all past voting results and (2) the closest past voting results before each
quarter to construct a disagreement with management measure. For each indi-
vidual fund j that votes for each proposal s in company i’s meeting which takes
place at time t, we donate disagree with mgts,i,j,t = 1 if the vote it casts is dif-
ferent from the management recommendation. As is well documented, the major-
ity of funds will follow the ISS recommendation (Cotter, Palmiter, and Thomas,
2010; Chio, Fisch, and Kaham, 2010). We use a stricter definition of disagree-
ing management by taking the ISS recommendation into consideration. We do-
nate disagree with mgt&ISS s,i,j,t = 1 if the vote a fund casts is different from both
the management and the ISS recommendation: it captures the cases where the
fund votes against the management recommendation even if the ISS agrees with
management. This variable will better capture the discontent expressed through
the fund’s discretionary voting deviating from the the ISS recommendation to go
against management. As the variable is constructed on a fund-proposal level,
we first aggregate all proposals in a meeting to fund-meeting level by defining
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disagree with mgti,j,t = 1 if
∑S
s disagree with mgts,i,j,t > 0, namely, if the fund has
disagreed with management once for any proposals during the meeting, we count the
fund as a disagreeing fund. For the strict measure, disagree with mgt&ISSi,j,t = 1 if∑S
s disagree with mgt&ISSs,i,j,t > 0. We also separate different proposal types and
this will be discussed below.
Finally we calculate the percentage of disagreeing funds out of the total
voting funds:
% Disagree with mgti,t =
∑J
j=1 disagree with mgti,j,t
J
(2.18)
For the strict measure:
% Disagree with mgt&ISSi,t =
∑J
j=1 disagree with mgt&ISSi,j,t
J
(2.19)
where J is the total number of voting funds.
In unreported analyses, we also match the 13F institution name with the
ISS voting analytics institution name and use ownership as weights to construct
voice measures and the results remain similar. As the data contain detailed pro-
posal descriptions, we can also investigate different types of proposals where the
disagreement is expressed. We first separate proposal types by sponsors: manage-
ment and shareholder sponsored proposals. Most management sponsored proposals
are routine ones such as director election, management compensation, annual report,
and so on. Shareholder sponsored proposals address various issues such as director
election, mergers and acquisitions, corporate social responsibility, and so on. We
further break down proposal types by separating governance related, compensation
related, capital structure and strategy related, and others. We adopt the character-
ization similar to that of Li (2016). Governance proposals include proposals related
to the Board of Directors and anti-takeover issues. Compensation proposals involve
equity-based and cash incentive plans, deferred compensation, and stock purchase
plans. Capital structure and strategy related proposals are related to stock au-
thorization, share repurchases/dividends, and takeover/reorganization. Proposals
in the “other” category include routine proposals such as auditor ratification and
miscellaneous proposals.
2.6.2 Summary statistics of voices
We report the summary statistics of institutional voices in Table 2.8. Panel A (B)
reports the aggregated disagreement with management (&ISS) recommendations
from voting funds during the annual meetings. The aggregated disagreement with
management (&ISS) recommendation is defined in equation 2.18 (2.19). Columns
(1) and (2) present the means, standard deviations, and medians of characteris-
tics for the target sample and control sample. Column (3) reports the differ-
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ence and t-statistics between the two samples. (S)V oice all is the disagreement
with management (&ISS) recommendations for all proposals. (S)V oice mgt and
(S)V oice shr separates proposals as management sponsored and shareholder spon-
sored. (S)V oice class further separates proposals to be management sponsored
compensation related (C1), management sponsored governance related (C2), man-
agement sponsored miscellaneous and other items (C3), management sponsored cap-
ital structure and strategy related (C4), shareholder sponsored compensation related
(C5), shareholder sponsored governance related (C6), and shareholder sponsored
other proposals (C7).
Table 2.8: Summary statistics of institutional voices
This table reports the characteristics of institutional voice expressed through voting in the
annual meetings of sample firms. Panel A (B) reports the aggregated disagreement with
management (&ISS) recommendations from voting funds during the annual meetings. The
aggregated disagreement with management (&ISS) recommendations is defined in equation
2.18 (2.19). Column (1) presents the means, standard deviations, and medians of charac-
teristics for the target companies. Column (2) reports the means, standard deviations, and
medians of characteristics for the firms in the control sample which covers all COMPUS-
TAT firms with data available on CRSP, ISS voting analytics, and 13F database. Column
(3) reports the differences between the target and control samples. (S)V oice all is the
disagreement with management (&ISS) recommendations for all proposals. (S)V oice mgt
and (S)V oice shr separates proposals as management sponsored and shareholder sponsored.
(S)V oice class further separates proposals to be management sponsored compensation re-
lated (C1), management sponsored governance related (C2), management sponsored miscel-
laneous and other items (C3), management sponsored capital structure and strategy related
(C4), shareholder sponsored compensation related (C5), shareholder sponsored governance
related (C6), and shareholder sponsored other proposals (C7). A detailed classification can
be found in subsection 2.6.1. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Voice – recent disagreement with management 
VARIABLES Target Control Comparison 
 
 
Mean 
(1a) 
SD 
(1b) 
Median 
(1c) 
Mean 
(2a) 
SD 
(2b) 
Median 
(2c) 
Difference 
(3a) 
t-statistics 
(3b) 
Voice_all 0.333 0.307 0.235 0.331 0.308 0.215 -0.002 -0.20 
Voice_mgt 0.301 0.289 0.195 0.293 0.291 0.169 -0.009 -0.88 
Voice_shr 0.533 0.324 0.564 0.529 0.318 0.553 -0.004 -0.14 
Voice_c1 0.267 0.288 0.142 0.222 0.270 0.096 -0.046*** -4.41 
Voice_c2 0.199 0.229 0.089 0.201 0.243 0.082 0.003 0.31 
Voice_c3 0.044 0.168 0 0.050 0.178 0 0.005 0.79 
Voice_c4 0.178 0.247 0.060 0.189 0.259 0.084 0.011 0.61 
Voice_c5 0.330 0.226 0.452 0.405 0.243 0.474 0.075* 2.19 
Voice_c6 0.706 0.275 0.798 0.641 0.292 0.704 -0.065* -2.03 
Voice_c7 0.268 0.214 0.290 0.232 0.197 0.224 -0.036 -1.49 
Panel B: Strict voice – recent disagreement with management & ISS 
 
 
Mean 
(1a) 
SD 
(1b) 
Median 
(1c) 
Mean 
(2a) 
SD 
(2b) 
Median 
(2c) 
Difference 
(3a) 
t-statistics 
(3b) 
SVoice_all 0.139 0.146 0.092 0.122 0.129 0.083 -0.017*** -3.83 
SVoice_mgt 0.137 0.146 0.090 0.120 0.128 0.080 -0.018*** -4.08 
SVoice_shr 0.026 0.063 0 0.030 0.066 0 0.004 0.71 
SVoice_c1 0.123 0.168 0.048 0.091 0.132 0.034 -0.032*** -6.31 
SVoice_c2 0.098 0.118 0.051 0.087 0.109 0.046 -0.011** -2.86 
SVoice_c3 0.007 0.036 0 0.008 0.037 0 0.000 0.35 
SVoice_c4 0.105 0.166 0.024 0.092 0.131 0.029 -0.012 -1.38 
SVoice_c5 0.039 0.073 0 0.027 0.063 0 -0.012 -1.39 
SVoice_c6 0.021 0.068 0 0.022 0.062 0 0.001 0.12 
SVoice_c7 0.035 0.065 0 0.038 0.064 0.008 0.003 0.36 
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Intuitively, when comparing the disagreement with management or the dis-
agreement with management&ISS between the target and control group we find that
both the closest past and all past disagreement are higher among target group before
targeting than the control group, and the difference when we use disagreement with
management&ISS is statistically significant. For example, about 12.2% voting funds
disagree with the management&ISS recommendations in our control sample while
that is 13.9% in the target sample. The difference also is largely from management
sponsored issues which are mainly routine proposals. It seems that shareholders’ dis-
content with regular issues rather than other shareholder proposals are more likely
to induce activism. This is consistent with some of the responses given by McCah-
ery, Sautner and Starks (2016) that shareholders rarely pass on proposals to actual
voting either due to early settlement or due to avoiding confrontation, which makes
shareholder proposals rare and may not capture the discontent from all shareholders.
For regular votes, we further discover that the control sample and target sample sta-
tistically differ in discontent in compensation and governance related issues. 12.3%
(9.8%) funds vote out of their discretion against management recommendations for
proposals related to executive compensation (governance) before campaigns in the
target company while only 9.1% (8.7%) vote against management in the control
sample. We also find the strict measure of the disagreement with management&ISS
has more statistical power to distinguish the target and control sample.
2.6.3 Regression results for different voices
Are activists more likely to target companies with more disagreement
with management expressed through voting?
To investigate whether activists selectively target companies with more disagreement
expressed during annual meetings, based on the summary statistics, we run the
following regression:
Targeti,t+1 = α+ β × disagree with mgt&ISSi,t + γ × Zi,t + θt + δi + εi,t (2.20)
Targeti,t+1 = 1 if company i is targeted during the quarter end at t+ 1. Zi,t
is a set of firm controls discussed in the previous subsections. δi is industry fixed
effect (results with firm fixed effect are untabulated and discussed below) and we
also include quarter fixed effect θt. We also separate for different type of proposal
and the results are presented in Table 2.9. Panel A (B) shows the results without
(with) E-index. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 2.9: An analysis of institutional voice and target selection
This table applies a linear probability model to examine how dissatisfaction through voting
in annual meetings predicts the activist target selection. Panel A reports the full sample
results and Panel B reports the sub sample with E-index available. All independent variables
are as defined in Table 2.1 and 2.8. In each column we report coefficients and their clustered
standard errors. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Panel A: full sample 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a) (8a) (9a) (10a) 
VARIABLES target target target target target target target target target target 
           
SVoice_all 0.005**          
 (0.002)          
SVoice_mgt  0.005**         
  (0.002)         
sSVoice_shr   0.002        
   (0.007)        
SVoice_c1    0.007**       
    (0.003)       
SVoice_c2     0.005*      
     (0.003)      
SVoice_c3      -0.000     
      (0.007)     
SVoice_c4       0.002    
       (0.004)    
SVoice_c5        0.016   
        (0.016)   
SVoice_c6         0.005  
         (0.008)  
SVoice_c7          -0.008 
          (0.012) 
LogMV -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
BM 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.006** 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Dividend  -0.119** -0.119** -0.042 -0.128** -0.121** -0.109** -0.132 -0.199 -0.013 -0.197 
yield (0.047) (0.047) (0.116) (0.055) (0.047) (0.049) (0.083) (0.166) (0.116) (0.171) 
Past return -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.009** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.003 -0.005 -0.012** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
Illiquidity -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.013 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.030) (0.004) (0.026) 
O_total 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.012** 0.009*** 0.008* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
           
Observations 116,412 116,412 23,938 93,761 116,229 103,443 36,036 9,289 17,537 13,103 
R-squared 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.021 0.012 0.019 
Ind FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Qtr FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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 Panel B: sub sample with E-index available 
 (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) (7b) (8b) (9b) (10b) 
VARIABLES target target target target target target target target target target 
           
SVoice_all 0.006*          
 (0.003)          
SVoice_mgt  0.005         
  (0.003)         
SVoice_shr   0.002        
   (0.007)        
SVoice_c1    0.012***       
    (0.004)       
SVoice_c2     0.009**      
     (0.004)      
SVoice_c3      0.010     
      (0.013)     
SVoice_c4       -0.003    
       (0.005)    
SVoice_c5        0.020   
        (0.015)   
SVoice_c6         0.005  
         (0.008)  
SVoice_c7          -0.004 
          (0.012) 
LogMV -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BM 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.007* 0.002 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dividend -0.111 -0.111 0.013 -0.110 -0.112* -0.075 -0.163* -0.241 0.027 -0.268* 
yield (0.068) (0.068) (0.125) (0.070) (0.068) (0.070) (0.085) (0.185) (0.145) (0.137) 
Past return -0.004 -0.004 -0.008* -0.004 -0.004 -0.004* -0.007* -0.001 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Illiquidity -0.005 -0.005 -0.013 -0.009*** -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 0.098** -0.013 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.045) (0.020) (0.052) 
O_total 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.010 0.008* 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
E_index 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 59,101 59,101 20,151 51,934 59,064 53,910 20,063 8,479 14,964 11,775 
R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.018 0.013 0.016 
Ind FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Qtr FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
 
Consistent with the summary statistics, the positive and statistically signif-
icant coefficient of discontent expressed through voting against management&ISS
indicates that the more discontent of the voters, the higher the probability of ac-
tivism targeting. When decomposing into different proposal types, we find that
management sponsored proposal and especially compensation and governance re-
lated proposal have more predicting power on targeting than the rest. Manage-
ment sponsored compensation has the highest power and economic magnitude. 1
standard deviation of disagreement with management&ISS measured at the closest
voting date before the quarter start increases the probability of targeting during the
quarter by 16.8%. In untabulated analysis, we use all past voting records to measure
disagreement and find the result is stronger for measures taken at the closest voting
date. This means activists weighs more on the more “recent” discontent than further
in the past. The results remain unchanged when we include E-index, which means
the discontent measure is different from traditional internal governance measures.
When we control for firm fixed effects, the coefficient on voting becomes
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statistically insignificant. This is potentially because voice measure is less frequent
and measured on an annual basis. We also reduce the frequency to annual basis and
the result (untabulated) remains the same.
2.7 How the three measures affect target selection si-
multaneously?
In this section, we add all the three measures – holding, exiting as well as voice – to
investigate which signals the activists pick up while targeting, and the results are
presented in Table 2.10. As the disagreement in management sponsored compensa-
tion proposals has the most power and economic magnitude, we use it as the proxy
for voice. We run the following panel regression:
Targeti,t+1 = α+ β1 × dissatisfied ownersi,t + β2 × dissatisfied sellersi,t + β3 × voicei,t + γ × Zi,t + θt + δi + εi,t
(2.21)
We measure dissatisfied owners and sellers both in ownership percentage
as well as fractions of numbers. We also restrict both variable specification to
large dissatisfied owners and sellers to capture the institutions that have more than
average stakes and thus may matter more in activists’ target selections. We also
include the rest of the ownership after separating out dissatisfied ownership from
total ownership. Table 2.10 panel A measures holding and exiting as fraction of
shares while panel B uses the proportion of certain institutions out of all institutional
investors. In column (1) of each panel, we use all dissatisfied owners or sellers and in
column (2) we restrict to large owners or sellers whose ownership exceeds the average.
In each specification, we also include E-index as governance quality measure, and
the sample size is reduced substantially due to data availability. We include firm
(industry) fixed effect and time fixed effects. Clustered robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
Table 2.10: An analysis of institutional dissatisfaction and target selection
This table applies a linear probability model to examine how dissatisfaction measured as
holding, exiting and voice predicts the activist target selection. Panel A measures holding
and exiting as fractions of shares while panel B uses the proportion of certain institutions
out of all institutional investors. In column (1) of each panel, we use all dissatisfied owners
or sellers and in column (2) we restrict to large owners or sellers whose ownership exceeds
the average. In each specification, we also include E-index as governance quality measure.
O rest is the difference between total institutional ownership and certain ownership decom-
position. For example, in column (1a) O rest is the difference between total institutional
ownership and O neg. All other independent variables are as defined in Table 2.1, 2.2, 2.5,
and 2.8. In each column we report coefficients and their clustered standard error. ∗, ∗∗ and
∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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 Panel A: aggregated dissatisfied ownership and exited ownership 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) 
VARIABLES target target target target target target target target 
         
O_neg 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.012**     
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)     
S_neg 0.048*** 0.037** 0.059** 0.052**     
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.023) (0.025)     
O_neg_large     0.015*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.013** 
     (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
S_neg_large     0.036** 0.024 0.053** 0.045* 
     (0.015) (0.016) (0.025) (0.026) 
SVoice_c1 0.011*** 0.007 0.016*** 0.014 0.011*** 0.007 0.016*** 0.014 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
LogMV -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
BM 0.003*** 0.003* 0.004*** 0.003 0.003*** 0.003* 0.005*** 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Dividend yield -0.140** -0.156* -0.113 -0.151 -0.140** -0.153* -0.115 -0.149 
 (0.055) (0.089) (0.071) (0.103) (0.055) (0.089) (0.071) (0.103) 
Past return -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Illiquidity -0.001 -0.010*** -0.007** -0.016 -0.002 -0.010*** -0.007** -0.016 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) 
O_rest 0.008*** 0.006 0.006** 0.007 0.009*** 0.006 0.006** 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
E-index   0.000 0.001*   0.000 0.001* 
   (0.000) (0.001)   (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Observations 93,761 93,761 51,934 51,934 93,761 93,761 51,934 51,934 
R-squared 0.009 0.067 0.009 0.071 0.008 0.067 0.009 0.070 
Firm FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Ind FE Y  Y  Y  Y  
Qtr FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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 Panel B: proportions of dissatisfied owners and sellers 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) 
VARIABLES target target target target target target target target 
         
PO_neg 0.002 0.004** 0.001 0.003     
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)     
PS_neg 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.005**     
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)     
PO_neg_large     0.019*** 0.023*** 0.011 0.023*** 
     (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
PS_neg_large     0.018*** 0.013** 0.034*** 0.030** 
     (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014) 
SVoice_c1 0.011*** 0.008 0.017*** 0.014* 0.011*** 0.007 0.016*** 0.014 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
LogMV -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
BM 0.003*** 0.002* 0.005*** 0.003 0.003*** 0.003* 0.005*** 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Dividend yield -0.149*** -0.170* -0.132* -0.170* -0.137** -0.154* -0.118* -0.154 
 (0.055) (0.089) (0.071) (0.103) (0.055) (0.089) (0.070) (0.103) 
Past return -0.004* -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Illiquidity -0.002 -0.011*** -0.009** -0.018 -0.003 -0.011*** -0.008** -0.017 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) 
O_total 0.011*** 0.008** 0.007*** 0.007 0.011*** 0.009** 0.008*** 0.008 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) 
E-index   0.000 0.001*   0.000 0.001* 
   (0.000) (0.001)   (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Observations 93,761 93,761 51,934 51,934 93,761 93,761 51,934 51,934 
R-squared 0.009 0.067 0.009 0.071 0.008 0.067 0.009 0.071 
Firm FE  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Ind FE Y  Y  Y  Y  
Qtr FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
 
We find that all the three measures – the dissatisfied owners, dissatisfied
sellers and voice – are associated with subsequent targeting controlling for industry
and quarter fixed effects. Voice becomes insignificant but economically unchanged
after controlling for firm fixed effect (columns (1b) and (1d)). Interestingly, af-
ter including dissatisfied owners and sellers and firm fixed effect (in columns (1d)
and (2d)), the rest of the ownership becomes economically small and insignificant
at 10%, which indicates that the dissatisfaction of existing owners and sellers is
more important than simple total institutional ownership for activists’ target selec-
tion. The magnitude of our variables of interest is also economically meaningful.
Take column (1a) in panel A Table 2.10 for example, 1 percentage point increase in
the dissatisfied ownership (sold) is associated with 0.014 (0.048) percentage point
increase in the probability of targeting. A 1 percentage point increase in disagree-
ment with management & ISS in the closest past annual voting is associated with a
0.011 percent point increase in the probability of targeting. The magnitude remains
similar to that when we analyse each proxy individually. When we further restrict
to large dissatisfied owners and large dissatisfied sellers, the results remains similar.
The magnitude of large dissatisfied owners become slightly bigger. This is plausible
in that the activists need to rely on existing large shareholders to push changes in
companies and their dissatisfaction with stock performance may indicate a higher
chance or less effort for activists to gain support. The magnitude of large dissatisfied
sellers becomes smaller and its statistical power is slightly reduced. This indicates
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that it is the small dissatisfied sellers’ consensus move that signals the prospect of
the company which may attract activists’ attention. In panel B Table 2.10, we also
present the results with the alternative measure of the ratio of the number of dissat-
isfied owners to that of total owners as well as the ratio of the number of dissatisfied
sellers to that of total sellers. We include total ownership as the control variable
for the baseline specification for ownership structure. The results remain largely
unchanged.
Controlling for other factors, the combination of selling which dips share
price, as well as continued holding from existing dissatisfied owners which can pro-
vide potential support for the activists, increases the likelihood of a stock becoming
the target of a campaign. We present in the next section some suggestive evidence
on how the remaining dissatisfied owners affect activists’ tactics and success.
2.8 How dissatisfied owners affect campaigns cross-sectionally?
2.8.1 Activists’ tactics
After recognizing the importance of institutional shareholder base for target selec-
tion, we also investigate how different institutional characteristics of target firms
affect activists’ tactics and its initial impact measured by the announcement re-
turns. Activists’ tactics are obtained from their item 4 disclosure in schedule 13D
as well as extensive news search on Factiva. The filer is required to state their “pur-
pose of transaction” in Item 4 and we use the sample classification as in Brav, Jiang,
Partnoy, and Thomas (2008). The activist may also submit shareholder proposals,
engage in proxy fights, and seek a board seat. We also code threat = 1 if the ac-
tivist threatens to sue the management or submit shareholder proposals regardless
its actual subsequent actions. Usually an activist will use a variety of tactics, thus
the above ones are not mutually exclusive.
We summarize the usage of all tactics in our sample in Table 2.1. There
are 11.2% cases where activists threaten to sue management and the frequencies for
takeover bid, submitting proposals and seeking board representation is 3.4%, 14.1%
and 20.9% respectively.
We investigate how the remaining displeased owners affect the activists’ tac-
tics by running the following probit regression on activists’ target sample only:
Tacticsi,t = α+ β × dissatisfied ownersi,t + γ × Zi,t + εi,t (2.22)
The result is presented in Table 2.11 with panel A investigating the tactics
of threat, panel B of proposals, panel C of takeover bids and panel D of board
representation. Both the coefficient estimates and associated marginal probabilities
are reported. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2.11: An analysis of institutional dissatisfied owners and activist’s tactics
This table applies a probit model to examine how the existence of dissatisfied institutions
affects activists’ tactics. Threats, shareholder proposals, takeover bids and seeking board
representations are investigated in each panel. O rest is the difference between total institu-
tional ownership and certain ownership decomposition. For example, in column (1a) O rest
is the difference between total institutional ownership and O neg. All other independent
variables are as defined in Table 2.1 and 2.2. In each column we report probit coefficients,
their heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, and the marginal probability change induced
by a one-unit change in the value of a specific covariate from its sample average. ∗, ∗∗ and
∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 Panel A: threat Panel B: proposal 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) 
VARIABLES Threat Mfx Threat Mfx Threat Mfx Threat Mfx Pro Mfx Pro Mfx Pro Mfx Pro Mfx 
                 
O_neg   0.620*** 0.115***       -0.095 -0.021     
   (0.226) (0.042)       (0.209) (0.046)     
O_neg_large 0.719*** 0.134***       -0.096 -0.021       
 (0.256) (0.047)       (0.239) (0.053)       
PO_neg     0.402** 0.075**       -0.018 -0.004   
     (0.201) (0.037)       (0.185) (0.041)   
PO_neg_large       1.555** 0.291**       -0.056 -0.012 
       (0.747) (0.139)       (0.716) (0.159) 
LogMV 0.035 0.006 0.036 0.007 0.028 0.005 0.043 0.008 -0.042 -0.009 -0.042 -0.009 -0.038 -0.008 -0.038 -0.009 
 (0.051) (0.009) (0.051) (0.009) (0.051) (0.010) (0.053) (0.010) (0.050) (0.011) (0.050) (0.011) (0.050) (0.011) (0.051) (0.011) 
BM 0.047 0.009 0.049 0.009 0.064 0.012 0.078 0.015 0.083 0.018 0.084 0.019 0.080 0.018 0.079 0.018 
 (0.088) (0.016) (0.088) (0.016) (0.086) (0.016) (0.086) (0.016) (0.085) (0.019) (0.085) (0.019) (0.085) (0.019) (0.085) (0.019) 
Dividend  -7.729 -1.436 -7.909 -1.470 -8.670 -1.624 -9.401 -1.760 18.406 4.091 18.382 4.085 18.589 4.132 18.637 4.143 
yield (14.463) (2.687) (14.458) (2.687) (14.472) (2.710) (14.410) (2.699) (12.863) (2.861) (12.859) (2.860) (12.870) (2.863) (12.916) (2.873) 
Past return 0.374 0.069 0.379 0.070 0.385 0.072 0.321 0.060 0.191 0.042 0.185 0.041 0.216 0.048 0.221 0.049 
 (0.303) (0.056) (0.305) (0.057) (0.319) (0.060) (0.305) (0.057) (0.265) (0.059) (0.266) (0.059) (0.278) (0.062) (0.269) (0.060) 
Illiquidity -0.447 -0.083 -0.436 -0.081 -0.479 -0.090 -0.508 -0.095 0.093 0.021 0.091 0.020 0.096 0.021 0.097 0.022 
 (0.320) (0.059) (0.319) (0.059) (0.325) (0.061) (0.329) (0.061) (0.240) (0.053) (0.239) (0.053) (0.241) (0.054) (0.244) (0.054) 
O_rest -0.518 -0.096 -0.516 -0.096 -0.175 -0.033 -0.193 -0.036 0.381 0.085 0.388 0.086 0.331 0.074 0.332 0.074 
 (0.329) (0.061) (0.330) (0.061) (0.295) (0.055) (0.296) (0.055) (0.320) (0.071) (0.321) (0.071) (0.289) (0.064) (0.293) (0.065) 
Constant Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
                 
Observations 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 
 Panel C: takeover bid Panel D: seeking board representation 
 (1c) (2c) (3c) (4c) (1d) (2d) (3d) (4d) 
VARIABLES Takeover Mfx Takeover Mfx Takeover Mfx Takeover Mfx Boardrep Mfx Boardrep Mfx Boardrep Mfx Boardrep Mfx 
                 
O_neg 0.279 0.020       0.120 0.034       
 (0.388) (0.028)       (0.218) (0.062)       
O_neg_large   0.264 0.019       0.112 0.032     
   (0.347) (0.025)       (0.191) (0.055)     
PO_neg     0.237 0.017       0.136 0.039   
     (0.311) (0.022)       (0.171) (0.049)   
PO_neg_large       0.593 0.043       -0.090 -0.026 
       (1.053) (0.076)       (0.638) (0.183) 
LogMV 0.074 0.005 0.076 0.005 0.076 0.005 0.077 0.006 0.059 0.017 0.060 0.017 0.061 0.018 0.053 0.015 
 (0.071) (0.005) (0.071) (0.005) (0.071) (0.005) (0.074) (0.005) (0.045) (0.013) (0.046) (0.013) (0.045) (0.013) (0.047) (0.013) 
BM 0.058 0.004 0.057 0.004 0.057 0.004 0.064 0.005 0.113 0.032 0.113 0.032 0.113 0.032 0.118 0.034 
 (0.146) (0.010) (0.146) (0.010) (0.145) (0.010) (0.142) (0.010) (0.080) (0.023) (0.080) (0.023) (0.081) (0.023) (0.079) (0.023) 
Dividend  -34.091 -2.441 -34.072 -2.438 -33.846 -2.422 -34.458 -2.475 -10.046 -2.873 -10.042 -2.872 -9.983 -2.854 -10.233 -2.927 
yield (27.841) (1.959) (27.815) (1.955) (27.691) (1.944) (27.738) (1.953) (13.864) (3.964) (13.860) (3.963) (13.850) (3.959) (13.892) (3.973) 
Past return 0.221 0.016 0.234 0.017 0.288 0.021 0.203 0.015 -0.194 -0.056 -0.189 -0.054 -0.144 -0.041 -0.255 -0.073 
 (0.389) (0.028) (0.392) (0.028) (0.421) (0.030) (0.387) (0.028) (0.255) (0.073) (0.256) (0.073) (0.270) (0.077) (0.260) (0.074) 
Illiquidity 0.396 0.028 0.400 0.029 0.379 0.027 0.375 0.027 0.151 0.043 0.153 0.044 0.142 0.041 0.155 0.044 
 (0.295) (0.021) (0.296) (0.021) (0.295) (0.021) (0.296) (0.021) (0.230) (0.066) (0.231) (0.066) (0.231) (0.066) (0.231) (0.066) 
O_rest -0.094 -0.007 -0.105 -0.008 0.025 0.002 0.016 0.001 -0.010 -0.003 -0.016 -0.004 0.036 0.010 0.061 0.018 
 (0.542) (0.039) (0.545) (0.039) (0.465) (0.033) (0.468) (0.034) (0.294) (0.084) (0.295) (0.084) (0.268) (0.077) (0.268) (0.077) 
Constant Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
                 
Observations 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 
 
We find weak evidence that the more dissatisfied owners are before a cam-
paign, the more likely the activist will make a takeover bid and seek board represen-
tation, although the results are not statistically significant. This may be due to the
fact that activists’ tactics are selected to maximize their opportunities to achieve
their goals and thus are more company specific. Interestingly, we find that the
higher the dissatisfied ownership (or the number of dissatisfied owners), the higher
the probability the activist threat to sue the management or take other hostile ac-
tions. This is plausible as activists can pressure managers more especially when the
existing shareholders are dissatisfied with poor company performance.
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2.8.2 Cross-sectional returns
Often the announcement returns are seen as the perceived success of activists (Brav,
Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008). We conjecture that the existence of dissatisfied
owners are more likely to support the activists and thus for campaigns with more
potential supporters, the activists may have a higher chance of success. In this
subsection, we present evidence to support this conjecture.
We first measure the cumulative abnormal announcement return for the win-
dow [-5,5] and [-10,10] trading days around the announcement day. To see if there
is any reversal, we also measure the cumulative abnormal quarterly return around
the announcement using the [-2,60] trading days window. For long term return and
long term success, our measure of dissatisfied ownership (before-target quarter) is
beyond its scope thus we do not investigate it here. The summary statistics for the
short term and long term returns is presented in Table 2.1. Similar to the prior
literature, our sample experiences a statistically significant return during the 10
(20) day window around the announcement and is 4.1% (4.3%) on average. The
quarterly return after the announcement is 2.7% on average.
We regress announcement returns as well as subsequent quarterly returns on
the existence of displeased owners for the activism sample:
Returni,t = α+ β × dissatisfied ownersi,t + γ × Zi,t + εi,t (2.23)
We report the results for different return specifications in columns (1), (2),
and (3) in Table 2.12 respectively. In each specification, we use the same four dif-
ferent measures of dissatisfied owners as before. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2.12: An analysis of institutional dissatisfied owners and target firm stock
returns
This table applies an ordinary least square model to examine how the existence of dissat-
isfied institutions affects activists’ campaign announcement returns. Column (1) and (2)
investigates short term market reaction while column (3) use the quarterly return as a long
term measure. All other independent variables are as defined in Table 2.1 and 2.2. In each
column we report coefficients and their heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. ∗, ∗∗ and
∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 (1a) 
Returns 
(1b) 
Returns 
(1c) 
Returns 
(1d) 
Returns 
(2a) 
Returns 
(2b) 
Returns 
(2c) 
Returns 
(2d) 
Returns 
(3a) 
Returns 
(3b) 
Returns 
(3c) 
Returns 
(3d) 
Returns 
VARIABLES [-5,+5] [-5,+5] [-5,+5] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] [-10,+10] [-10,+10] [-10,+10] [-2,+60] [-2,+60] [-2,+60] [-2,+60] 
             
O_neg  0.026*    0.036*    0.059**   
  (0.014)    (0.019)    (0.025)   
O_neg_large 0.029*    0.041*    0.069**    
 (0.016)    (0.021)    (0.029)    
PO_neg   0.021*    0.017     0.035 
   (0.013)    (0.018)     (0.024) 
PO_neg_large    0.086*    0.078   0.230**  
    (0.046)    (0.068)   (0.092)  
LogMV 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
BM 0.013 0.013 0.014* 0.014* 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Dividend yield -0.646 -0.648 -0.733 -0.766 -0.026 -0.031 -0.179 -0.204 -2.034 -2.046 -2.310 -2.277 
 (0.848) (0.848) (0.847) (0.856) (1.327) (1.327) (1.329) (1.341) (1.690) (1.691) (1.687) (1.693) 
Past return 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.020 0.044 0.044 0.040 0.039 -0.025 -0.024 -0.019 -0.027 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.051) 
Illiquidity -0.007 -0.007 -0.011 -0.013 0.026 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.123** 0.123** 0.108* 0.114* 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) 
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
             
Observations 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 
R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.020 
 
We find that all our proxies for dissatisfied owners are significantly and pos-
itively associated with the perceived success of activists upon announcement. A 1
percentage increase in the dissatisfied ownership is associated with 2.6 (3.6) basis
point increase in the 10 (20) days return around announcement and the result is
not reversed but slightly increases for the following quarter. The magnitudes of
coefficient for large owners are slightly bigger. This provides some suggestive evi-
dence that the presence of such a discontented shareholder base may well be more
pro-activist and lead to their success of pushing changes in these companies.
2.9 Evidence on support to activists from dissatisfied
owners
This section attempts to provide direct evidence for our conjecture that dissatisfied
institutions can be the potential allies of activists and thus we test how they vote
during annual meetings under the influence of the campaigns as well as after the
campaigns. As is shown in Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), the median
campaign length is 369 days, for each target company with voting records after a
campaign announcement, we take the annual meeting that takes place during one
calendar year after campaign announcement as the campaign year annual meeting.
Voting against management can be seen as pro-activist (Kedia, Starks and Wang,
2016) and we investigate whether institutions classified as dissatisfied before a cam-
paign announcement are more likely to vote against management in the subsequent
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annual meetings of the target firms. We also check whether dissatisfied institutions
vote differently from others during the annual meetings after campaign years to rule
out the different voting preferences between them unrelated to dissatisfaction of the
target stock. As management sponsored proposals are routine proposals that do not
suffer from selection problems, we mainly focus on these proposal types. One of the
common activism agendas is to target companies with excessive executive compen-
sation and we also analyse management sponsored compensation related proposals.
We use the same definition of dissatisfied owners as in section 2.4. Dissatisfied
owners are defined at the quarter end immediately before the campaign announce-
ment. We manually match the 13F institution name with ISS voting analytics N-PX
institution ID and there are in total 193 institutions, 799 firm-year annual meetings
in the campaign year and 1,838 firm-year annual meetings afterwards. On aver-
age, institutions vote against management proposals 10.1% of the time, while the
ISS recommends against management 7.8% of the time. For each voting institution
(fund family), we follow the literature and define % against as the proportion of its
total funds voting against management. As the measure also captures disagreement
within fund family, we also defined the dummy variable against = 1 if there is at
least one fund within the fund family vote against management.
We present the results in Table 2.13. Panel A presents all management
sponsored compensation related proposals while panel B includes all management
sponsored proposals. Column (a) presents the ordinary least square results with per-
centage funds within a fund family against management as dependent variable while
column (b) presents the result of the linear probability model using dummy variable
against = 1 as the dependent variable. Column (1) includes annual meetings during
one year after the campaign announcement and column (2) investigates all annual
meetings afterwards.We include a set of firm level control variables measured at the
fiscal year end before annual meetings. ROA is defined as earnings before interest,
tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by lagged assets. Leverage is
the book leverage ratio defined as debt/(debt + book value of equity). ISSAgainst
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ISS recommend to vote against management.
All other independent variables are as defined in Table 2.1.We include institution,
proposal type and year fixed effect and clustered standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
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Table 2.13: An analysis of institutional dissatisfied owners’ voting
This table examines how the dissatisfied institutions vote during annual meetings of target
companies. Panel (A) presents all management sponsored compensation related proposals
while panel B includes all management sponsored proposals. Column (1) includes annual
meetings during one year after the campaign announcement and column (2) investigates
all annual meetings afterwards. Column (a) uses the percentage of funds voting against
management within an institution as the dependent variable and an ordinary least square
model. Columns (b) apply the probit model to the dummy variable Against = 1 if at least
one fund within the family votes against management. Dissatisfied is equal to 1 if the
institution is classified as dissatisfied in equation 2.2 at the quarter end before campaign
announcement and 0 otherwise. ISS Against equals to 1 if ISS recommends to vote against
management and 0 otherwise. The rest of the variables are measured at the fiscal year end
before the annual meetings. ROA is defined as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation
and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by lagged assets. Leverage is the book leverage ratio
defined as debt/(debt + book value of equity). All other independent variables are as defined
in Table 2.1. In each column we report coefficients and their clustered standard errors. ∗,
∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 Panel A: management compensation proposals Panel B: all management sponsored proposals 
 Campaign year Years after campaigns Campaign year Years after campaigns 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
VARIABLES % against Against % against Against % against Against % against Against 
         
Dissatisfied 0.019** 0.025*** -0.000 0.000 0.009* 0.011* 0.003 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
ISS Against 0.572*** 0.591*** 0.576*** 0.601*** 0.554*** 0.570*** 0.545*** 0.573*** 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) 
LogMV 0.000 0.008* -0.003 0.005 -0.007*** -0.002 -0.005** -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
BM -0.019*** -0.015** -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA -0.127*** -0.145*** -0.076*** -0.075*** -0.008 -0.020 -0.015 -0.014 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) 
Past return -0.000 0.001 0.004 0.004* 0.005* 0.004 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Leverage -0.025* -0.022 -0.004 -0.011 -0.000 0.005 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
Dividend yield 0.023 0.012 -0.075 -0.071 -0.096 -0.094 -0.101* -0.115* 
 (0.113) (0.120) (0.060) (0.066) (0.093) (0.101) (0.057) (0.061) 
Illiquidity 0.068 0.086 0.000 0.022 -0.001 0.012 -0.014 -0.010 
 (0.074) (0.081) (0.041) (0.043) (0.038) (0.040) (0.029) (0.033) 
O_total -0.018 -0.007 -0.001 0.007 -0.003 0.006 0.004 0.013 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Observations 13,641 13,641 65,412 65,412 151,712 151,712 684,691 684,691 
R-squared 0.438 0.423 0.409 0.387 0.439 0.401 0.412 0.377 
Institution FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Proposal type FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cluster Institution Institution Institution Institution Institution Institution Institution Institution 
 
We find that institutions that had experienced negative holding period re-
turns before a campaign announcement (the remaining dissatisfied owners) are more
likely to vote against management in routine votes and especially in management
sponsored compensation proposals. In untabulated results, the unconditional mean
of vote against management in compensation related proposals is 15.2%. Dissatisfac-
tion increases the likelihood by 2.5 percentage points. Consistent with the literature,
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we find institutions are more likely to vote against management in compensation
related proposals if the ISS votes against management and if the firm performs
poorly in operation. The latter do not affect institutional voting in all management
sponsored proposals. Interestingly, in the annual meetings after the campaign year,
there is no difference in term of voting patterns between these originally dissatisfied
institutions and other institutions. This gives us direct evidence that dissatisfied
owners turn out to be more pro-activist and support our conjecture that a concen-
tration of dissatisfied institutional owners will make the firm an easier target for the
hedge fund activist.
2.10 Summary
In summary, this chapter investigates the institutional investor environment of the
target firms and relates it to the selection of target companies. It documents that
firms with a higher concentration of institutional investors expressing dissatisfaction
through voting, holding and exiting, are more likely to be the activism targets. The
revealed governance preference from institutional investors can signal the quality
of the firm and the activists are more likely to gain support from these dissatis-
fied shareholders. Supporting evidence shows that activists are more likely to use
threats to sue management or submit shareholder proposals if there are more dissat-
isfied owners holding the target companies. Indirect evidence shows that the more
dissatisfied owners there are, the higher the campaign announcement return is. Di-
rect evidence from subsequent annual meeting shows that the remaining dissatisfied
institutions are more likely to be pro-activist in routine votes and especially com-
pensation related votes. The chapter contributes to the understanding of activism
target selection.
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Chapter 3
Social networks and information
sharing in hedge fund activism
3.1 Introduction
On March 26, 2007, GAMCO Investors, Inc., a prominent activist hedge fund,
disclosed in a Schedule 13D filing a 5.4% stake in Intermec, Inc., a workflow perfor-
mance company. In the Schedule 13D, GAMCO and its affiliates stated that they
“may suggest or take a position with respect to potential changes in the operations,
management or capital structure” as a means of “enhancing shareholder values.”
Intermec’s stock price jumped 8.2% during the [-2, +2] event window surrounding
the announcement.
Transamerica Asset Management, an investment company, began to pur-
chase Intermec’s shares aggressively around GAMCO’s announcement. During the
60 calendar days prior to the 13D filing, Transamerica accumulated 0.6% of Inter-
mec’s outstanding stock, and the fund acquired 198,660 shares on March 2 alone.
Given Intermec’s average daily volume was 640,973 shares during the 60-day period
(excluding GAMCO’s purchases), Transamerica was clearly a standout.
Interestingly, Transamerica and GAMCO were linked with each other through
their key personnel. For example, Patricia L. Sawyer, a director of Transamerica
since 1993, served as Vice President at the American Express Company (NYSE
ticker: AXP) from 1987 to 1989. During the same period, John C. Ferrara was
director for financial planning and analysis, a senior role at AXP. Mr. Ferrara
held various senior positions at GAMCO from 1999 to the end of 2007. The social
connection Ms. Sawyer and Mr. Ferrara established while working at AXP might
have facilitated information flows between the two funds, which could have influ-
enced Transamerica’s decision to purchase the Intermec stock around GAMCO’s
disclosure of its large stake in the company.
The Transamerica/GAMCO case does not appear to be an exception.1 Ac-
tivist hedge funds, which push for broad changes at (underperforming) firms, often
1According to a 2014 Wall Street Journal article (Pulliam, Chung, Benoit, and Barry, 2014),
Jana Partners LLC informed Elliott Management Corp. of its stake in Juniper Networks, Inc.
before the media reported on the stake on January 23, 2014. The article provided several other
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communicate with other investors about their campaigns, permissible under the
SEC rules.2 In doing so, these sophisticated investors can build alliances for their
planned campaigns at the target firms. As minority shareholders, activists need
the support of other institutional investors in order to accomplish their goals (Brav,
Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008; Jiang, Li, and Mei, 2016). The head of activist
strategy at Clinton Group, Inc., another activist fund, once commented “I’m happy
to give people my thoughts on things I own and I’m happy to learn about how other
people think.” (Pulliam, Chung, Benoit, and Barry, 2014.)
Institutional investors that receive information on the activist’s campaign,
either before or after the activist’s disclosure, can potentially profit from this in-
formation. Communication prior to the disclosure enables the activist to use “the
pop in the stock price to help pay these people [institutions],” according to corpo-
rate law firm Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. Further communication after
the 13D filing would clarify the activist’s goals and plans, and help build a solid
alliance, which could increase the odds of winning the coming battle against the
target company.
Despite the importance of this issue, however, the academic literature has
not formally analyzed the characteristics of social interactions between the activist
and other institutions around activism events, or more importantly, how such in-
formation flows would help the activist to attract allies for its campaign. In this
paper, we study information dissemination during activist campaigns using a social
network framework (see Jackson (2011) for an overview of social networks applica-
tions). The activist, on the one hand, possesses valuable private information — its
insights of the target company, its stake, and its planned actions against the firm.
As a minority stockholder, the activist has a strong incentive to gain attention and
support from other important players such as large institutional investors. Institu-
tional investors, on the other hand, have a strong incentive to access this private
information to trade profitably. An institution and the activist are more likely to
interact if they are socially connected. A convenient feature for identification is that
the connection itself typically has been formed prior to the activism event, and its
formation is usually independent of the information to be transmitted.
Our study builds on a comprehensive sample covering 1,422 activist cam-
paigns involving 287 unique activists from 2005 to 2014. We use the BoardEx
database to identify social ties between managers of the lead activist and those at
other institutions, of which the main social relationships are school ties (36% of
all ties) and past employment ties (55% of all connections), as well as connections
from club membership and charity work (9% of all ties). To test whether infor-
mation is spread via the social network between the lead activist and institutional
investors, we first compare the trades of institutions whose mangers are socially
connected to the activist with trades of funds whose managers have no ties with
similar cases.
2Generally, investors are free to communicate with one another in any manner they prefer,
subject to restrictions that apply if they are held to be engaging in a solicitation of proxies, avoiding
disclosure obligations, or if they have access to material, confidential information about the company
whose stock they hold, or are trading.
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the activist. To the extent socially connected fund managers have a comparative
advantage in collecting information regarding the activist’s campaign, we should
observe that they purchase more aggressively around the activist disclosure, and
earn higher risk-adjusted returns on their trades. The increase of overall stakes by
connected institutions can potentially benefit the lead activist, resulting in a higher
rate of campaign success.
Our analyses reveal that actively managed institutions whose managers are
socially connected to those at the lead activist tend to increase their stakes in the
target firm around the activist disclosure. More specifically, a connected institution
is 2.9 percentage points more likely to increase its portfolio weight in the target
firm, compared to funds that are not socially connected to the activist. We find
similar effects of social ties on institutional trading prior to the activist disclosure,
using 13F institutional ownership data and an alternative transaction database.
Interestingly, using a difference-in-differences specification, we find that there is a
stronger association between social connections and the propensity for trading when
the activist has a better track record, as measured by its past success rate. This
suggests that support from connected funds is not unconditional – activists of higher
quality tend to garner more support.
In addition, we explore heterogeneity in social connections. Relationships
established at public firms are associated with a lower likelihood of ownership in-
creasing around the activist disclosure, compared to connections created at private
firms and social functions such as clubs and charity work. This is potentially at-
tributed to a lower chance of knowing someone well in public companies, which are
typically larger than private firms and functions.
Connected funds also perform significantly better on their investments than
non-connected institutions, generating a risk-adjusted long-short portfolio return
of 1.8% per month. Furthermore, we find that connected institutions as a whole
increase their ownership in the target by 1.3 percentage points of the outstanding
stock around the campaign disclosure, relative to non-connected institutions. There
is also a wide spread in the differential changes in holdings in the target stock, sug-
gesting that activists in certain targets could enjoy disproportionally more support
from connected funds. Further evidence suggests that such disproportional acqui-
sition of stocks by connected funds around the disclosure benefits the activists by
increasing the campaign success rate, including gaining board seats, as these share-
holders can be the activist core allies in its endeavors in making changes at the target
firm (see Brav, Dasgupta, and Mathews (2016) for a theoretical discussion). As our
study focuses on the interaction between the activist and actively managed funds,
it complements Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016), who found that large ownership
stakes of passive institutional investors tend to increase the likelihood of success by
activists.
Our results are robust to alternative specifications, such as the linear prob-
ability model with fund and time fixed effects. We obtain similar results by using
school ties only, which are deemed more exogenous than other types of social con-
nections (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008). Another potential concern is that a
social tie with the lead activist may capture a higher ability of the fund manager,
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rather than a comparative advantage in information. To address this, we control
for elite school ties as a proxy for fund managers’ ability, as suggested by Butler
and Gurun (2012). Our result shows that, after controlling for elite school ties,
non-elite school ties still significantly predict institutional trading. Furthermore, if
social ties capture similarities in fund characteristics or investment styles between
the activist and connected institutions, we would expect that connected funds also
trade more aggressively non-target stocks in the activist’s portfolio during the cam-
paign quarter. A placebo test using 13F institutional holdings data finds no such
effect.
Our study relates a growing literature on hedge fund activism to the literature
on the role of social networks in economics and finance.3 Recent work on hedge
fund activism has examined the characteristics of hedge fund activism events, and
whether such actions create value for target shareholders (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and
Thomas, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner, 2015). A
strand of this literature analyzes the effects of activism on two important groups of
stakeholders: creditors (Klein and Zur, 2011) and employees (Brav, Jiang, and Kim,
2015; Fos and Jiang, 2015). Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2016) also document that
institutional selling tends to raise a firm’s probability of becoming an activist target.
However, little is known about whether and how activists influence other investors’
decisions to trade the target stock, and whether such influence would support the
activist’s agenda in achieving its stated goals.
Brav, Dasgupta, and Mathews (2016) have developed a theoretical model to
study so-called “wolf pack” activism, in which coordination is established between
the lead activist and other institutions as they anticipate each other’s actions in
making their trading decisions. Our paper, by uncovering a potential information
channel through which activists can influence other institutions’ trading decisions,
complements the implicit coordination channel they model. Information exchange
between the lead activist and institutional investors could facilitate effective coor-
dination. Our work is related to, but distinct from, a recent study by Wong (2016),
which examines the formation of wolf packs during activism events, and finds that
investors other than the lead activist accumulate some shares before the activist dis-
closure. Our paper takes a different approach by explicitly mapping out investors’
social connections such as school ties and past employment relationships, which en-
ables us to study information dissemination and alliance building around activism
events.4
Our paper is also related to the literature on how social networks may af-
fect investors’ investment decisions and portfolio performance. Recent theoretical
work shows that information sharing among investors generally improves market
efficiency (Colla and Mele, 2010; Ozsoylev and Walden, 2011; Han and Yang, 2013).
3See Jackson (2014) for an introduction to economics of social networks, and Allen and Babus
(2008) for a survey of networks in finance.
4Unlike Wong (2016), we do not focus on potential information leakage prior to activists’ dis-
closures. The SEC is currently investigating whether certain activist hedge funds have coordinated
their trades without filing appropriate disclosures (Schedule 13D filings). Rather, we argue in-
vestors who receive information from the activists, either before or after the activists’ disclosures,
can potentially profit from this information.
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Empirically, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) have shown a correlation in trades by
mutual fund managers who work in the same city, while Cohen, Frazzini, and Mal-
loy (2008) found that fund managers enjoy higher abnormal returns by investing
in firms to which they are connected through school ties. The literature also in-
cludes Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007), Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner (2007), Pool,
Stoffman, and Yonker (2015), Gao and Huang (2015), Ahern (2016), and Gompers,
Mukharlyamov, and Xuan (2016). Our study is different in that there is potentially
a higher incentive for information exchange between the lead activist and connected
institutions as the latter appear to stand ready to support the activist’s endeavor in
implementing its agenda. Our unique setting also enables an estimation of mutual
benefits to the lead activist and its connected institutions.
3.2 Data sources and sample overview
3.2.1 Sample of activist campaigns
Similar to Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) and Gantchev (2013), we use
data from Schedule 13D filings and SharkRepellent — a data provider specializing in
corporate governance — to construct a comprehensive list of campaigns launched by
activist hedge funds from 2005 to 2014. Our sample starts in 2005 for two reasons.
First, social network data on fund managers are sparse before 2005. Second, and
more importantly, mutual funds, a major type of institution studied in this paper,
have been required by the SEC to report their quarterly holdings of US stocks
since May 2004. The activist hedge funds are referred to as lead activists. Our
main source is Schedule 13D, which an investor is required to file with the SEC if
they acquire 5% or more of a publicly traded firm with the intention to influence
its operation, strategy or management. SharkRepellent further identifies activism
events in which the campaigns are launched through press releases, rather than 13D
filings.
We manually collect the following information: the lead activist’s filing date
or press release date, the activist’s identity and its ownership in the target company
at disclosure, the campaign outcome (what the activist achieves from its interven-
tion), and the name and CUSIP of the target firm. Our campaign sample starts with
2,016 unique activism events. The sample is reduced to 1,422 unique campaigns after
it is merged with CRSP, Compustat, BoardEx, and the Thomson Reuters institu-
tional ownership database. These events involve 1,050 distinct target firms and 287
lead activists. Figure 3.1 plots the annual frequency of activist campaigns and the
number of unique lead activists over our sample period. Activism activity reached
its peak in 2007, before dropping significantly during the financial crisis and then
increasing in more recent years.
51
Figure 3.1: Hedge fund campaigns from 2005 to 2014
The grey bars plot the annual number of campaigns launched by lead activist hedge funds.
The dark bars plot the correspondent numbers of unique lead activist funds engaged in these
events.
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3.2.2 Sample of social networks
To identify social ties between a lead activist and other institutional investors, we re-
strict our sample of institutions to two types of actively managed funds: non-activist
institutions and non-campaign activist funds. Non-activist institutions include non-
activist hedge funds and growth-oriented mutual funds.5 Growth-oriented mutual
funds seek maximum capital gains and have comparatively high risks, thus share
some features of hedge funds (Klein and Li, 2015). We exclude other types of mutual
funds because these investment firms are well diversified, and their investment in a
target company is less likely to be affected by activism events. To ensure tractabil-
ity for manual collection of social ties between the lead activist and institutional
investors, we restrict non-activist hedge funds to those with an average portfolio
value above $5 billion over the past five years prior to the campaign quarter. Fur-
ther, in order to study institutions’ quarterly changes in ownership in the target
5Using the Thomson Reuters database, we obtain 13F filings for all investment firms that are
categorized as 4 or 5 in the Thomson Reuters database. These investmeampaign activist funds, the
former consisting of non-activint firms primarily are hedge funds or similar types of investing firms.
We label this group of investors “non-activist hedge funds.” Using the Thomson Reuters database,
we obtain S12 filings for mutual funds with investment objective codes equal to 2, 3 and 4, the
database’s indicators for Aggressive Growth, Growth and Growth & Income funds, respectively. We
make sure that non-activist hedge funds and growth-oriented mutual funds are mutually exclusive.
We then aggregate individual funds’ holdings at the fund manager level.
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stock before the activist disclosure, for each campaign we drop the institutions that
report holdings in the Thomson Reuters database for less than two consecutive
quarters before the campaign quarter.
Our sample of institutions consists of 454 unique non-activist institutions
and 282 unique non-campaign activist funds. The average number of all institutions
for one campaign is 467, with an average of 276 non-activist funds, and 191 non-
campaign activist funds.
Procedure for identifying social connections
Our primary data source to identify social connections between each institution
and the lead activist is BoardEx. BoardEx collects biographical and relationship
data for directors and senior executives in public and private companies across the
globe. We locate funds – lead activists and other institutions – in BoardEx by
manually searching variations of their names.6 For all funds identified in BoardEx,
the top four positions are Managing Director, Vice President, Director, and Portfolio
Manager. A lead activist and an institution are defined to be socially connected if
any top official from the activist has a social relationship with a top official from
the institution. From our original sample, we drop 101 activists and 125 institutions
that have never had any recorded officials in BoardEx.
The two main social relationships identified by BoardEx are school ties (when
two people attended the same university at the same time), and employment ties
(when two people worked in the same organization at the same time, such as sitting
on the Board of Directors of a company). Other ties include club membership and
charity work.
To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we include only “past ties” that have been
established well before the activist launches its campaign. Reverse causality would
be a concern if we were to include ties created during or after the campaign year,
because the activist often gains board seats during the campaign, which may create
new ties with certain institutions via serving on the board. Past ties between the
activist and other institutions, however, are relatively exogenous to the initiation of
an activist campaign, thus facilitating causal interpretation.
Our independent variable of interest, connection to lead activist, takes a
value of 1 if at least one relationship established in the past between two funds’
key personnel is still active during the campaign quarter. Otherwise, this dummy
variable equals 0. During our sample period a fund may experience turnover of its
key personnel. We thus deem a relationship with another fund to be severed if a
key connected person leaves before the campaign year and there is no other active
relationship between existing personnel pair of the two funds.
A simple example illustrates social connections between two funds. Ronald
H. McGlynn and Mario J. Gabelli both graduated from Columbia Business School
in 1967. In 1973, Ronald H. McGlynn co-founded Cramer Rosenthal McGlynn,
LLC (“CRM”), a $7 billion hedge fund. In 1977, Mario J. Gabelli founded Gabelli
6For individual funds that do not exist in BoardEx, we use information of directors and senior
executives at their fund families.
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Asset Management Company Investors (“GAMCO Investors”), a prominent activist
hedge fund. The “start time” for the tie between CRM and GAMCO Investors is
thus 1977. Both were still working at the two funds as of May 2016. Therefore,
for the 2007 activism event launched by GAMCO Investors in Aquila, Inc., an
electricity and natural gas distribution firm, CRM was a connected fund. For CRM,
the dummy variable, connection to lead activist, equals 1 for this event. A more
rigorous algorithm is shown in Appendix A.
It is worth noting that our method of defining the variable connection to
lead activist is conservative. We do not sum all the personal ties between any two
funds. Large institutions typically have more key employees, thus the summation
may simply capture the “size effect.” Another potentially more important reason
is that BoardEx may not cover all personnel working at all institutions during our
sample period. Adding up all the personal ties between two funds thus could further
introduce bias. Nevertheless, using the summation of all the personal ties between
two funds yields similar results to our main findings.
3.2.3 Institutional ownership and trading data
To examine how socially connected institutions trade around activist campaigns and
the potential benefits of such trades, relative to non-connected funds, we mainly
rely on Thomson Reuters 13F institutional ownership information.7 As illustrated
in Figure 3.2, for each institution in our sample, we obtain its quarterly holdings
in each target firm immediately before and after the activist disclosure date (13D
or press release date). We then use two metrics for this institution’s holdings in
the target firm: (1) weight of the target stock in the institution’s portfolio, (2)
percent ownership of the target’s outstanding stock. As funds’ portfolio allocations
are constrained by their total capital available, we mainly use the first measure to
investigate whether social connections affect funds’ trading in the target firm.
Figure 3.2: An illustration of the event timeline
This timeline illustrates the timing of an activist event. The activist disclosure takes place
during quarter t (from the end of quarter t− 1 to the end of quarter t).
 
 
 
  
Activist’s Disclosure 
End of Quarter t-1 End of Quarter t End of Quarter t-2 
7Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, investment firms with over $100 million of US
equities are required to report their US equity holdings in a Form 13F within 45 days of calendar
quarter ending March 31, June 30, September 30 and December 31.
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By using 13F institutional ownership data in our main analysis, we do not
know when exactly in a quarter an institution’s trades are executed and, therefore,
we cannot make inferences on whether the investor traded prior to or after the
activist disclosure. We attempt to separately study the effect of social connections on
institutional trading before the activist disclosure as trading activity could be most
sensitive to information during this period. To this end, we rely on a transaction
database which includes only a subset of the institutions that file Schedule 13Fs as
well as smaller funds that are not required to file 13Fs. We are able to match 638
distinct activist events, which involve 537 unique target firms and 190 lead activists.
As we do not observe the complete portfolios for funds in this transaction database,
our main specification relates changes in funds’ ownership in target firms to their
social connections with the lead activist.
3.2.4 Sample overview
Firm characteristics
Table 3.1 compares characteristics of the target firms to those of a set of industry,
size (market capitalization), and book-to-market (“B/M”) matched firms. Matched
companies for each target are assigned from the same year, same industry based
on three-digit SIC, and same 10×10 size and B/M sorted portfolios. Column (1)
presents the means, medians, and standard deviations of characteristics for the
target companies. Column (2) reports differences in attributes between the average
target firm and the average matched company. When we report the difference in
size, the size matching criterion is abandoned, and when we describe the difference
in B/M, the B/M matching is dropped.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of firm fundamentals
This table reports the characteristics of firms targeted by lead activist hedge funds. Column
(1) presents the averages, medians, and standard deviations of characteristics for the target
companies. Column (2) reports differences between the target firms and the industry, size
(market capitalization), and book-to-market matched firms. Our sample includes all 1,422
firms targeted by activists from 2005 to 2014. B/M is book value of equity divided by market
value of equity. Growth is the growth rate of sales over the previous year. Return on assets
is defined as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) scaled
by lagged assets. Cash is (cash + cash equivalents)/assets, and Dividend yield is (common
dividend + preferred dividend)/(market value of common stock + book value of preferred
stock). Prior − year stock return is the buy-and-hold stock return during the 12 months.
Amihud illiquidity is the yearly average (using daily data ending quarter t-1 from CRSP)
of 1000
√|ret|/dollartradingvolume. Finally, Institutional ownership is the proportion
of shares held by institutional investors, as reported by the Thomson Reuters Ownership
Database. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
 
VARIABLES Summary statistics Difference with matched firms 
 Average Median Std. Dev. Diff. in Avg. t-stat. of Diff. 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) 
Market value ($ billion) 1.255 0.206 3.751 -2.107*** -6.21 
B/M 0.771 0.533 0.594 0.064*** 3.51 
Growth 0.104 0.052 0.397 -0.061*** -3.98 
Return on assets (ROA) 0.055 0.083 0.186 0.078*** 13.97 
Cash 0.202 0.120 0.212 -0.027*** -4.05 
Dividend yield 0.010 0.000 0.059 -0.002*** -5.40 
Prior-year stock return 0.008 0.011 0.484 -0.014 -1.24 
Amihud illiquidity 0.355 0.115 0.661 -0.237*** -10.45 
Institutional ownership 0.592 0.631 0.301 0.201*** 27.01 
Table 3.1 shows that target companies are significantly smaller than matched
firms (at the 1% level), with an average market value of $1.3 billion. However, target
stocks are more liquid, measured by Amihud Illiquidity (Amihud, 2002). Targets
have higher B/M ratios, implying activist hedge funds are value investors (Brav,
Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008). Relative to their matched peers, target compa-
nies have slower sales growth. However, they have higher profitability, as measured
by return on assets (ROA), which is consistent with Gantchev (2013). In terms of
capital structure, targets have a lower cash-to-assets ratio and dividend yield. In-
terestingly, target firms appear to experience lower buy-and-hold returns during the
12 months prior to the activist announcement, indicating the lead activists are more
likely to target underperforming firms.8 Lead activists also tend to target firms with
significantly higher institutional ownership, consistent with a key finding of Jiang,
Li and Mei (2016), who analyze activists’ endeavors in opposing announced merger
deals. Consistent with Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), Klein and Zur
8In our sample, prior-year stock returns for target firms are lower than those in Brav, Jiang,
Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), and Gantchev (2013). This is likely to be due to the fact that our
sample period includes the 2008-2009 financial crisis, during which many target companies had
negative returns.
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(2009), and Gantchev (2013), our overall evidence suggests activists tend to target
small and underperforming companies with no significant operational issues.
Network characteristics
Table 3.2 shows characteristics of the networks between lead activists and other
institutions for 2005-2014. For example, the 2010 sample consists of 60 unique
lead activists, 281 non-activist institutions, and 207 non-campaign activist funds.
There is a total of 53,563 relationship pairs between the lead activists and other
institutions for the 122 campaigns launched in 2010, 6.1% of which are connected
relationships (defined as “network density”). The most frequent relationships are
school ties (2.14% of all relationship pairs) and employment ties (3.12% of all re-
lationship pairs). Other ties, such as club membership and charity work, make
up the remaining 1.89% of connections. Although there is some fluctuation in the
number of lead activists across years, the number of institutional investors and the
network density remains relatively stable. This is consistent with findings in the
social network literature (Jackson, 2011).
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of network characteristics
This table reports the network characteristics. Column (1a)-(1c) show the annual numbers
of lead activists and other institutions, respectively. Column (1d) reports the numbers of all
relationship pairs between the lead activists and institutional investors, while column (1e)
lists the numbers of all socially connected pairs between the lead activists and institutional
investors. Column (2) reports network densities for all connections, school ties, employment
ties, and other ties, respectively. For each type of connection, network density is defined as
the number of connected pairs divided by the number of total pairs.
  Institutional investors   Network density 
Year 
# Lead 
activists  
# Non-campaign 
activist funds 
# Non-activist 
institutions 
# Relationship pairs 
b/t lead activists and 
institutions 
# Connected pairs 
b/t lead activists 
and institutions 
All 
connections 
School 
ties 
Employment 
ties 
Other 
ties 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) 
2005 78 164 290 67,822 2,458 3.55% 1.52% 1.17% 0.88% 
2006 99 178 258 81,746 5,035 6.16% 1.78% 2.76% 2.28% 
2007 96 202 290 95,763 5,282 5.52% 1.92% 2.27% 1.97% 
2008 96 215 259 83,710 4,342 5.19% 1.48% 2.06% 2.31% 
2009 56 220 281 44,929 2,563 5.70% 1.60% 2.82% 1.96% 
2010 60 207 281 53,563 3,276 6.12% 2.14% 3.12% 1.89% 
2011 59 187 253 45,572 2,640 5.79% 1.88% 2.76% 2.20% 
2012 64 212 365 63,634 4,303 6.72% 2.78% 3.94% 0.89% 
2013 64 209 365 63,800 5,141 8.06% 3.21% 5.33% 1.08% 
2014 54 202 352 60,465 4,955 8.19% 2.96% 5.15% 1.32% 
 
3.3 Social Networks and institutional trading
If connected institutions are better informed about the lead activist’s stake in the
target firm and its plan of attack, we should observe larger trades by them around
the activist disclosure (Brav, Dasgupta, and Mathews, 2016). For each type of
institution, we mainly report quarterly changes in ownership around the disclosure.
In subsections 3.3.5 and 3.3.6, we further investigate whether connected institutions
trade more aggressively prior to the disclosure, during which information presumably
is more valuable.
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3.3.1 Univariate analysis of quarterly ownership
To start with, Table 3.3 reports connected institutions’ portfolio values and their
investments in target stocks, compared to non-connected institutions. On average,
a connected institution has a portfolio value of $25.9 billion, significantly larger
than that of a non-connected one (t-statistic = 70.6). Connected institutions also
invest more capital in the target stock before the activist disclosure. In terms of
the weight of the target stock in the institution’s portfolio, however, the difference
between connected and non-connected institutions is not statistically significant at
the 10% level.
Table 3.3: Univariate analysis of quarterly ownership
This table compares the overall portfolio value and investment in the target firm between
connected institutions and non-connected institutions. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 Connected institutions Difference with non-connected institutions 
 Average Median Std. Dev. Diff. in Avg. t-stat. of Diff. 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) 
Total portfolio value ($ billion) 25.870 5.244 86.293 15.945*** 70.58 
Capital invested in target stock before lead activist’s 
disclosure ($ million) 2.751 0.000 32.351 1.984
*** 23.46 
Weight of target stock in a fund’s portfolio before lead 
activist’s disclosure (%) 0.014 0.000 0.209 0.000 0.01 
Increase in capital in target stock ($ million) 0.189 0.000 14.374 0.219*** 4.92 
Percentage point increase in the weight of target stock 
in a fund’s portfolio around lead activist’s disclosure 
(%) 
0.005 0.000 0.298 0.007*** 5.78 
 
Importantly, around the disclosure, connected institutions on average in-
crease their capital investment in the target, while non-connected ones actually
reduce their holdings. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.
This univariate analysis provides initial evidence that socially connected institu-
tions trade more aggressively around activist disclosures, presumably because they
are more informed about their positions and plans.
3.3.2 Changes in institutions’ quarterly ownership
Having shown that an institution’s social connection to the lead activist is associ-
ated with more purchases around the disclosure, we now turn to multivariate tests
of whether this trading decision is systematically related to the institution’s rela-
tionship to the activist, controlling for the institution’s capital constraint and other
target firm-level attributes. We estimate a probit model in which the dependent
variable equals 1 if an institution increases the weight of the target firm in its port-
folio around the disclosure date (from quarter end t-1 to t), 0 otherwise. The results
are presented in Table 3.4. Each column displays the coefficients and the associated
marginal probability representing the marginal effect of each regressor on the likeli-
hood of an institution’s increase in ownership in the target. The set of regressors is
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the same as that in Table 3.1.
Table 3.4: Social connections and institutional trading
This table applies a probit model to examine whether connection to the lead activist predicts
a change in an institution’s ownership in the target firm around the activist’s disclosure.
Connection to lead activist is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the institution is connected
to the activist as of year t − 1 (year t is when the activist discloses it position in the
target firm). We report the main results for the full sample, the sample of activist funds,
and the sample of non-activist institutions in column (1), (2), and (3) respectively. All
other independent variables are as defined in Table 3.1. In each column we report probit
coefficients, their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics, and the marginal probability change
induced by a one-unit change in the value of a specific covariate from its sample average. ∗,
∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
                         Dependent variable: dummy for an increase in the weight of the target stock in a fund’s portfolio 
around the activist’s disclosure 
 Full sample Non-activist institutions Non-campaign activist funds 
 Coefficient t-stat. Marg. 
Prob. 
Coefficient t-stat. Marg. 
Prob. 
Coefficient t-stat. Marg. 
Prob. 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c) 
Connection to lead activist 0.347*** 34.25 2.91% 0.365*** 31.23 3.80% 0.185*** 8.35 0.83% 
Log (MV) 0.165*** 65.43 1.04% 0.181*** 60.80 1.43% 0.129*** 25.42 0.48% 
Return on assets (ROA) 0.080*** 3.28 0.50% 0.147*** 4.98 1.15% -0.107** -2.38 -0.40% 
Prior-year stock return 0.031*** 4.05 0.19% 0.016* 1.75 0.13% 0.062** 4.26 0.24% 
B/M 0.048*** 7.97 0.30% 0.057*** 7.95 0.45% 0.025** 2.12 0.09% 
Growth -0.072*** -7.01 -0.44% -0.089*** -7.21 -0.70% -0.032* -1.73 -0.12% 
Cash 0.134*** 7.69 0.87% 0.184*** 8.52 1.45% 0.042 1.22 0.16% 
Dividend yield 0.163*** 3.25 1.02% 0.222*** 3.91 1.75% -0.026 -0.12 -0.10% 
Amihud illiquidity -0.034*** -4.08 -0.21% -0.023*** -2.65 -0.18% -0.068*** -3.15 -0.26% 
Institutional ownership 0.531*** 38.29 3.32% 0.560*** 34.08 4.40% 0.498*** 18.15 1.88% 
          
Observations 611,139   361,279   249,860   
Pseudo R-squared 8.3%   9.3%   6.0%   
% (Dep variable = 1) 3.8%   5.0%   2.0%   
 
Column (1) shows results for the full sample of all institutions. Most im-
portantly, and consistent with results in Table 3.3, Connection to lead activist has
a significant (at the 1% level) impact on the likelihood of a fund’s increase in the
weight of the target firm in its portfolio. A connected institution is 2.9 percentage
points more likely to raise its stake in the target around the activist disclosure, com-
pared to those that are not socially connected to the lead activist. Relative to the
unconditional probability of 3.8% for an increase in the target stock, the incremental
probability is remarkable. Such a relation indicates that even after controlling for
institutions’ capital constraints, connected funds buy target stock more aggressively,
likely due to better access to information via their social connections to the lead
activist.
As expected, institutions are more likely to increase their weights in larger
and more liquid targets, as measured by the logarithm of market capitalization
and Amihud Illiquidity. This is consistent with Falkenstein (1996), Gompers and
Metrick (2001), and Bennett, Sias and Starks (2003), who found that institutions
prefer the stock of large corporations with a deeper market. Relatedly, funds have
a higher propensity to purchase stocks with a higher institutional ownership, which
are also larger and have a higher liquidity. Institutions also tend to chase recent
outperforming firms as measured by return on assets (ROA) or prior-year stock
59
return, consistent with Gompers and Metrick (2001), and Ferreira and Matos (2008).
Investors on average reduce their investment in growth stocks, as implied by the
negative coefficient on growth (significant at the 1% level), suggesting they are able
to exploit value anomaly. This is also consistent with a positive coefficient on B/M.
Institutions tend to increase holdings in cash-rich firms, and those that pay large
dividends, consistent with findings in Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008),
and Gantchev (2013).
Next, we examine the effects of social ties for non-activist institutions and
non-campaign activist funds, respectively. Column (2) shows that a connected non-
activist institution is 3.8 percentage points more likely to increase its portfolio weight
in the target around the disclosure, compared to non-activist institutions that are
not socially connected to the lead activist. Coefficient estimates for other covariates
are similar to those for the full sample.
Column (3) reports results for a subsample of non-campaign activist funds.
The coefficient estimate on connection on lead activist indicates that a connected
non-campaign activist fund is 0.8 percentage point more likely to increase its portfo-
lio weight in the target firm around the lead activist’s disclosure. This is consistent
with findings for the full sample and the subsample of non-activist institutions.
The incremental probability is economically significant relative to the unconditional
probability of 2.0% for an increase in the portfolio weight in the target. Similar
to the results for the full sample, these activist funds are more likely to increase
investment in larger and more liquid firms with higher institutional ownership, as
well as value stocks with higher recent returns. However, the funds tend to increase
their weights in firms with lower returns on assets, while cash and dividend yield
do not seem to affect these investors’ weights in the target firm. These suggest that
non-campaign activist funds’ investment objectives may be different from the rest
of the sample – non-activist institutions.
3.3.3 Robustness analyses
Sensitivity to alternative specifications
In the analyses above, we take into account an institution’s capital constraint in
creating our dependent variable. Although this is our preferred measure, we also
carry out an analysis by using an alternative measure — a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the fund increases its percent ownership of the target company around the
activist disclosure. As shown in Table 3.5, for the full sample, a connected institution
is 2.7 percentage points more likely to increase its ownership in the target around
the disclosure (significant at the 1% level), relative to those that are not connected
to the activist. The magnitude is comparable to our main analysis.
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Table 3.5: Social connections and changes in institutional ownership
This table applies a probit model to examine whether connection to the lead activist predicts
a change in an institution’s ownership in the target firm around the activist’s disclosure.
Connection to lead activist is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the institution is connected to
the activist as of year t−1 (year t is when the activist discloses it position in the target firm).
All other independent variables are as defined in Table 3.1. In each column we report probit
coefficients, their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics, and the marginal probability change
induced by a one-unit change in the value of a specific covariate from its sample average. ∗,
∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:  Dummy for an increase in percent ownership of the target stock around the 
disclosure 
 Probit model 
 Coefficient t-stat. Marg. Prob. 
Connection to lead activist 0.360*** 34.61 2.74% 
Log (MV) 0.163*** 60.65 0.91% 
Return on assets (ROA) 0.065*** 2.57 0.36% 
Prior-year stock return 0.046*** 5.83 0.26% 
B/M 0.041*** 6.63 0.23% 
Growth -0.042*** -4.10 -0.24% 
Cash 0.073*** 3.83 0.41% 
Dividend yield 0.125** 2.38 0.70% 
Amihud illiquidity -0.061*** -5.05 -0.34% 
Institutional ownership 0.525*** 35.58 2.92% 
    
Observations 611,139   
Pseudo R-squared 8.5%   
Adj. R-squared    
Fund fixed effects    
Campaign event fixed effects    
% (Dep variable = 1) 3.4%   
 
To mitigate the potential concern that past employment ties and other types
of social ties may not be strictly exogenous to the activist events (i.e., social ties
are made due to an “anticipation effect”), we now focus on education ties only,
which are usually formed many years in the past, and their formation is typically
independent of the information to be transmitted via the network (Cohen, Frazzini,
and Malloy, 2008). Two managers are defined to be connected if they attended
the same school or department of a university at the same time. The results are
presented in table 3.6. Column (1) in table 3.6 shows that for the full sample, a
connected institution is 3.2 percentage points more likely to increase its weight in
the target firm around the activist disclosure than institutions without connections.
The magnitude is consistent with our estimate using all types of social connections.
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Table 3.6: Education connections and changes in institutional ownership
This table applies a probit model to examine whether connection to the lead activist predicts
a change in an institution’s ownership in the target firm around the activist’s disclosure.
Connection to lead activist is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the institution is connected
to the activist as of year t− 1 (year t is when the activist discloses it position in the target
firm). Panel (C) focuses on education ties, in which school tie to lead activist is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the institution is connected to the activist through education ties as
of year t− 1. Elite (non− elite) school tie to lead activist is an indicator equal to 1 if the
connection is through attending the same elite (non-elite) school. The list of elite schools is
the intersection of the top-20 ranking lists from US News & World Report (2008), Financial
Times (2006), and Business Week (2000). The elite schools are Berkeley, Chicago, Columbia,
Dartmouth, Harvard, Michigan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Northwestern, New
York University, Stanford, University of California, Los Angeles, University of Pennsylvania,
and Yale. All other independent variables are as defined in Table 3.1. In each column
we report probit coefficients, their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics, and the marginal
probability change induced by a one-unit change in the value of a specific covariate from
its sample average. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
 Dependent variable: dummy for an increase in the weight of the target stock in a 
fund’s portfolio around the activist’s disclosure 
 Coefficient t-stat. Marg. Prob. Coefficient t-stat. Marg. Prob. 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) 
School tie to lead activist 0.364*** 22.43 3.20%    
Elite school tie to lead activist    0.393*** 19.16 3.57% 
Non-elite school tie to lead activist    0.318*** 12.26 2.70% 
Log (MV) 0.167*** 66.33 1.06% 0.167*** 66.32 1.06% 
Return on assets (ROA) 0.074*** 3.07 0.47% 0.075*** 3.06 0.47% 
Prior-year stock return 0.034*** 4.48 0.22% 0.034*** 4.47 0.22% 
B/M 0.049*** 8.12 0.31% 0.049*** 8.11 0.31% 
Growth -0.072*** -7.05 -0.46% -0.072*** -7.04 -0.45% 
Cash 0.133*** 7.42 0.85% 0.134*** 7.42 0.85% 
Dividend yield 0.169*** 3.40 1.07% 0.170*** 3.41 1.07% 
Amihud illiquidity -0.037*** -4.31 -0.23% -0.037*** -4.31 -0.23% 
Institutional ownership 0.529*** 38.17 3.34% 0.529*** 38.15 3.34% 
       
Observations 611,139   611,139   
Pseudo R-squared 8.0%   8.0%   
% (Dep variable = 1) 3.8%   3.8%   
 
Sensitivity to alternative explanations
Many fund managers graduate from top schools. Fund managers’ social connections,
especially their school ties to the lead activist, might capture the managers’ abilities
that affect their trading decisions around the activist disclosure. To address this
potential concern, we control for ties established at elite schools as a proxy for fund
managers’ abilities, as suggested by Butler and Gurun (2012). Following Butler and
Gurun (2012), our list of elite schools is the intersection of the top-20 ranking lists
from US News & World Report (2008), Financial Times (2006), and Business Week
(2000). The elite schools are Berkeley, Chicago, Columbia, Dartmouth, Harvard,
Michigan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Northwestern, New York Univer-
sity, Stanford, University of California, Los Angeles, University of Pennsylvania, and
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Yale. Column (2) Table 3.6 reports that, after controlling for elite school ties, a con-
nected institution through a non-elite school tie is still 2.7 percentage points more
likely to increase its portfolio weight in the target stock, relative to non-connected
institutions. The estimate is significant at the 1% level.
Furthermore, we address another potential concern that social connections
might capture similarities in fund characteristics or investment styles between the
lead activist and connected institutions, rather than information advantage for the
connected institutions. We use a placebo test to examine whether connected in-
stitutions also trade more aggressively the non-target stocks in the lead activist’s
portfolio during the campaign quarter compared with non-connected ones. If social
ties truly capture similarities in fund traits or investment styles between the two
funds, then for these non-target firms we should observe a pattern similar to that
reported in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Social ties and changes in institutional ownership: a placebo test
This table applies a probit model to examine whether a connection to the lead activist
predicts a change in an institution’s ownership in the activist’s non-target portfolio firms
around the activist’s campaign disclosure. Connection to lead activist is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the institution is connected to the activist as of year t − 1 (year t is when
the activist discloses it position in the target firm). The analysis is carried out for non-
target firms with over 5% ownership by the activists during their campaign quarter. All
other independent variables are as defined in Table 3.1. In each column we report probit
coefficients, their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics, and the marginal probability change
induced by a one-unit change in the value of a specific covariate from its sample average. ∗,
∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 Dependent variable: dummy for an increase in the weight of non-target 
stocks in a fund’s portfolio around the activist’s disclosure 
 Coefficient t-stat. Marg. Prob. 
    
Connection to lead activist -0.001 -0.04 -0.01% 
Log (MV) 0.216*** 62.56 0.22% 
Return on assets (ROA) 0.001 0.05 0.01% 
Prior-year stock return 0.052*** 6.44 0.05% 
B/M 0.001*** 14.48 0.01% 
Growth -0.068*** -5.85 -0.07% 
Cash -0.102*** -6.02 -0.10% 
Dividend yield -0.307*** -4.68 -0.31% 
Amihud illiquidity -0.168*** -5.45 -0.17% 
Institutional ownership 0.025** 2.17 0.03% 
    
Observations 2,292,349   
Pseudo R-squared 7.6%   
% (Dep variable = 1) 2.8%   
 
We apply the same analysis in subsection 3.3.2 to the 1,221 unique non-
target firms with over 5% ownership by 136 activists during their campaign quarters.
The activists’ ownership in these companies is comparable to that in the campaign
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targets. As reported in Table 3.7, in contrast to our main findings, connected
institutions are 0.01 percentage points less likely to increase their portfolio weights
in non-target firms in the activist’s portfolio, although the estimate is statistically
insignificant at the 10% level. In untabulated analysis, we include all non-target
companies held by the activists in the campaign quarters and obtain similar results.
Overall, the evidence lends support to our claim that social ties capture information
flows between the activists and other institutions around the activists’ disclosures,
rather than reflect fund manager abilities, similarities in fund traits or investment
styles.
3.3.4 Heterogeneity in social ties and activist quality
The detailed biographical and relationship data in BoardEx affords us the opportu-
nity to explore how different types of social connections affect institutional trading
differently. In addition to education ties studied in subsection 3.3.3, in untabu-
lated analysis, we separately examine employment ties and other ties such as club
membership and charity work. Regarding relationships established while working
at private companies, a connected institution is 4.3 percentage points more likely
to increase its weight in the target firm around the activist disclosure than those
without connections, other things being equal. The marginal probability of increas-
ing ownership in the target due to relationships established at public companies is
estimated to be 2.8 percentage points. This smaller magnitude is potentially due to
the fact that the chance of knowing someone well in public firms is slimmer than in
private firms, which are typically smaller. For other ties, the incremental probability
of increasing ownership in the target is about 5.8 percentage points. This relatively
large magnitude again is attributed to the close-knit nature of the functions, such
as club membership and charity work.
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Table 3.8: The heterogeneity in activist quality
This table applies a probit model to examine whether the heterogeneity in activist quality
affects changes in institutions’ ownership in the target firm around the activist’s disclosure.
Connection to lead activist is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the institution is connected
to the activist as of year t − 1 (year t is when the activist discloses its position in the
target firm). Past campaign success rate equals the number of campaigns in which the
activist achieved at least one of its stated goals divided by the total number of campaigns
launched by the activist. Firm control variables are as defined in Table 3.1. In each column
we report probit coefficients, their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics, and the marginal
probability change induced by a one-unit change in the value of a specific covariate from
its sample average. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
 Dependent variable: dummy for an increase in the weight of 
the target stock in a fund’s portfolio around the activist’s 
disclosure 
 Coefficient t-stat. Marg. Prob. 
    
Connection to lead activist 0.331*** 22.11 2.74% 
Past success rate of lead activist 0.133*** 12.07 0.84% 
Connection to lead activist × Past campaign success rate 0.073** 2.14 0.46% 
Firm controls Yes   
    
Observations 611,139   
Pseudo R-squared 8.3%   
% (Dep variable = 1) 3.8%   
 
In Table 3.8, we further study whether the quality of the lead activist influ-
ences the propensity of institutional trading associated with their social ties to the
activist. The lead activist’s quality is approximated by its past campaign success
rate, which equals to the number of campaigns in which the activist achieved at
least one of its stated goals divided by the total number of campaigns launched.
The average success rate is 0.66, with a standard deviation of 0.35. The positive co-
efficient on the interaction term, connection to lead activist×past campaign success
rate, indicates that there is a stronger association between social connections and
institutional trading around activist disclosure when the activist has a better track
record. This suggests that support from connected institutions is not unconditional
– good activists on average enjoy more support from connected ones, as reflected in
more purchases of the target stock by them.
3.3.5 Changes in quarterly ownership before the activist disclosure
Using 13F institutional ownership data provides an advantage of wide coverage,
however, we do not know when in the quarter institutions’ trades are executed
and, therefore, our estimates are likely to capture the effects of social ties to the
lead activist on institutional trading both before and after the activist’s disclosure.
65
It would be interesting to separately examine the effect of social connections on
institutional trading even before the activist’s disclosure, during which trading may
be most sensitive to information flows. Similar to Klein, Saunders, and Wong (2014),
we look at institutional holdings from the end of quarter t−2 to t−1, of campaigns
with quarter t − 1 ending within 20 or 10 days before the activist disclosure (see
Figure 3.2). Such a short window ensures that the institution is likely to execute
the bulk of its trades within the past three months prior to the activist disclosure.
Table 3.9: Changes in institutional ownership before the activist disclosure
This table applies a probit model to examine whether connection to the lead activist predicts
a change (from quarter t − 2 to quarter t − 1) in an institution’s ownership in the target
firm before the activist’s disclosure. Connection to lead activist is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the institution is connected to the activist as of year t− 1 (year t is when the activist
discloses it position in the target firm). All other independent variables are as defined in
Table 3.1. In each column we report probit coefficients, their heteroscedasticity-robust t-
statistics, and the marginal probability change induced by a one-unit change in the value of
a specific covariate from its sample average. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 Dependent variable: dummy for an increase in the weight of the target stock in a fund’s 
portfolio around the activist’s disclosure 
 Quarter t-1 ends within 20 days before the 
disclosure 
Quarter t-1 ends within 10 days before the 
disclosure 
 Coefficient t-stat. Marg. Prob. Coefficient t-stat. Marg. Prob. 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) 
       
Connection to lead activist 0.346*** 15.21 2.79% 0.306*** 8.24 2.20% 
Log (MV) 0.162*** 27.96 0.98% 0.151*** 14.07 0.83% 
Return on assets (ROA) 0.042 0.71 0.25% -0.062 -0.64 -0.34% 
Prior-year stock return 0.226*** 14.31 1.37% 0.203*** 8.78 1.11% 
B/M 0.045*** 3.90 0.27% 0.066*** 3.51 0.37% 
Growth -0.153*** -4.47 -0.92% 0.040 0.65 0.22% 
Cash 0.240*** 5.76 1.45% 0.078 1.11 0.43% 
Dividend yield -0.294 -1.48 -1.77% 0.628** 2.43 3.46% 
Amihud illiquidity -0.049** -2.38 -0.13% 0.009 0.58 0.05% 
Institutional ownership 0.489*** 15.13 2.95% 0.726*** 14.14 4.00% 
       
Observations 117,165   51,853   
Pseudo R-squared 9.1%   8.7%   
% (Dep variable = 1) 3.7%   3.4%   
 
Table 3.9 reports results using the same method as in subsection 3.3.2. Col-
umn (1) (column (2)) restricts to a sample where quarter t − 1 ends 20 (10) days
before the activist announcement. The sample is reduced to 258 (114) campaigns
involving 128 (77) activists. Column (1) (column (2)) reports that, for an average
institution, the marginal probability of increasing ownership in the target due to
social ties is estimated to be 2.8 (2.2) percentage points, other things being equal.
The magnitude is comparable to our main results reported in column (1), Table 3.4.
The estimates for most other covariates are also similar to those reported in Table
3.4. These results suggest that social connections to the lead activist appear to be
relevant in institutions’ trading decisions even before the public disclosure.
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3.3.6 Daily trades before the activist disclosure
In addition to the smaller sample size, one potential concern about the analysis in
subsection 3.3.5 is that the direction and timing of the actual trades within the
quarter before campaign disclosure are unobserved. Furthermore, some institutions
trading far from disclosure could be affected not only by their social connections to
the lead activist but also by other events. To mitigate these, we use a transaction
database to determine a more precise connection between the activist disclosure and
institutional trading activity during 60 or 30 calendar days prior to the disclosure
(see Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2016) for a similar setting).9
The database, spanning 1998 to 2010, records information for each transac-
tion by covered institutions: the CUSIP of the stock traded, time of the transaction,
number of shares traded, execution price, as well as direction of the transaction (a
purchase or sale). We repeat the procedure in subsection 3.2.2 to identify social ties
between these institutional investors and the lead activist. We drop activism events
with no institutional trading during the 60 or 30 calendar days prior to the an-
nouncement date. After merging with CRSP, Compustat and the Thomson Reuters
database, our final sample consists of 638 campaigns from 2005 to 2010.
Due to space, we do not tabulate network characteristics between the lead
activist and other institutions for this sample. For comparison purposes, the 2010
sample consists of 79 campaigns launched by 45 unique lead activists. There is a
total of 21,560 relationship pairs between the lead activists and 273 institutions, and
the network density is 4.9%. This density is slightly lower than the one when using
the 13F database to create the networks, potentially due to incomplete personnel in-
formation BoardEx collected for the generally smaller funds (than 13F institutions)
in this transaction database. The network density measure remains relatively stable
during our sample period.
9According to Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2016), this data provider supplies transaction cost
analysis to brokers, mutual fund companies, and pension plan sponsors representing almost 14% of
total CRSP trading volume for 2000-2007.
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Table 3.10: Changes in institutional ownership before the disclosure using trading
data
Using institutional trading data, this table applies a probit model to examine whether
connection to the lead activist predicts a change in an institution’s ownership in the target
firm before the activist’s disclosure (date 0) measured as the shares held in relative to
total shares outstanding of the target companies. Connection to lead activist is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the institution is connected to the activist as of year t−1 (year t is when
the activist discloses it position in the target firm). All other independent variables are as
defined in Table 3.1. In each column we report probit coefficients, their heteroscedasticity-
robust t-statistics, and the marginal probability change induced by a one-unit change in
the value of a specific covariate from its sample average. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
     Dependent variable: dummy for an increase in percent ownership of 
the target before the disclosure 
 During the (-60, 0) period During the (-30, 0) period 
 Coefficient t-stat. Marg. Prob. Coefficient t-stat. Marg. Prob. 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) 
       
Connected to lead activist 0.235*** 6.32 0.68% 0.239*** 5.26 0.40% 
Log (MV) 0.176*** 21.22 0.39% 0.189*** 18.24 0.24% 
Return on assets (ROA) 0.144** 1.99 0.32% 0.402*** 4.57 0.50% 
Prior-year stock return 0.053*** 3.48 0.12% 0.009 0.35 0.01% 
B/M 0.041*** 3.56 0.10% 0.036 1.52 0.04% 
Growth -0.033 -1.39 -0.07% -0.103** -2.34 -0.13% 
Cash 0.215*** 4.59 0.47% 0.191*** 3.17 0.24% 
Dividend yield 0.337*** 2.72 0.74% 0.451*** 3.13 0.56% 
Amihud illiquidity 0.027 0.44 0.06% 0.121 1.38 0.15% 
Institutional ownership 0.396*** 9.43 0.87% 0.396*** 7.07 0.50% 
       
Observations 182,013   182,013   
Pseudo R-squared 6.1%   6.9%   
% (Dep variable = 1) 1.1%   0.6%   
 
As we do not observe complete portfolios for funds in this transaction database,
the dependent variable is thus a dummy variable equal to 1 if the fund increases
its percent ownership of the target company during the 60 (30) calendar days prior
to the disclosure date. The results, comparable to those using 13F institutional
ownership data, are reported in Table 3.10. Column (1) (column (2)) shows that a
connected fund is 0.7% (0.4%) percentage points more likely to increase its owner-
ship in the target during the 60 (30) days before the announcement, compared to
institutions that do not have a social tie with the lead activist. The effects of most
covariates are similar to those reported in Table 3.4.
In summary, we find that, compared to institutions without a connection to
the lead activist, a connected institution is significantly more likely to raise its stake
in the target both around and before the activist disclosure.
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3.4 Returns on “Connected” Investment
The fact that connected institutional investors appear to increase their stakes in the
target firm around the campaign disclosure does not necessarily imply these trades
are profitable. Taking a similar approach to Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) and
Klein and Li (2015), we thus compare the performance, for individual institutions,
of investment in connected activists’ target firms to that in non-connected activists’
targets, and test the hypothesis that an institution earns higher returns due to its
social connections to the lead activists.
We use a event study method in the spirit of Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy
(2008). For all the target firms a sample institution holds at their correspond-
ing campaign quarter ends, we assign each of them to one of the two portfolios:
connected or non-connected. For a target firm, if the institution is (not) socially
connected to its lead activist, it is assigned to the (non-) connected portfolio. We
compute monthly returns on stocks in the connected and non-connected portfolios
over their campaign quarters as a proxy for the returns earned around the activist
disclosures. Next, we compute value-weighted portfolio returns (connected and non-
connected) by weighting each stock by the fund’s dollar investment in it at the end
of quarter t, and then averaging across institutions.
As we are aggregating returns from different quarters, in addition to the
market-adjusted returns (returns in excess to a value-weighted portfolio of all CRSP
firms), we also calculate characteristically adjusted returns (“DGTW-adjusted re-
turns”) as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997): For each stock’s
return, we subtract the return on a value-weighted portfolio of all CRSP stocks in
the same size (market capitalization), book-to-market and momentum quintile.
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Table 3.11: Social connections and institutions’ returns
This table reports average market-adjusted returns and DGTW-adjusted returns (Daniel,
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997) for connected institutions versus non-connected
ones during the campaign quarter. At the beginning of each quarter, for each institution we
assign target firms in its portfolio to one of the two portfolios: connected or non-connected.
For a target firm, if the institution is socially connected to the lead activist, then the stock
is in the connected portfolio. The stock is in the non-connected portfolio if the institution is
not socially connected to the activist. We compute monthly returns on connected and non-
connected stocks over the campaign quarter as a proxy for the returns earned around the
activist disclosure. Market-adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the returns
on a value-weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms. DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns
are defined as raw returns minus the returns on a value-weighted portfolio of all CRSP
firms in the same size, industry-adjusted market-to-book, and one-year momentum quintile.
We then compute value-weighted portfolios (connected and non-connected) by averaging
across institutions, weighting each stock by the fund’s dollar investment in it at the end
of the quarter. Returns are in monthly percent, and are calculated for the full sample of
institutions, non-campaign activist funds, and non-activist institutions, respectively. t −
statistics are shown below the estimates, and ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 Market-adjusted return DGTW-adjusted return 
 Connected 
portfolio 
Non-connected 
portfolio 
Difference Connected 
portfolio 
Non-connected 
portfolio 
Difference 
       
Full sample 3.10%*** 1.54%*** 1.56%** 2.47%*** 0.66%* 1.81%*** 
 [6.53] [4.20] [2.35] [5.55] [1.84] [2.85] 
Non-activist institutions 2.75%*** 1.21%*** 1.54%** 2.17%*** 0.34% 1.83%*** 
 [5.13] [3.47] [2.45] [4.19] [1.01] [3.00] 
Non-campaign activist funds 4.09%*** 2.14%*** 1.95% 3.34%*** 1.21% 2.13%* 
 [4.12] [2.65] [1.20] [3.87] [1.54] [1.83] 
 
Table 3.11 reports our findings. For the full sample of institutions, the con-
nected and non-connected portfolios earn 3.10% and 1.54% monthly in market-
adjusted returns, respectively. The long-short market-adjusted return between the
connected portfolio and the non-connected one is 1.56% monthly, significant at the
5% level. The corresponding DGTW-adjusted long-short portfolio return is 1.81%
per month, significant at the 1% level. When we restrict our sample to non-activist
institutions, the long-short portfolio yields a monthly market-adjusted return of
1.54% and a DGTW-adjusted return of 1.83%. Restricting the sample to non-
campaign activist funds, we also obtain similar estimates for both return measures
as for the full sample. However, only the difference in DGTW-adjusted return is
significant at the 10% level. It is worth noting that our long-short portfolio returns
are somewhat larger than those found in Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), poten-
tially due to two reasons. First, ours include “run-up” returns before the disclosure,
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as suggested by Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), while Cohen, Frazzini,
and Malloy (2008) report abnormal returns within two trading days around news
announcements. Second, we pool one-off cross-time returns altogether, while Co-
hen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) study returns around regular news events, such as
earnings releases.
Our results support the hypothesis that connected institutions have a com-
parative advantage in obtaining information on the target stocks from the lead
activist. When fund managers and the lead activist are likely to have a higher level
of social interactions, they increase their stakes in the stock and earn large posi-
tive returns. As a result, the long-short portfolio that consists of connected and
non-connected target stocks earns positive abnormal returns around the activist
announcement.
3.5 Potential benefits to the lead activist
In this section, we investigate from the lead activist’s perspective whether its so-
cial ties with institutional investors benefit the activist campaign. Having profited
from information on the campaign, connected funds are expected to stand ready to
support the activist’s agenda. This type of alliance building differentiates our study
from the literature on social networks and investment performance (e.g., Cohen,
Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008), which focuses on information flows from the insiders to
investors.
We first examine the differential changes in aggregate ownership between
connected and non-connected funds for the average firm. Relative to non-connected
funds, connected institutions as a whole increase their ownership in the target by
1.3 percentage points of the outstanding stock (significant the 5% level). This is
also economically significant as the median ownership by the lead activist is 6.8%
in our sample. The median target sees a 0.6% increase in holdings by connected
institutions, relative to non-connected ones. The 75th and 25th percentile values are
2.5% and -0.9%, respectively, while at the 95th and 5th percentiles, they are 11.4%
and -5.6%. This large difference suggests that some target firms potentially enjoy
disproportionally more support from connected funds, which could tip the outcome
of the activist campaign.
Second, we present evidence that connected funds’ ownership in the target
stock could benefit the lead activist when it prepares to implement its agenda. The
presence of connected funds, presumably the activist’s core allies, can be used as
leverage when the activist engages target management. Specifically, we relate trades
by connected institutions during the campaign quarter to campaign success. Our
main independent variable of interest is the percentage-point increase in connected
funds’ ownership during the campaign quarter. An alternative measure is con-
nected funds’ aggregate ownership in the target divided by non-connected funds’ at
the quarter end immediately after the disclosure. Both variables capture potential
support for the lead activist resulting from its social connections. For campaigns
that information on the outcomes is available, the dependent variable equals 1 if
the lead activist fully or partly achieves its goals, and 0 otherwise. A probit model
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is employed to study whether potential support for the activist predicts campaign
success, controlling for the same firm covariates in the previous subsection.
Table 3.12: Social connections and activist campaign success
This table examines how the presence of connected institutions affects campaign success
of the lead activist in both the market measure and actual measure. In column (1), the
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the activist achieves at least one of
its stated goals between the disclosure and resolution dates. The dependent variable in
column (2) is an indicator equal to 1 if the activist is granted board seats as a result of
the campaign. In column (3), the dependent variable is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold
abnormal returns of the target companies during the [−10,+30] trading-day window around
the campaign disclosure. In panel (A), the independent variable of interest is the aggregated
percentage-point increase in connected institutions’ ownership in the target stock during the
campaign quarter. The independent variable of interest in panel (B) is the shares of target
held by all connected institutions divided by shares owned by non-connected institutions
at the quarter end immediately after the disclosure. Firm control variables are as defined
in Table 3.1 (not tabulated). In columns (1) and (2), we report the coefficients, their
heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics and the marginal probability change induced by a one-
unit change in the value of a specific covariate from its sample average. In column (3), we
report the coefficients and t-statistics ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Dummy for campaign 
success 
Dummy for campaign 
success when the activist 
gains board seats 
Abnormal return during [-
10, 30] around the activist 
disclosure 
 Coefficient t-stat. Marg. 
Prob. 
Coefficient t-stat. Marg. 
Prob. 
Coefficient t-stat. 
Panel A (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) 
Percentage-point increase in 
connected funds’ ownership 
during campaign quarter 
0.204** 2.50 3.89% 0.315** 2.11 5.99% 0.018*** 4.85 
Firm controls  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 521   429   1,235  
Pseudo R-squared 2.2%   2.1%     
Adj. R-squared       1.9%  
% (Dep variable = 1) 66.0%   64.8%     
         
Panel B         
Connected funds’ ownership 
divided by non-connected funds’ 
ownership 
0.440** 2.22 12.15% 0.365* 1.85 10.42% 0.009*** 4.25 
Firm controls  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations 521   429   1,235  
Pseudo R-squared 1.3%   0.9%     
Adj. R-squared       1.8%  
% (Dep variable = 1) 60.2%   60.1%     
 
As shown in column (1) of Table 3.12, potential support for the activist pos-
itively predicts its success. When the increase in connected funds’ ownership during
the campaign quarter goes up by one percentage point, there is a 3.9 percentage
point increase in the likelihood of campaign success. As expected, the target size
negatively predicts the activist’s success as it is usually more difficult to implement
changes in large and complex firms. Also activists are also more likely to succeed in
targets with higher institutional ownership, consistent with a key finding in Appel,
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Gormley, and Keim (2016).
In column (2), we use an alternative measure for campaign success, which
equals 1 if the activist is granted board seats as a result of its intervention, 0 other-
wise. Gaining board seats typically is viewed as a major success for activist investors,
who can then effect changes via these directors (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas,
2008). A one percentage point increase in connected institutions’ ownership is asso-
ciated with a 6.0 percentage point increase in the likelihood of the activist obtaining
board seats.
In addition, we relate the former to short-term stock returns around the
disclosure, which is a market measure for campaign success. Column (3) reports
that a one percentage point increase in connected funds’ ownership is associated
with 1.8 percentage point increase in the Fama-French four factor abnormal returns
during the [-10,+30] trading-day window around the disclosure. Varying the window
for the return measure does not substantially alter our results.
3.6 Summary
In summary, this chapter investigates the implications of social connections in the
context of hedge fund activism. By mapping out investors’ social connections such as
school ties and past employment relationships, we uncover a potential information
channel through which lead activists can communicate with other institutions to
build an alliance. An institutional investor whose managers are socially connected
to those at the lead activist is 2.9 percentage points more likely to increase its
portfolio weight in the target firm over the campaign quarter, relative to funds that
are not connected to the activist. The effect is stronger when the activists have a
better track record. Connected institutions earn significantly more announcement
returns. Evidence suggests that the presence of connected funds can benefit the
activist by increasing its success rate.
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Chapter 4
The benefits of friendship in
hedge fund activism
4.1 Introduction
Activist shareholders, hedge funds in particular, have become a major force in cor-
porate decision-making. They have successfully pressured target companies to listen
to their demands in about two-thirds of the campaigns launched since 2005. Despite
the growth of activist investment in recent years, activists generally hold a small
percentage of target company stock, and usually do not play a pivotal role in vote
outcomes. According to FactSet, for campaigns launched in 2015, the median per-
centage ownership of the dissident group was less than 7%, and was less than 3% at
firms with a market capitalization of over $20 billion.
In order to succeed in their campaigns, activists rely on the support of in-
stitutional investors who have become increasingly dominant players in the stock
market. To build alliances for their campaigns, activists often communicate with
asset managers about the wisdom of their plans for a target firm, permissible under
the SEC rules.1 Even a renowned investor such as Nelson Peltz needed personally
and repeatedly to pitch his ideas for Procter & Gamble to portfolio managers at
numerous institutions, including top fund companies such as BlackRock and State
Street. Support from some of these institutions is believed to be the single most
important factor in winning the hardest-fought proxy contest in 2017 (the winning
margin was a mere 0.0016 percent of the shares outstanding).
Despite the importance of this issue, however, the academic literature has
not formally analyzed the characteristics of interactions between activists and other
institutions in activism events, or more importantly, how such interactions would
affect connected institutions’ trading and governance practice. In this chapter, we
study activists’ alliance building during campaigns using a social network framework
(see Jackson (2011) for an overview of social networks applications). An activist
1Generally, investors are free to communicate with one another in any manner they prefer,
subject to restrictions that apply if they are held to be engaging in a solicitation of proxies, avoiding
disclosure obligations, or if they have access to material, confidential information about the company
whose stock they hold, or are trading.
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possesses valuable private information — its insights of problems at the target com-
pany and its planned actions against the firm. However, their stake in the target
firm is usually less than 5% ownership. Their target firms generally have a higher
concentration of other institutional investors such as mutual funds. These insti-
tutional investors have a strong incentive to access activists’ information and learn
about their true intention and quality to decide whether to exercise their governance
rights by voting against management. An institution and the activist are more likely
to interact if they are socially connected. The head of an institution is also more
familiar with the activist if she or he has past social relationships with the activist.
A convenient feature for identification is that the connection itself typically has been
formed prior to the activism event, and its formation is usually independent of the
information to be transmitted.
To test whether information is spread via the social network between an
activist and institutional investors, we first compare the trades of institutions whose
mangers are socially connected to the activist with trades of funds whose managers
have no ties with the activist. To the extent socially connected fund managers have
a comparative advantage in collecting information regarding the activist’s campaign,
we should observe that they purchase more aggressively after the activist disclosure,
and earn higher risk-adjusted returns on their trades. The increase in connected
institutions’ stakes can benefit the activist in voting events, resulting in a higher
rate of campaign success.
Our analysis reveals that actively managed institutions whose managers are
socially connected to those at an activist hedge fund tend to increase their stakes
in the target firm during the activist’s campaign. More specifically, a connected
institution is 1.1 percentage points more likely to increase its stake in the target
firm, compared to funds that are not socially connected to the activist. Given
that the unconditional probability for an increase in the target firm is 2.5%, this
represents a 44% increase in the incremental probability. Note that we obtain this
result after controlling for major similarities between the activist and institutions,
as well as event and institution fixed effects that capture time-invariant event and
institution level characteristics.
We next examine three types of social connections: school ties, employment
ties and other ties. As one of the most exogenously formed social relationship, school
ties are found to positively affect connected institutions’ propensity to trade the
target stock during a campaign (the incremental probability is 36%). Employment or
other ties are associated with a higher incremental probability of trading, potentially
attributed to ties established in more recent years or the close-knit nature of the
connections, such as club membership and charity work.
To address the concern that some omitted variables capturing similarities
between activists and institutions, such as stock picking skills, we replace institu-
tion fixed effects with institution×activist fixed effects. These fixed effects control
for all types of time-invariant similarities between institutions and activists. The
economic and statistical significance of the estimated coefficient on the social con-
nection dummy is similar to that in the main analysis in subsection 4.3.1.
Some could argue that certain social ties, such as past employment ties,
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may not be strictly exogenous to activism events. As in He and Huang (2017), we
use mergers and acquisitions (“M&As”) among financial institutions as plausibly
exogenous shocks to social connections. Institutions typically merge for reasons
unrelated to an official’s social tie to a particular activist. By using a subsample
that includes all institutions subject to M&As before activism events, we find that a
connected institution is 1.7 percentage points more likely to raise stakes in a target
firm, which represents an increase of 47% in the incremental probability. This is
qualitatively similar to our main analysis in subsection 4.3.1.
Connected institutions also perform significantly better on their investment
than non-connected institutions, generating a risk-adjusted long-short portfolio re-
turn of 0.42% to 0.51% per month. Hedge funds achieve a slightly higher alpha
than mutual fund families, partly attributed to the fact that hedge funds on average
trade more aggressively than mutual funds.
We next link institutional trading with alliance building by comparing con-
nected and non-connected institutions’ voting in the annual sharehlder meetings of
targeted companies. If connected institutions are more ready to challenge manage-
ment by voting against their proposals, this is strong evidence that activists have
built an alliance that can effectively force changes at target firms. We use vot-
ing records by mutual fund families from Institutional Shareholder Services’ Vot-
ing Analytics to test this hypothesis. We find that connected institutions’ votes
against management proposals (management-sponsored directors) are 0.9 (1.3) per-
centage points more than those by non-connected funds, representing an increase
of 9% (13%) in the disapproval rate. Furthermore, connected institutions that pur-
chase target stocks during a campaign are more likely to challenge management in
shareholder meetings, which presumably will benefit them more if campaigns are
successful. We also confirm that the effects exist only for meetings during activist
campaigns, but not for meetings after outcome dates.
Our results are robust when we restrict our sample to events in which activist
announcements take place within 10 trading days after Quarter t − 1 ends or the
Abel Noser transaction database which includes a subset of the institutions that file
Schedule 13Fs as well as smaller funds that are not required to file 13Fs. To account
for an institution’s capital constraint, we also replace the dependent variable with
an indicator equal to one if an institution increases the weight of the target stock
in its portfolio during a campaign. The results are similar to our main analysis in
subsection 4.3.1. Dropping repeat activists, we obtain similar results.
Our study relates a growing literature on hedge fund activism to the literature
on the role of social networks in economics and finance.2 Recent work on hedge
fund activism has examined the characteristics of hedge fund activism events and
whether such actions create value for target shareholders (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and
Thomas, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner, 2015), and
the determinants of targeting by activists (Brav, Jiang, and Li, 2017; Gantchev and
Jotikasthira, 2016; Kedia, Starks, and Wang, 2017). However, little is known about
2See Jackson (2014) for an introduction to economics of social networks, and Allen and Babus
(2008) for a survey of networks in finance. More recent papers in this literature includes Xu (2017),
Paddrik, Park, and Wang (2017), Fisman, Shi, Wang, and Xu (2017), Cai and Szeidl (2016).
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whether and how activists influence other investors’ trading and voting decisions,
and whether such influence would support the activist’s agenda in achieving its
stated goals.
This chapter is closely related to the literature on business networks and
proxy voting in the asset management industry. Cvijanovic, Dasgupta, and Zachari-
adis (2016) find that business ties with portfolio firms (based on 401(K) plans) influ-
ence mutual funds’ proxy voting, confirming the pattern found in the prior literature
(Davis and Kim, 2007; Ashraf, Jayaraman, and Ryan, 2012). Ours is the first to
examine how connections with shareholder opponents affect mutual fund voting, ex-
panding the literature on the factors that influence investor voting (Iliev and Lowry,
2014; Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 2009; Bolton, Li, Ravina, and Rosenthal, 2018).
Brav, Dasgupta, and Mathews (2017) have developed a theoretical model to
study the so-called “wolf pack” activism, in which an lead activist’s presence implic-
itly helps a group of smaller activists to coordinate their efforts and become more
aggressive at engaging the target, thus leading to a higher probability of successful
activism. In particular, they predict the entry of a number of small activists after
the lead activist’s disclosure. This chapter, by uncovering a potential information
channel through which activists can influence other institutions’ trading decisions,
complements the implicit coordination channel they model. Information exchange
between the lead activist and connected institutions could facilitate effective coor-
dination.
Our work is related to, but distinct from, a recent study by Wong (2016),
which finds that some investors other than the lead activist accumulate significant
shares before the activist disclosure. He attributes this to potential information
leakage prior to activists’ disclosures. In contrast, we focus on social interactions
after the activists’ disclosures per Brav, Dasgupta, and Mathews (2017), and identify
systematic trading and voting patterns by connected institutions. Another difference
between our paper and Wong (2016) is that we explicitly map out investors’ social
connections such as school ties and past employment relationships, while Wong
(2016) proxies for social interactions by past co-investment activities. Our study
also relates to Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016), who find aggregate ownership
stakes of passive institutional investors are associated with an increase in activists’
success probability. Rather, we study individual institutions’ trading and voting
decisions by exploring their social connections to a lead activist.
Our paper is also related to the literature on how social or business net-
works may affect investors’ investment decisions and portfolio performance. Recent
theoretical work shows that information sharing among investors generally improves
market efficiency (Colla and Mele, 2010; Ozsoylev and Walden, 2011; Han and Yang,
2013). Notable empirical works include Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005), Pool, Stoff-
man, and Yonker (2015), Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007), Ivkovic´ and Weis-
benner (2007), Gao and Huang (2015), Ahern (2016), Gompers, Mukharlyamov, and
Xuan (2016), Maggio, Franzoni, Kermani, and Sommavilla (2016), Kumar, Mullally,
Ray, and Tang (2017).
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4.2 Data sources and sample overview
4.2.1 Sample of activist campaigns
The sample is the same as in Chapter 3. Figure 3.1 plots the annual frequency
of activist campaigns and the number of unique activists over our sample period.
Activism activity reached its peak in 2007, before dropping significantly during the
financial crisis and then increasing in more recent years.
4.2.2 Sample of social networks
To identify social ties between an activist and institutional investors, we restrict
our sample of institutions to two types of actively managed funds: hedge funds
and actively-managed mutual funds.3 We divide hedge funds into three size groups
based on their average portfolio value over the past five years prior to the campaign
quarter: $100 million-$1 billion (3,270 funds), $1 billion-$5 billion (838 funds), and
above $5 billion (423 funds).4 To ensure tractability for manual collection of social
ties between an activist and institutional investors, in each of the first two size
groups, we randomly pick 100 funds to search in BoardEx. For the third group
(above $5 billion), we search every fund in BoardEx. Using the Thomson Reuters
database, we also obtain S12 filings for all actively-managed mutual funds, and
aggregate individual funds’ holdings to the fund family level.
Our sample of institutions consists of 703 unique hedge funds (including the
activist hedge funds) and 362 distinct mutual fund families. The average number
of all institutions for one campaign is 660, with an average of 414 hedge funds, and
246 mutual fund families.
Procedure for identifying social connections
The procedure is the same as in Chapter 3. Our independent variable of interest,
Connection to activist, takes a value of one if at least one relationship established in
the past between two institutions’ key personnel is still active during the campaign
quarter. Otherwise, this dummy variable equals zero. During our sample period an
institution may experience turnover of its key personnel. We thus deem a relation-
ship with another fund to be severed if a key connected person leaves before the
campaign year and there is no other active relationship between existing personnel
in the two funds.
3Using the Thomson Reuters database, we first obtain 13F holdings for all investment firms
that are categorized as 4 or 5 in the Thomson Reuters database. We then exclude pension funds
and endowments. The remaining investment firms are primarily hedge funds or similar types of
investing firms. We label this group of investors “hedge funds.”
4According to Preqin, a leading source of data and intelligence for the alternative assets industry,
funds with AUM over $1 billion are considered as large funds. Funds with AUM over $5 billion are
considered ultra large. As of May 2017, “$1 Billion Club” managers held 88% of all hedge fund
capital (Preqin, 2017). Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, investment firms, including
hedge funds, with over $100 million of US equities are required to report their US equity holdings
in a Form 13F within 45 days of the calendar quarters ending March 31, June 30, September 30
and December 31.
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4.2.3 Institutional ownership and trading data
To examine how socially connected institutions trade during activist campaigns and
the potential benefits of such trades, relative to non-connected funds, we mainly
rely on Thomson Reuters 13F institutional ownership information. As illustrated in
Figure 4.1, for each institution in our sample, we obtain its quarterly ownership in
each target firm immediately after the 13D or press release date (end of Quarter t),
as well as its quarterly ownership in each target immediately before the campaign
outcome date (end of Quarter t+ n). Institutional trading is proxied by the change
in its holdings in the target firm from the end of Quarter t to the end of Quarter t+n.
To account for the possibility that institutions’ portfolio allocations are constrained
by their total capital available, in Appendix D, we also use the change in the weight
of the target stock in an institution’s portfolio to examine whether social connections
affect its trading in the target firm.
Figure 4.1: An illustration of the event timeline
This timeline illustrates the timing of an activist event. The activist disclosure takes place
during Quarter t (between the end of Quarter t− 1 and the end of Quarter t). The end of
Quarter t is referred to as the campaign announcement quarter end, and the end of Quarter
t+ n is referred to as the quarter end before the outcome date.
 
 
 
 
 
Activist’s Disclosure 
End of Quarter t End of Quarter t+n End of Quarter t-1 Campaign Outcome 
Da 
By using 13F institutional ownership data in our main analysis, we do not
know when exactly in the campaign announcement quarter an institution’s trades
are executed and, therefore, it is possible that our proxy for institutional trades
captures only part of the actual trades during an activist campaign, especially when
the activist’s disclosure takes place toward the beginning of Quarter t. To this end,
in robustness analysis, we restrict our sample to events in which activist announce-
ments take place within 10 trading days after Quarter t − 1 ends. We then proxy
institutional trading by ownership change in the target firm from the end of Quarter
t− 1 to the end of Quarter t+ n.
In addition, we rely on the Abel Noser transaction database which includes a
subset of the institutions that file Schedule 13Fs as well as smaller funds that are not
required to file 13Fs. Abel Noser is a leading execution cost consulting firm serving
over 500 clients globally. According to Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2016), this data
provider supplies transaction cost analysis to brokers, mutual fund companies, and
pension plan sponsors representing almost 14% of total CRSP trading volume for
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2000-2007. Therefore, the data set represents a significant subset of institutional
trading.5 We identify social connections with activists for all institutions in the
Abel Noser database.
The database, spanning 1998 to 2010, records information for each transac-
tion by covered institutions: the CUSIP of the stock traded, time of the transaction,
number of shares traded, execution price, as well as direction of the transaction (a
purchase or sale). We repeat the procedure in subsection 4.2.2 to identify social ties
between these institutional investors and activists.
4.2.4 Institutional voting data
An important part of this chapter is to examine whether connected institutions are
less likely to support management than non-connected institutions in target firms’
shareholder meetings during activist campaigns. Starting in 2003 the SEC has re-
quired all US mutual funds to disclose their proxy voting records via N-PX filings.
Our source of mutual fund voting records is the ISS Voting Analytics database,
which contains votes cast by major fund families on all proposals for each Rus-
sell 3000 firm from 2005 to 2014.6 Merging our sample of target companies into
Voting Analytics, we end up with 818 unique target firms with 171 fund families
that have BoardEx information. For these target firms, 162 fund families voted on
5,329 management-sponsored proposals (including 3,805 director nominees) in 796
meetings between activist announcement and resolution dates. Relatedly, 165 fund
families voted on 13,832 management-sponsored proposals (9,857 director nominees)
in 1,816 meetings after campaign resolution. It is worth noting that we focus on
management-sponsored proposals, including director nominations, to mitigate selec-
tion issues arising from strategic behavior of shareholder sponsors (Ertimur, Ferri,
and Muslu, 2011; Matsusaka, Ozbas, and Yi, 2017).
4.2.5 Proxies for similarities between activists and institutions
Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) show that mutual fund managers who work in the
same city have correlated trades. To account for such similarities between activists
and institutions, we create an indicator variable equal to one if an activist and an
institution are located in the same city, and zero otherwise. Head office locations
of activists and institutions are obtained from name searches on EDGAR, the US
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) online portal.
As Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) point out, fund managers also exhibit a
strong preference for locally headquartered firms. To control for such an investment
preference, we create an indicator equal to one if an institution and a target firm’s
headquarters are located in the same city, and zero otherwise. City names are
obtained from fund name searches on EDGAR.
5The Abel Noser transaction database has been used by several recent studies to analyze the
trading behavior of institutional investors, which include Chemmanur, He, and Hu (2009), Puckett
and Yan (2011), and Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2014).
6The ISS Voting Analytics database includes fund votes by the top 100 fund families between
2003 and 2006, and from 2007 onward, ISS has collected voting records by the top 300 families.
80
Following Blocher (2016), we measure the portfolio overlap in stock holdings
between funds i and j during quarter t as the dot product between a vector of
securities held by fund i (hit) and fund j (hjt), divided by the product of Euclidean
norm of each vector. The portfolio overlap is computed at each quarter end.
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) find that fund managers with a
similar amount of assets under management herd with each other to some extent.
At the end of quarter t, we pool all activists and institutions and divide them into
size quintiles based on total net assets (“TNA”). We create a dummy variable equal
to one if an institution and an activist are in the size quintile, and zero otherwise.
4.2.6 Sample overview
This subsection presents the network characteristics and summary statistics of our
sample.
Network characteristics
Table 4.1 shows characteristics of the networks between activists and institutional
investors for 2005-2014. For example, the 2010 sample consists of 60 unique ac-
tivists, 412 hedge funds, and 238 mutual fund families. There is a total of 69,728
relationship pairs between the activists and other institutions for the 122 campaigns
launched in 2010, 5.9% of which are connected relationships (defined as “network
density”). The most frequent relationships are school ties (2.6% of all relationship
pairs) and employment ties (4.0% of all relationship pairs). Other ties, such as club
membership and charity work, make up just 0.5% of all connections. Note that
school, employment, and other ties are not mutually exclusive. Although there is
some fluctuation in the number of activists across years, the number of institutional
investors and the network density remain relatively stable. This is consistent with
findings in the social network literature (Jackson, 2011).
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of network characteristics
This table reports network characteristics for our sample. Columns (1a)-(1c) show the an-
nual numbers of activists, hedge fund companies, and mutual fund families, respectively.
Columns (2a)-(2d) report network densities for all types of social connections, school ties,
employment ties, and other ties, respectively. A school tie is a social connection an insti-
tution and an activist have through top personnel who attended a school together in the
past. An employment tie is a social connection an institution and an activist have through
top personnel who worked together in a third institution in the past. Other ties refer to
connections created through club membership, charity work and so on. School, employment,
and other ties are not mutually exclusive. For each type of connection, network density is
defined as the number of connected pairs divided by the number of all relationship pairs
between an activist and institutional investors. A detailed procedure to define social ties
can be found in Appendix A.
  Institutional investors Network density 
Year # Activists  
# Hedge fund 
companies 
# Mutual fund 
families 
All connections 
School 
ties 
Employment ties 
Other 
ties 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) 
2005 78 399 221 2.58% 1.45% 1.46% 0.10% 
2006 99 418 225 4.58% 2.05% 3.05% 0.18% 
2007 96 426 238 4.05% 2.08% 2.54% 0.20% 
2008 96 454 251 4.39% 2.27% 2.60% 0.35% 
2009 56 438 245 5.20% 2.25% 3.63% 0.35% 
2010 60 412 238 5.85% 2.64% 3.99% 0.48% 
2011 59 447 244 5.11% 2.47% 3.24% 0.62% 
2012 64 553 267 7.16% 3.54% 4.47% 0.91% 
2013 64 548 263 9.10% 4.28% 6.27% 1.05% 
2014 54 529 238 8.42% 3.73% 5.49% 1.36% 
 
For the Abel Noser sample, the network characteristics between activists and
other institutions are the same as in Chapter 3.
Summary statistics
Table 4.2 reports the averages, medians and standard deviations for variables used
in our analysis. We separately report statistics for the main Thomson Reuters 13F
sample, and the Abel Noser sample. In 2.5% of the time, an institution increases
holdings in a target stock from the campaign announcement quarter end (Quarter
t) to the quarter end before the outcome date (Quarter t + n). The proportion of
funds within the average family that vote against management-sponsored proposals
(director nominees) during activist campaigns is 10% (10%). In fact, most funds
within a family vote in unison — for 98.5% of the time, the proportion of funds
voting against management on a given proposal is either zero or 100%. Activists
achieve at least one of their stated goals in 66.7% of the interventions. On average,
return on assets improves from 2.8% from the first year after activist disclosure to
4.6% in the third year. This is consistent with Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang (2015),
who find that target firms’ profitability improves during a five-year period after
activist disclosures. The average (median) buy-and-hold abnormal return is 4.7%
(3.5%) over a one-year period after the disclosure, while it is 17.9% (14.8%) over a
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three-year period.
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
This table shows summary statistics of major variables used in the study. For the Thomson
Reuters 13F sample, Increase in ownership during activist campaign equals 1 if an insti-
tution increases ownership in a target stock from the campaign announcement quarter end
to the quarter end before the outcome date, and 0 otherwise. V ote against management
proposal (director nominee) is the percent of “Against” votes among all funds within an
institution on management-sponsored proposals (director nominees) at shareholder meet-
ings that take place between campaign announcement and outcome dates. V ote against
management (director nominee) in all meetings is the percent of “Against” votes among
all funds within an institution on management-sponsored proposals (director nominees) at
all shareholder meetings that take place after the campaign announcement. Campaign
Success equals 1 if an activist achieves at least one of its stated goals, and 0 otherwise.
Return on assets (ROA) is earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization
(EBITDA) scaled by lagged assets. ROA Y 1, ROA Y 2 and ROA Y 3 are calculated during
the first, second, and third year after campaign announcement, respectively. BHAR[0, Y 1],
BHAR[0, Y 2] and BHAR[0, Y 3] are the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (benchmarked to
one of the 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market value-weight portfolios) of a target stock
during 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years after campaign announcement, respectively. Connection
to activist equals 1 if an institution and the activist are socially connected via top personnel,
and 0 otherwise. Same city – institution and firm is an indicator equal to 1 if an institu-
tion and the target firm’s headquarters are located in the same city. Same city – institution
and activist equals 1 if an institution and the activist are located in the same city, and
0 otherwise. Same – size quintile equals 1 if portfolios of an institution and the activist
are in the same size quintile at the quarter end before campaign announcement. Portfolio
overlap in stock holdings between funds i and j during quarter t as the dot product be-
tween a vector of securities held by fund i (hit) and fund j (hjt), divided by the product
of Euclidean norm of each vector (Blocher, 2016). The portfolio overlap is computed at
each quarter end. For the Abel Noser transaction sample, Increase in ownership during
activist campaign equals 1 if an institution increases ownership in a target stock from one
day after campaign announcement to one day before the outcome date, and 0 otherwise.
Other variables are defined as for the Thomson Reuters 13F sample.
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 The Thomson Reuters 13F Sample 
Dependent variable Average Median Std. Dev. 
Institution level    
Increase in ownership during activist campaign 0.025 0 0.155 
Vote against management proposal 0.100 0 0.295 
Vote against management proposal in all meetings 0.089 0 0.280 
Vote against director nominee 0.100 0 0.294 
Vote against director nominee in all meetings 0.089 0 0.280 
Firm level    
Campaign success 0.667 1 0.423 
ROA Y1 0.028 0.073 0.225 
ROA Y2 0.033 0.070 0.377 
ROA Y3 0.046 0.076 0.206 
BHAR [0, Y1] 0.047 0.035 0.593 
BHAR [0, Y2] 0.106 0.103 0.802 
BHAR [0, Y3] 0.179 0.148 0.903 
Independent variable of interest    
Connection to activist 0.055 0 0.227 
Connection to activist (by hedge funds) 0.066 0 0.248 
Connection to activist (by mutual funds) 0.049 0 0.216 
Connection to activist (school ties) 0.026 0 0.160 
Connection to activist (employment ties) 0.035 0 0.185 
Connection to activist (other ties) 0.005 0 0.072 
 
Control variable    
Same city – institution and activist 0.116 0 0.320 
Same city – institution and target 0.018 0 0.133 
Portfolio overlap 0.026 0 0.061 
Same-size quintile 0.222 0 0.416 
 The Abel Noser sample 
 Average Median Std. Dev. 
Increase in ownership during activist campaign 0.018 0 0.134 
Connection to activist 0.037 0 0.189 
Same city – institution and activist 0.080 0 0.272 
Same city – institution and target 0.011 0 0.105 
 
 
In terms of similarities between activists and institutions, 11.6% of the time,
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an institution and an activist locate in the same city (New York City, Boston,
and Chicago are the top three locations for institutions and activist funds). An
institution and a target firm are headquartered in the same city just 1.8% of the
time. The average portfolio overlap between an activist and an institution is 2.6%,
while more than 22% of activist-institution pairs are in the same size quintile.
Summary statistics for the same variables in the Abel Noser sample are sim-
ilar to those in the 13F sample. However, we do not construct Portfolio overlap and
Same-size quintile for this sample because institutions in the Abel Noser database
do not report their portfolio holdings or TNA.
4.3 Social networks and institutional trading
4.3.1 Baseline results
If connected institutions are better informed about the activist’s plan of attack and
its chance of success, we should observe larger trades by them from the activist
disclosure to the outcome date (Brav, Dasgupta, and Mathews, 2016). We begin
our analysis by estimating the linear probability model regression
IncreaseInOwnershipfijt = α+ βConnectionijt + δControlsijt + λfit + µj + fijt
(4.1)
in which IncreaseInOwnershipfijt is an indicator equal to one if institution j in-
creases ownership in a firm f targeted by activist i in year t from the campaign
announcement quarter to the quarter end before the outcome date, and zero oth-
erwise. Connectionijt equals one if an institution and an activist are socially con-
nected through top personnel, and zero otherwise. Controlsijt is a vector of control
variables, including location dummies between the institution and activist/target,
portfolio overlap between an institution and an activist, and same-size indicators.
λfit represent activism-event fixed effects and µj are institution fixed effects. fijt
is the error term.
If social interactions systematically influence institutions’ trading in a target
stock, then β in equation (1) should be positive. The estimate of β is the incremental
probability of an increase in target stock holdings during activist campaigns for
connected institutions. The control variables control for major similarities between
an institution and an activist that may affect the institution’s decision in trading the
target stock. The fixed effects control for all time-invariant event and institution
characteristics. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and they are
clustered along the institution dimension.
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Table 4.3: Social connections and changes in institutional ownership
This table applies a linear probability model to examine whether a social connection to the
activist predicts an increase in target stock ownership from campaign announcement quarter
end to the quarter end before the outcome date. Connection to activist is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if an institution is connected to the activist as of year t − 1 (year t is when the
activist discloses its position in the target firm). Panel A reports main results for our full
sample, the subsample of hedge funds, and the subsample of mutual funds, while Panel B
shows additional analysis for the full sample examining different types of social connections.
Panel C replicates Panel A except that the analysis includes Institution × Activist fixed
effects. All other independent variables are as defined in table 4.2. In each column we
report coefficient estimates and their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. Standard errors
are clustered at the institution level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Main analysis 
Dependent variable: Increase in ownership during 
activist campaign Full sample Hedge funds Mutual funds 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Connection to activist 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
 [5.718] [4.007] [4.377] 
Same city – institution and target 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [1.277] [0.700] [0.884] 
Same city – institution and activist 0.003* 0.005** 0.001 
 [1.904] [2.149] [0.179] 
Portfolio overlap 0.021*** 0.015** 0.031*** 
 [4.145] [2.389] [3.032] 
Same-size quintile 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 
 [12.848] [11.327] [6.389] 
    
Observations 884,530 584,206 300,324 
Adj. R-squared 0.141 0.141 0.145 
Event FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes 
% (Dep variable = 1) 2.45% 2.63% 2.11% 
 
Panel B: Types of social connections 
Dependent variable: Increase in ownership during 
activist campaign School ties Employment ties Other ties 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Connection to activist 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 
 [3.713] [3.854] [2.678] 
Same city – institution and target 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [1.376] [1.403] [1.406] 
Same city – institution and activist 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
 [1.912] [1.902] [1.919] 
Portfolio overlap 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 [4.284] [4.223] [4.279] 
Same-size quintile 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 [12.861] [12.885] [12.880] 
    
Observations 884,530 884,530 884,530 
Adj. R-squared 0.141 0.141 0.141 
Event FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes 
% (Dep variable = 1) 2.45% 2.45% 2.45% 
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Panel C: Alternative model specification 
Dependent variable: Increase in ownership during 
activist campaign Full sample Hedge funds Mutual funds 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Connection to activist 0.009*** 0.006* 0.013*** 
 [3.136] [1.728] [3.303] 
Same city – institution and target 0.005** 0.006** 0.002 
 [2.317] [2.353] [0.646] 
Portfolio overlap -0.005 -0.013 0.011 
 [-0.563] [-1.315] [0.718] 
Same-size quintile 0.002** 0.002 0.002** 
 [2.312] [1.540] [2.049] 
    
Observations 800,281 532,530 267,751 
Adj. R-squared 0.283 0.281 0.293 
Event FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Institution × Activist FEs Yes Yes Yes 
% (Dep variable = 1) 2.62% 2.81% 2.25% 
 
As shown in table 4.3, panel A, for the full sample of all institutions, a
connected institution is 1.1 percentage points more likely to raise its stake in the
target during an activist campaign, compared to those that are not socially con-
nected to the activist. The coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the 1%
level. Given that the unconditional probability for an increase in the target stock
is 2.5%, this represents an increase in the incremental probability of 44%. Simi-
larities between institutions and activists appear to capture institutional purchases
as well. An institution is 0.3 percentage points more likely to increase its holdings
in an target stock if it is located in the same city as the activist (the estimate is
significant at the 10% level). This is consistent with the results in Hong, Kubik, and
Stein (2005). In addition, a one-standard-deviation increase in portfolio overlap is
associated with a 13 basis-point increase in the likelihood of institutional purchase,
all else being equal. If an institution and an activist are from the same-size quintile,
then the institution is 1.1 percentage points more likely to increase holdings. Both
coefficient estimates are significant at the 1% level. Columns (2) and (3) report
results for hedge funds and mutual fund families, respectively. The effects of social
connections on institutional purchases for these two groups are similar to that for
the full sample.
Appendix B replicates the analysis by replacing the event fixed effects with
firm characteristics. The coefficient estimates on Connection for the full sample and
subgroups are almost identical to those from the fixed-effect model.7
In panel B of table 4.3, we show results by re-estimating equation (2) for
three types of social connections: school ties, employment ties and other types of
ties. School ties on average are established earlier than other ties before an activism
event starts, and their formation is typically independent of the information to
be transmitted via the network. Therefore they are considered as one of the most
exogenous social connections (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008; Butler and Gurun,
7Firm characteristics also predict institutional trading in target firms. For example, institutions
are more likely to raise investments in small stocks and those with poor recent price performance.
They also tend to increase holdings in cash-rich firms and those that pay lower dividends, consistent
with Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008).
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2012). An institution connected via school ties is 0.9 percentage point more likely
to increase investment in the target during an activist campaign, compared to those
that are not socially connected to the activist. This represents an increase in the
incremental probability of 36%. Employment ties are associated with an increase
of 60% in the incremental probability. The larger magnitude is potentially due
to the fact that employment ties are established in more recent years. Other ties
are associated with an increase of 64% in the incremental probability. The larger
magnitude may be attributed to the close-knit nature of the social functions, such
as club membership and charity work.
Controlling for all similarities between institutions and activists
The baseline analysis in subsection 4.3.1 may not control for omitted variables cap-
turing similarities between institutions and activists, such as stock picking abilities
or investment styles. To address this, we replace institution fixed effects in equation
4.1 with Institution×Activist fixed effects. Institution×Activist fixed effects control
for all types of time-invariant similarities between institutions and activists. How-
ever, this makes the model more restrictive by using only events launched by repeat
activists to estimate the coefficients. As shown in panel C of table 4.3, the economic
and statistical significance of the estimated coefficient on Connection is similar to
that in the main analysis.
4.3.2 Identification using fund company M&As
Although variations of specifications for equation (2) rule out time-invariant fac-
tors in institutional investment decisions and similarities between institutions and
activists, it remains possible that some social ties (e.g., past employment ties) may
not be strictly exogenous to the activist events (i.e., social ties are potentially made
due to an “anticipation effect”). To address such endogeneity concerns, we use
M&As among institutions as plausibly exogenous shocks to social connections.
As explained in He and Huang (2017), institutions typically merge for reasons
unrelated to the fundamentals of their individual stock holdings. Similarly, institu-
tions merge for reasons unrelated to an official’s social connection to a particular
activist. When two institutions merge, the acquiring entity can become connected
to an activist because connected personnel from the target institution move to the
new institution. On the other hand, connections can be severed due to senior of-
ficial turnover associated with a deal. By focusing on a subset of institutions that
experience M&As before the launch of activist campaigns, we are able to claim
a causal relationship between social connections and institutional trading during
activist campaigns.
Our sample of financial institution M&As is obtained from the Securities
Data Company (“SDC”) database. We apply the following filters in the prior litera-
ture (He and Huang, 2017): (1) both the target and acquirer are financial institutions
(four-digit SIC from 6000 to 6999), (2) a merger is announced between 2004 and
2013 and is completed within a year. These steps generate 274 unique mergers. For
all institution-activist pairs in each year t− 1 (year t is when the activist discloses
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its position in the target firm), we include only institutions that completed M&As
during the previous year (year t − 2). This matching criterion yields 1,082 events
involving 195 unique institutions.
Table 4.4: Fund company M&As and social connections
This table applies a linear probability model to examine whether social connections, created
or severed by fund company mergers and acquisitions (M&As), predict an increase in target
stock ownership from campaign announcement quarter end to the quarter end before the
outcome date. For all institution-activist pairs in each year t−1 (year t is when the activist
discloses its position in the target firm), we select a subsample of institutions that experience
M&As during the previous year t − 2. In column (1), we include all institutions that are
subject to M&As, and in column (2), we exclude institutions that are subject to M&As
but remain connected with the activist. Connection to activist is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if an institution is connected to the activist as of year t − 1. All other independent
variables are as defined in table 4.2. In each column we report coefficient estimates and their
heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Increase in ownership 
during activist campaign 
All institutions subject to M&As 
All institutions subject to M&As, 
excluding those remain connected 
 (1) (2) 
Connection to activist 0.017*** 0.015** 
 [2.609] [2.035] 
Same city – institution and target 0.002 0.001 
 [0.293] [0.110] 
Same city – institution and activist 0.012 0.001 
 [0.935] [0.086] 
Portfolio overlap 0.042 0.041 
 [1.529] [1.333] 
Same-size quintile 0.018*** 0.016*** 
 [4.529] [4.358] 
   
Observations 25,774 23,272 
Adj. R-squared 0.224 0.214 
Event FEs Yes Yes 
Institution FEs Yes Yes 
% (Dep variable = 1) 3.61% 3.06% 
 
Table 4.4 reports the results by re-estimating equation (2). In column (1),
our sample includes all institutions that are subject to M&As before activism events.
A connected institution is 1.7 percentage points more likely to increase investment
in the target during an activist campaign, compared to those that are not socially
connected to the activist. This represents an increase in the incremental probability
of 47%. In column (2), we exclude institutions that remain connected after M&As.
The magnitude of the estimate is qualitatively similar to that shown in column (1).
Overall, our results using fund company M&As as plausibly exogenous shocks
to social connections are consisent with our main results. The findings suggest
that our main results are unlikely to be driven by potentially endogenous social
connections.
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4.3.3 Returns on “connected” investment
The fact that connected institutional investors appear to increase their stakes in
the target firm during an activist campaign does not necessarily imply these trades
are profitable. Taking a similar approach to Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008),
and Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2015), we thus compare the performance, for
individual institutions, of investment in connected activists’ target firms to that in
non-connected activists’ targets, and test the hypothesis that an institution earns
higher returns due to its social connections to activists.
We use a calendar-time portfolio method. Following Cao, Goldie, Liang,
and Petrasek (2016) and Jiang, Li, and Mei (2017), we construct two calendar-
time portfolios on a daily basis, and the portfolios are rebalanced when campaigns
are launched, concluded or withdrawn. For each target firm a sample institution
holds during its campaign, we assign the target-institution pair to one of the two
portfolios: connected or non-connected. For a target firm, if the institution is (not)
socially connected to its activist, it is assigned to the (non-) connected portfolio. For
each day and each portfolio, we compute value-weighted returns by weighting the
institution’s dollar investment in the firm at the beginning of quarter t. To obtain
abnormal returns earned from connections, we first aggregate daily portfolio returns
to the monthly level and run time-series regressions using the market factor, and
Fama French five-factors, respectively. The reported abnormal returns are thus in
monthly percent, and are calculated for the full sample of institutions, hedge funds,
and mutual funds, respectively.8 Table 4.5 presents calendar time portfolio returns
for the full sample, hedge funds, and mutual fund families, respectively.
8We also calculate characteristically adjusted returns (“DGTW-adjusted returns”) as in Daniel,
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), and find that the results are similar to those from the
calendar-time portfolio regressions.
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Table 4.5: Returns on “Connected” campaigns
This table reports calendar-time portfolio returns. At the beginning of each activist cam-
paign, if the target stock is held by a connected institution, we assign the stock to a “con-
nected” portfolio. Following Cao, Goldie, Liang, and Petrasek (2015) and Jiang, Li, and
Mei (2017), the calendar-time portfolio is constructed on a daily basis, and is rebalanced
when campaigns are launched, concluded or withdrawn. We compute value-weighted port-
folios. To obtain abnormal returns, we aggregate daily portfolio returns to the monthly
level and run time-series regressions using the market factor, and Fama French five-factors,
respectively. Returns are in monthly percent, and are calculated for the full sample of insti-
tutions, hedge funds, and mutual funds, respectively. The t-statistics in the square brackets
are calculated using Newey-West (1987) standard errors with seven lags. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 
Raw return Abnormal return from CAPM  
Abnormal return from the Fama-French five-factor 
model 
 Connected 
portfolio 
Non-connected 
portfolio 
Diff. Connected 
portfolio 
Non-connected 
portfolio 
Diff. Connected 
portfolio 
Non-connected 
portfolio 
Diff. 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c) 
          
Full sample 1.56%*** 1.06** 0.50%** 0.86%*** 0.35 0.51%** 0.95%*** 0.53** 0.42% 
 [2.75] [1.20] [1.85] [2.62] [1.41] [1.85] [2.78] [2.06] [1.47] 
          
Hedge funds 1.61%*** 1.05** 0.55%* 0.86%** 0.33 0.53%* 1.00%** 0.48* 0.53%** 
 [2.63] [2.00] [1.76] [2.29] [1.36] [1.67] [2.59] [1.91] [2.30] 
          
Mutual funds 1.50%*** 1.11** 0.39% 0.86%** 0.43%** 0.43% 0.93%** 0.59* 0.34 
 [2.64] [2.46] [1.04] [2.26] [2.31] [2.17] [2.35] [1.71] [0.86] 
 
For the full sample of institutions, the connected and non-connected port-
folios earn 1.56% and 1.06% monthly in raw returns, respectively. A long-short
portfolio that purchases stocks in the connected portfolio and shorts non-connected
ones earns 0.5% per month, significant at the 5% level. The abnormal return for
the long-short portfolio using the CAPM and Fama-French five-factor models are
0.51% and 0.42% per month respectively (t-statistic = 1.85). When we restrict
our sample to hedge funds, the long-short portfolio yields a monthly raw return
of 0.55% and a Fama-French alpha of 0.53%. For mutual fund families, we obtain
slightly smaller estimates for both return measures than those for hedge funds. The
fact that hedge funds trade more aggressively than mutual funds may contribute to
this difference. On average, hedge funds buy $7.9 million in connected stocks and
$6.3 million in non-connected stocks, while mutual fund families buy $3.3 million in
connected stocks and $1.8million in non-connected stocks.
Our results support the hypothesis that connected institutions have a com-
parative advantage in obtaining information on the target stocks from activists.
When fund managers and an activist are likely to have a higher level of social inter-
actions, they increase their stakes in the stock and earn large positive returns. As a
result, the long-short portfolio that consists of connected and non-connected target
stocks earns positive abnormal returns during the activist campaign.
4.4 Social connections and shareholder voting
In this section, we study how connected institutions’ trading contribute to activists’
successes. As Edmans and Holderness (2017) point out, institutional investors pri-
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marily exercise their shareholder rights through voting for directors and major cor-
porate proposals. Directors receiving a meaningful fraction of negative votes are
more likely to step down (Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 2009), and companies often re-
spond to negative voting outcomes on other management-sponsored proposals, such
as compensation-related ones (Ferri and Maber, 2013). If connected institutions are
more ready than non-connected institutions to vote against management in target
companies during activist campaigns, this is strong evidence that the activists have
built an alliance that can effectively challenge management and potentially improve
firm performance and shareholder value.
We study director elections and other management-sponsored proposals,
which include executive compensation plans, Say-on-Pay proposals, governance-
related proposals, capitalization proposals, and routine and miscellaneous proposals.
Together, they account for over 95% of all proposals (Li, 2016).
For mutual fund s, we define an indicator variable Vote against management
proposals that equals one if the fund votes against a proposal sponsored by man-
agement, and zero otherwise. Our main dependent variable below represents the
percent of funds within an institution that vote against management:
Vote against management proposal =
S∑
s
Vote against management proposals
(4.2)
in which S is the number of funds within the institution. Vote against director
nominee is defined in a similar fashion.
As ISS recommendations are shown to significantly sway institutional votes
(Iliev and Lowry, 2014; Cvijanovic, Dasgupta, and Zachariadis, 2016), we also define
ISS against management, which equals one if ISS recommends against management,
and zero otherwise. On average, ISS recommends against management proposals
7.5% of the time, while it recommends against management’s director nominees
7.4% of the time. Both percentages are less than the proportion of votes cast by
fund families (10%).
We estimate a linear probability model by regressing Vote against manage-
ment proposal or Vote against director nominee on Connection to activist, proxies
for similarities between instiutitons and activists, and proposal fixed effects and in-
stitution fixed effects, which capture time-invariant proposal and institution level
characteristics.
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Table 4.6: Social connections and shareholder voting during activist campaigns
This table examines how connected institutions vote in target firms’ shareholder meet-
ings after activist disclosures. Column (1) include shareholder meetings that take place
between campaign announcement and outcome dates, while column (2) includes all post-
announcement shareholder meetings by target firms. V ote against management proposal
(director nominee) is the percent of “Against” votes among all funds within an institu-
tion on management-sponsored proposals (director nominees). Connection to activist is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if an institution is connected to the activist as of year t−1 (year
t is when the activist discloses its position in the target firm). Meeting during campaign
is an indicator equal to 1 if a shareholder meeting is held between campaign announce-
ment and outcome dates. All other independent variables are as defined in table 4.2. In
each column we report coefficient estimates and their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics.
Standard errors are clustered at the institution level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 
Meetings during activist campaign 
All meetings after activist 
announcement 
Dependent variable  Vote against 
management 
proposal 
Vote against 
director nominee 
Vote against 
management 
proposal 
Vote against 
director nominee 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Connection to activist 0.009* 0.013** 0.003 0.004 
 [1.908] [2.333] [1.344] [1.346] 
Connection to activist × Meeting during 
campaign 
  0.009** 0.012** 
   [2.265] [2.513] 
Same city – institution and target -0.003 0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
 [-0.280] [0.478] [-0.826] [-0.857] 
Same city – institution and activist -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
 [-0.223] [-0.587] [-0.416] [-0.202] 
Portfolio overlap -0.066 -0.076 -0.015 -0.015 
 [-1.460] [-1.328] [-0.567] [-0.427] 
Same-size quintile 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.002 
 [0.354] [0.380] [0.123] [0.577] 
     
Observations 101,308 72,634 443,606 320,027 
Adj. R-squared 0.483 0.512 0.466 0.503 
Proposal FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
In column (1) of table 4.6, we report evidence on whether connected insti-
tutions are more likely to challenge management in shareholder meetings during
activist campaigns. Column (1a) reports that connected institutions’ votes against
management proposals are 0.9 percentage point more than those by non-connected
institutions. The coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the 10% level.
Given that the unconditional disapproval rate of fund families for directors is 10%,
this represents an increase in disapproval of 9%.
Column (1b) replicates the analysis in column (1a) for director elections only.
Connected institutions’ votes against management-sponsored directors are about 1.3
percentage points more than those by non-connected institutions (significant at the
5% level). This represents an incremental increase in disapproval of 13%.
In column (2), we relate disapproval of management proposals and director
nominees with Connection to activist, interacted with Meeting during campaign,
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which is an indicator variable equal to one for meetings that take place during
activist campaigns. This difference-in-differences (“DiD”) specification compares
differential votes between connected and non-connected institutions during cam-
paign years with those in years with less activist influence. Note that the regressor
Meeting during campaign and ISS recommends against proposal is dropped due to
multicollinearity with proposal fixed effects. 9 The results are similar. The result
in column (2b) suggests that during activist campaigns, the difference in “Against”
votes for directors between connected and non-connected institutions is about 1.2
percentage points, compared with that in later years with less activist influence. We
obtain similar results for all management proposals in columns (2a).
4.4.1 Ownership changes and shareholder voting
Having shown that socially connected shareholders are move likely to challenge
management during activism events, we proceed to study the interactive effects of
institutional trading and voting. Presumably, connected institutions that purchase
target stocks during a campaign are more likely to challenge the management in
shareholder meetings because doing so will benefit them more than when they do not
increase holdings. Loosely speaking, this is analogous to Cornelli and Li (2002), who
explain that a risk arbitrageur “creates” private information after purchasing shares
because they are now privately informed about their own voting decisions, which
in turn increases the value of the shares by raising the probability of a favourable
vote outcome (deal completion). Applying the same framework to an connected
institution during an activist campaign, its information advantage lies in the fact
it is privately informed about its intention to support the activist (vote against
management), which improves the probability of activist success and an increase in
stock prices.
9Appendix C replicates the analysis by replacing the event fixed effects with firm characteristics.
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Table 4.7: Ownership changes and shareholder voting during activist campaigns
This table examines how connected institutions vote in target firms shareholder meetings
when their ownerships change. The sample includes shareholder meetings that take place
between campaign announcement and outcome dates. V ote against management proposal
(director nominee) is the percent of “Against” votes among all funds within an institution on
management-sponsored proposals (director nominees). Connection to activist is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if an institution is connected to the activist as of year t − 1 (year t is
when the activist discloses its position in the target firm). Increase in ownership during
activist campaign equals 1 if an institution increases ownership in a target stock from the
campaign announcement quarter end to the quarter end before the outcome date, and 0
otherwise. All other independent variables are as defined in table 4.2. In each column we
report coefficient estimates and their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. Standard errors
are clustered at the institution level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 Meetings during activist campaign 
Dependent variable  Vote against management 
proposal 
Vote against director nominee 
 (1) (2) 
Connection to activist 0.003 0.007 
 [0.548] [1.025] 
Connection to activist × Increase in ownership during activist 
campaign 
0.017** 
[2.494] 
0.018** 
[2.090] 
   
Increase in ownership during activist campaign -0.001 0.003 
 [-0.075] [0.447] 
Same city – institution and target -0.003 0.006 
 [-0.262] [0.484] 
Same city – institution and activist -0.001 -0.004 
 [-0.234] [-0.601] 
Portfolio overlap -0.067 -0.076 
 [-1.478] [-1.340] 
Same-size quintile 0.002 0.003 
 [0.317] [0.355] 
   
Observations 101,316 72,634 
Adj. R-squared 0.455 0.512 
Proposal FEs Yes Yes 
Institution FEs Yes Yes 
 
For this study, we focus on all meetings that take place during activist cam-
paigns. Specifically, we regress Vote against management proposal or Vote against
director nominee on Connection to activist, interacted with Increase in ownership,
as well as proxies for similarities between institutions and activists, and proposal
fixed effects and institution fixed effects. A positive coefficient on the interac-
tion term, Connection to activist×Increase in ownership, indicates that there is
a stronger association between social connections and voting against management
proposals/director nominees when an institution purchases target stocks during the
campaign. As shown in column (1) of table 4.7, connected institutions’ votes against
management-sponsored proposals/directors are 1.7-1.8 percentage points more than
those by non-connected institutions when the institutions increase investment in the
target firms (significant at the 5% level). This represents an incremental increase in
disapproval of 17% to 18%.
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4.5 Robustness analysis
4.5.1 Activist disclosure within 10 days after Quarter t− 1 ends
Using 13F institutional ownership data provides an advantage of wide coverage,
however, we do not know when in the quarter institutions’ trades are executed
and, therefore, it is possible that our proxy for institutional trades captures only
part of the actual trades during an activist campaign, especially when the activist’s
disclosure takes place toward the beginning of Quarter t. To this end, in robustness
analysis, we restrict our sample to events in which activist announcements take place
within 10 trading days after Quarter t−1 ends. We then proxy institutional trading
by ownership change in the target firm from the end of Quarter t − 1 to the end
of Quarter t + n. Such a short window ensures that the change in an institution’s
ownership captures the bulk of its trades even if it trades heavily shortly after the
activist disclosure.
Table 4.8: Robustness analysis
This table applies a linear probability model to examine whether a social connection to an
activist predicts an increase in target stock ownership after the activists disclosure. Column
(1) uses the Thomson Reuters 13F ownership data, and restricts the sample to campaigns
that start within 10 trading days after the end of Quarter t-1 (see Figure 4.1). Column (2)
uses the Abel Noser transaction database. The dependent variable equals 1 if an institutions
stakes increase from one day after activist announcement to the outcome date. Connection
to activist is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an institution is connected to the activist
as of year t − 1 (year t is when the activist discloses its position in the target firm). All
other independent variables are as defined in table 4.2. In each column we report coefficient
estimates and their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered at
the institution level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Increase in ownership 
during activist campaign 
The 13F sample: Activist disclosure takes place within 
10 trading days after Quarter t-1 ends 
The Abel Noser transaction 
sample 
 (1) (2) 
Connection to activist 0.011*** 0.007*** 
 [2.888] [2.761] 
Same city – institution and target 0.003 0.004 
 [0.479] [1.224] 
Same city – institution and activist 0.007*** 0.005** 
 [2.844] [2.276] 
Portfolio overlap 0.051***  
 [2.667]  
Same-size quintile 0.003**  
 [2.298]  
   
Observations 76,709 224,061 
Adj. R-squared 0.156 0.102 
Event FEs Yes Yes 
Institution FEs Yes Yes 
% (Dep variable = 1) 2.27% 1.83% 
 
Table 4.8 reports results by re-estimating equation (2). In column (1), we
restrict to a sample where quarter t − 1 ends within 10 days before the activist
announcement. The sample is reduced to 124 campaigns involving 81 activists.
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Column (1) reports that, for an average institution, the marginal probability of
increasing ownership in the target due to social ties is estimated to be 1.1 percentage
points, other things being equal. The magnitude is identical to our main results
reported in table 4.3. The estimates for most other covariates are also similar to
those reported in table 4.3.
4.5.2 The Abel Noser transaction sample
One potential concern about the analysis in subsection 4.5.1 is the small sample
size. Alternatively, we use the Abel Noser transaction database to determine a more
precise connection between the activist disclosure and institutional trading activity
during campaign (see Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2016) for a similar setting).
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if an institution
increases its percent ownership of the target company from one day after activist
announcement to the outcome date. The results, comparable to those using 13F
institutional ownership data, are reported in column (2) of table 4.8. A connected
institution is 0.7% percentage point more likely to increase its ownership in the
target during a campaign, compared to institutions that do not have a social tie
with the activist. This represents a 38% increase in incremental probability. The
effects of most covariates are similar to those reported in table 4.3. (Portfolio overlap
and Same-size quintile are omitted for this sample because funds in the Abel Noser
database do not report their portfolio holdings or TNA.)
4.5.3 Sensitivity to alternative specifications
In the analyses above, we do not take into account an institution’s capital constraint
in creating our dependent variable. Although that is our preferred measure, we also
carry out an analysis by using an alternative measure — a dummy variable equal to
one if an institution increases the weight of the target stock in its portfolio during
a campaign. As shown in Appendix D, for the full sample, a connected institution
sees a 32% increase in the incremental probability of increasing its portfolio weight
(significant at the 1% level), relative to those that are not connected to the activist.
This magnitude is comparable to our main analysis. The results for hedge funds
and mutual fund families are also similar.
4.5.4 Excluding events by repeat activists
Activist events can be concentrated with a number of large funds involving in mul-
tiple campaigns. For example, for the 122 campaigns launched in 2010, 103 are
initiated by activists who launched activism in at least one campaign in the past.
To address the concern that our results are potentially driven by a few large funds,
such as GAMCO, Pershing Square, and Icahn Capital LP who may also have many
social connections with other institutions, we re-estimate equation (2) by excluding
repeat activists.
In columns (1) to (3) of Appendix E, we include only events by activists who
in the past launched zero events, fewer than two events, and fewer than five events,
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respectively. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on Connection to activist
is slightly larger than that in the main analysis in table 4.3.
4.6 Summary
This chapter investigates the benefits of social connections in the context of hedge
fund activism. An institutional investor whose managers are socially connected to
those at the lead activist is 1.1 percentage points more likely to increase its owner-
ship in the target firm during the campaign period, compared to funds that are not
socially connected to the activist. The effect is robust when using a subsample that
includes all institutions subject to M&As to capture exogenous shocks to social con-
nections. Connected institutions earn significantly more returns on campaigns and
they are more likely to vote pro-activist in the annual meetings during campaigns.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In conclusion, the thesis has investigated the institutional investor environment of
target firms and related it to the selection of target companies and the information
channel through social connections among activists and other institutions.
We have documented that firms with a higher concentration of institutional
investors expressing dissatisfaction through voting, holding and exiting are more
likely to be activism targets. The revealed governance preference from institutional
investors can signal the quality of the firm, and activists are more likely to gain sup-
port from these dissatisfied shareholders. Supporting evidence shows that activists
are more likely to use threats to sue management or submit shareholder proposals
if there are more dissatisfied owners holding the target companies. Indirect evi-
dence shows that the more dissatisfied owners there are, the higher the campaign
announcement return is. Direct evidence from subsequent annual meeting voting
records shows that dissatisfied institutions are more likely to be pro-activist in rou-
tine votes and especially compensation related votes.
In the analysis of information sharing through social networks, investors’
social connections, such as school ties and past employment relationships, have
been mapped out. An institutional investor whose managers are socially connected
to those at the lead activist is 2.9 percentage points more likely to increase its
portfolio weight in the target firm over the campaign quarter, relative to funds
that are not connected to the activist. Compared to those established at public
companies, social ties created at private firms and social functions such as clubs
are associated with a higher likelihood of increasing “connected” ownership, and
the likelihood is higher when the activist has a better track record. The monthly
returns earned from investing in connected hedge funds’ targets is 1.8 percentage
points higher than those from non-connected ones. Further evidence suggests that
the presence of connected funds can benefit the activist by increasing its success rate,
including gaining board seats. The results are robust to alternative specifications, as
well as to alternative hypotheses, such as fund manager ability, fund characteristics,
or investment styles.
In the same framework of analyzing alliance building among activists and
institutional investors during campaign period, a connected institution is found to
increase, on average, 1.1 percentage points its ownership in the target firm, compared
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to funds that are not socially connected to the activist. To address endogeneity by
using mergers and acquisitions among financial institutions as plausibly exogenous
shocks to social connections, similar results are obtained: a connected institution
is 1.7 percentage point more likely to raise stakes in a target firm (the incremental
probability is 47%). Connected institutions also perform significantly better on their
investment than non-connected institutions, generating a risk-adjusted long-short
portfolio return of 0.42% to 0.51% per month. Furthermore, connected institutions’
votes against management proposals (management-sponsored directors) are 0.9 (1.3)
percentage points more than those by non-connected funds, representing an increase
of 9% (13%) in the disapproval rate. The connected institutions that purchase
target stocks during a campaign are even more likely to challenge management in
shareholder meetings, which presumably will benefit them more if campaigns are
successful. These effects only exist for meetings during activist campaigns, but not
for meetings after outcome dates.
The thesis contributes to the literature of hedge fund activism and provides
an insightful picture of the working of a campaign. It also relates to corporate
governance theories and the applications of social networks in finance research. It
is the product of the ever increasing awareness of institutional investors’ roles in
corporate governance and sheds light on the ever more complex nature of minority
shareholder investing and governing.
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Appendix A
Defining activist social ties
To determine“effective” social ties between an activist fund and an institutional
investor, we list the four scenarios below (all names are hypothetical).
Scenario 1: John worked at an activist fund named Activist Capital (“Ac-
tivist A”) from 2005 to 2014. Mary worked at an investment company called Growth
Capital (“Institution B”) from 2008 to 2012. Both John and Mary were studying at
the same university in 1975. The effective social tie between Activist Capital and
Growth Capital based on John and Mary’s connection started in 2008 and ended in
2012.
Scenario 2: John worked at an activist fund named Activist Capital (“Ac-
tivist A”) from 2005 to 2014. Mary worked at an investment company called Growth
Capital (“Institution B”) from 2008 to 2012. Both John and Mary served as direc-
tors of a corporation from 2009. The effective social tie between Activist Capital and
Growth Capital based on John and Mary’s connection started in 2009 and ended in
2012.
Scenario 3: John worked at an activist fund named Activist Capital (“Ac-
tivist A”) from 2005 to 2010. Mary worked at an investment company called Growth
Capital (“Institution B”) from 2008 to 2012. Both John and Mary were studying at
the same university in 1975. The effective social tie between Activist Capital and
Growth Capital based on John and Mary’s connection started in 2008 and ended in
2010.
Scenario 4: John worked at an activist fund named Activist Capital (“Ac-
tivist A”) from 2005 to 2010. Mary worked at an investment company called Growth
Capital (“Institution B”) from 2008 to 2012. Both John and Mary served as direc-
tors of a corporation from 2009. The effective tie between Activist Capital and
Growth Capital based on John and Mary’s connection started in 2009 and ended in
2010.
These four scenarios correspond to the four charts in the algorithm detailed
in Figure A1 below.
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Figure A.1: An illustration of social ties between activist A and institution B
AS (BS) is the starting time of a person in institution A (B) and AE (BE) is the last
day the person works for institution A (B). The green (orange) box is the duration a
person works in institution A (B). OS is the starting time when the two people from
institutions A and B become known to each other via a third organization. The
shaded area is the time during which the two people are known to each other. The
duration between labels highlighted in red is the “effective” period during which
institutions A and B are connected by the two people they are still working in their
institutions and are known to each other via a third party.
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Connected ownership
Table B.1: Social connections and changes in institutional ownership – Extension
of Table 4.3, Replacing Event Fixed Effects with Firm Controls
This table replicates Table 4.3 except that event fixed effects are replaced with firm char-
acteristics. All variables are as defined in Tables 3.1 and 4.2. In each column we report
coefficient estimates and their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. Standard errors are
clustered at the institution level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Increase in ownership during 
activist campaign Full sample Hedge funds Mutual funds 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Connection to activist 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
 [5.323] [3.717] [4.092] 
Same city – institution and target 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [1.305] [0.817] [0.759] 
Same city – institution and activist 0.003* 0.005** -0.000 
 [1.712] [2.202] [-0.153] 
Portfolio overlap 0.017*** 0.012* 0.024** 
 [3.258] [1.805] [2.519] 
Same-size quintile 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 
 [12.779] [11.290] [6.344] 
Log (MV) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002 
 [-3.302] [-2.936] [-1.494] 
Return on assets (ROA) -0.001 0.003 -0.008 
 [-0.195] [0.545] [-1.343] 
Prior-year stock return -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 [-5.676] [-4.512] [-3.395] 
B/M -0.003** -0.003** -0.002 
 [-2.426] [-2.128] [-1.146] 
Growth 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 
 [5.455] [4.528] [3.093] 
Cash 0.012*** 0.010* 0.018*** 
 [3.106] [1.811] [3.160] 
Dividend yield -0.106*** -0.138*** -0.046* 
 [-5.765] [-5.541] [-1.894] 
Amihud illiquidity -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [-1.639] [-1.071] [-1.241] 
Institutional ownership 0.006 0.005 0.006 
 [1.596] [1.166] [1.040] 
    
Observations 741,351 489,343 252,008 
Adj. R-squared 0.139 0.139 0.143 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes 
% (Dep variable = 1) 2.51% 2.69% 2.17% 
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Connected voting
Table C.1: Social connections and shareholder voting during activist campaigns –
Extension of Table 4.3, Replacing Event Fixed Effects with Firm Controls
This table replicates Table 4.3 except that event fixed effects are replaced with firm char-
acteristics. All variables are as defined in Tables 3.1 and 4.2. ISS recommends against
proposal is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Institutional Shareholder Services issues a rec-
ommendation against a proposal, and 0 otherwise. In each column we report coefficient
estimates and their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered at
the institution level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
 
Meetings during activist campaign 
All meetings after activist 
announcement 
Dependent variable  Vote against 
management 
proposal 
Vote against 
director nominee 
Vote against 
management 
proposal 
Vote against 
director nominee 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Connection to activist 0.012** 0.016** 0.003 0.003 
 [2.560] [2.753] [1.081] [1.103] 
Connection to activist × Meeting during 
campaign 
  0.010*** 0.013*** 
   [2.628] [2.737] 
Meeting during campaign   0.006*** 0.006** 
   [2.663] [2.149] 
Same city – institution and target -0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 [-0.594] [0.565] [-0.697] [-0.762] 
Same city – institution and activist -0.003 -0.004 0.002 0.002 
 [-0.416] [-0.616] [0.532] [0.362] 
Portfolio overlap -0.062 -0.072 -0.023 -0.026 
 [-1.767] [-1.595] [-1.419] [-1.213] 
Same-size quintile 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.002 
 [0.644] [0.844] [0.341] [0.631] 
ISS recommends against proposal 0.561*** 0.553*** 0.544*** 0.537*** 
 [12.030] [10.563] [12.324] [11.429] 
Log (MV) -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004* 
 [-0.472] [-0.593] [-1.550] [-1.696] 
B/M 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 [0.251] [0.519] [-0.761] [-0.857] 
Return on assets (ROA) -0.020 -0.013 -0.013* -0.006 
 [-1.499] [-1.105] [-1.734] [-0.727] 
Prior-year stock return -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 [-1.047] [-0.430] [-0.549] [-0.902] 
Growth 0.016* 0.016 0.007* 0.009* 
 [1.938] [1.484] [1.779] [1.943] 
Cash 0.015* 0.017 0.013 0.012 
 [2.093] [1.439] [1.506] [1.128] 
Dividend yield -0.100 -0.173 -0.104* -0.130* 
 [-0.765] [-1.305] [-1.774] [-1.861] 
Amihud illiquidity 0.020 0.017 0.031 0.042 
 [0.339] [0.199] [0.867] [0.826] 
Institutional ownership -0.004 -0.006 0.000 -0.007 
 [-0.458] [-0.396] [0.098] [-0.985] 
     
Observations 86,699 62,521 390,510 282,562 
Adj. R-squared 0.433 0.466 0.420 0.461 
Proposal-type FEs Yes  Yes  
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Connected portfolio allocation
Table D.1: Social connections and changes in institutional portfolio allocation
– Extension of Table 4.3, Replacing the Dependent Variable with Increase in
Portfolio Weight
This table replicates Table 2 except that the dependent variable is replaced with Increase in
portfolio weight during activist campaign, which is an indicator equal to 1 if an institution
increases the weight of the target stock in its portfolio between activist announcement and
outcome dates. In each column we report coefficient estimates and their heteroscedasticity-
robust t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Increase in portfolio weight 
during activist campaign Full sample Hedge funds Mutual funds 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Connection to activist 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 [4.882] [3.527] [3.624] 
Same city – institution and target 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.532] [0.374] [0.074] 
Same city – institution and activist 0.002 0.004* -0.000 
 [1.407] [1.722] [-0.112] 
Portfolio overlap 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 
 [5.336] [3.914] [2.959] 
Same-size quintile 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 
 [13.401] [11.715] [6.804] 
    
Observations 884,530 584,206 300,324 
Adj. R-squared 0.141 0.144 0.140 
Event FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes 
% (Dep variable = 1) 2.50% 2.70% 2.10% 
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Social connections and changes
in institutional ownership in
non-repetitive activists’
campaigns
Table E.1: Social connections and changes in institutional ownership in non-
repetitive activists’ campaigns – Extension of Table 2, Excluding Repeat Activists
This table replicates column (1) of Table 2 except that repeat activists are excluded from
the analysis. In column (1), all repeat activists who have launched more than one campaign
in the past are excluded. In column (2), activists with fewer than two past campaigns are
included. In column (3), activists with fewer than five past campaigns are included. In
each column we report coefficient estimates and their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics.
Standard errors are clustered at the institution level. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Increase in ownership 
during activist campaign 
Activists with zero past 
campaigns 
 Activists with fewer than two 
past campaigns 
Activists with fewer than five 
past campaigns 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Connection to activist 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 [3.678] [4.568] [5.282] 
Same city – institution and target 0.000 0.002 0.001 
 [0.288] [1.574] [0.958] 
Same city – institution and activist 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 [0.366] [0.799] [0.332] 
Portfolio overlap 0.056*** 0.073*** 0.054*** 
 [4.993] [7.696] [7.227] 
Same-size quintile 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 
 [4.160] [6.638] [10.169] 
    
Observations 184,605 297,564 483,742 
Adj. R-squared 0.133 0.137 0.136 
Event FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes 
% (Dep variable = 1) 1.82% 2.03% 2.12% 
 
108
Bibliography
Admati, A. R. and Pfleiderer, P., 2009, The “Wall street walk and shareholder
activism: exit as a form of voice, Review of Financial Studies 22(7), 2645-2685.
Ahern, K. R., 2016, Information networks: evidence from illegal insider trading tips,
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Allen, F. and Babus, A., 2008, Networks in finance. In Kleindorfer, Paul R. and
Yoram (Jerry) Wind (eds.), Network-based strategies and competencies, Wharton
School Publishing, 367-382.
Amihud, Y., 2002, Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects,
Journal of Financial Markets 5(1), 31-56.
Appel, I., Gormley, T. A. and Keim, D. B., 2016, Standing on the shoulders of
giants: the effect of passive investors on activism, Working Paper, Boston College
and University of Pennsylvania.
Ashraf, R., Jayaraman, N. and Ryan, H.E., 2012, Do pension-related business ties
influence mutual fund proxy voting? Evidence from shareholder proposals on
executive compensation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47(3),
567-588.
Aslan, H. and Kumar, P., 2016, The product market effects of hedge fund activism,
Journal of Financial Economics 119(1), 226-248.
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A. and Ferrell, A., 2008, What matters in corporate gover-
nance?, Review of Financial Studies 22(2), 783-827.
Becht, M., Franks, J. R., Grant, J. and Wagner, H. F., 2015, The returns to hedge
fund activism: an international study, European Corporate Governance Institute
(ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 402/2014.
109
Becht, M., Franks, J., Mayer, C. and Rossi, S., 2008, Returns to shareholder ac-
tivism: evidence from a clinical study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, Review of
Financial Studies 22(8), 3093-3129.
Bennett, J. A., Sias, R. W. and Starks, L. T., 2003, Greener pastures and the
impact of dynamic institutional preferences, Review of Financial Studies 16(4),
1203-1238.
Bharath, S. T., Jayaraman, S. and Nagar, V., 2013, Exit as governance: an empirical
analysis, Journal of Financial Markets 68(6), 2515-2547.
Blocher, J., 2016, Network externalities in mutual funds, Journal of Financial Mar-
kets 30, 1-26.
Bolton, P., Li, T., Ravina, and Rosenthal., 2018, Investor Ideology, working paper,
Columbia University and University of Florida
Brav, A., Dasgupta, A. and Mathews, R. D., 2016, Wolf pack activism, working
paper, Fuqua School of Business, London School of Economics, and University of
Maryland.
Brav, A., Jiang, W. and Kim, H., 2015, The real effects of hedge fund activism:
productivity, asset allocation, and labor outcomes, Review of Financial Studies
28(10), 2723-2769.
Brav, A., Jiang, W. and Li, T., 2017, Picking friends before picking a fight: how
does mutual fund foting shape proxy contests, working paper, Fuqua School of
Business, Columbia University, and University of Florida.
Brav, A., Jiang, W., Ma, S. and Tian, X., 2017, How does hedge fund activism
reshape corporate innovation?, Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Brav, A., Jiang, W., Partnoy, F. and Thomas, R., 2008, Hedge fund activism,
corporate governance, and firm performance, Journal of Finance 63(4), 1729-
1775.
Brav, A. and Mathews, R. D., 2011, Empty voting and the efficiency of corporate
governance, Journal of Finance Economics 99(2), 289-307.
Brown, L. D., Call, A. C., Clement, M. B. and Sharp, N. Y., 2017, Managing the
narrative: investor relations officers and corporate disclosure, Working Paper,
Temple University, Arizona State University, University of Texas at Austin, and
Texas A&M University.
110
Brown, N.C., Wei, K.D. and Wermers, R., 2013, Analyst recommendations, mutual
fund herding, and overreaction in stock prices, Management Science 60(1), 1-20.
Bushee, B. J., 1998, The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D invest-
ment behavior, Accounting review 305-333.
Butler, A.W. and Gurun, U. G., 2012, Educational networks, mutual fund voting
patterns, and CEO compensation, Review of Financial Studies 25 (8), 2533-2562.
Cai, J. and Szeidl, A., 2016, Interfirm Relationships and Business Performance,
working paper, NBER
Cai, J., Garner, J.L. and Walkling, R., 2009, Electing directors, Journal of of Fi-
nance 64(5), 2389-2421.
Cao, C., Goldie, B.A., Liang, B. and Petrasek, L., 2016, What is the nature of
hedge fund manager skills? Evidence from the risk-arbitrage strategy, Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 51(3), 929-957.
Carleton, W. T., Nelson, J. M. and Weisbach, M. S., 1998, The influence of in-
stitutions on corporate governance through private negotiations: evidence from
TIAACREF, Journal of Finance 53(4), 1335-1362.
Chang, Y., Hong, H. and Liskovich, I., 2015, Regression discontinuity and the price
effects of stock market indexing, Review of Financial Studies 28, 212246.
Chemmanur, T.J., He, S. and Hu, G., 2009, The role of institutional investors in
seasoned equity offerings, Journal of Financial Economics 94(3), 384-411.
Choi, S., Fisch, J. and Kahan, M., 2009, The power of proxy advisors: myth or
reality, Emory LJ 59.
Clifford, C. P., 2008, Value creation or destruction? hedge funds as shareholder
activists, Journal of Corporate Finance 14(4), 323-336.
Cohen, L., Frazzini, A. and Malloy, C., 2008, The small world of investing: board
connections and mutual fund returns, Journal of Political Economy 116(5), 951-
979.
Colla, P. and Mele, A., 2010, Information linkages and correlated trading, Review
of Financial Studies 23(1), 203-246.
Cornelli, F. and Li, D.D., 2002, Risk arbitrage in takeovers, Review of Financial
Studies 15(3), 837-868.
111
Cotter, J., Palmiter, A. and Thomas, R., 2010, ISS recommendations and mutual
fund voting on proxy proposals, Vill. L. Rev 55.
Coval, J.D. and Moskowitz, T.J., 1999, Home bias at home: Local equity preference
in domestic portfolios, Journal of Finance 54(6), 2045-2073.
Coval, J.D. and Moskowitz, T.J., 2001, The geography of investment: Informed
trading and asset prices, Journal of political Economy 109(4), 811-841.
Cvijanovic, D., Dasgupta, A. and Zachariadis, K. E., 2016, Ties that bind: how
business connections affect mutual fund activism, Journal of Finance 71(6), 2933-
2966.
Daniel, K., Grinblatt, M., Titman, S. and Wermers, R., 1997, Measuring mu-
tual fund performance with characteristic based benchmarks, Journal of Finance
52(3), 1035-1058.
Dasgupta, A. and Piacentino, G., 2015, The wall street walk when blockholders
compete for flows, Journal of Finance 70(6), 2853-2896.
Davis, G.F. and Kim, E.H., 2007, Business ties and proxy voting by mutual funds.,
Journal of Financial Economics 85(2), 552-570.
Edmans A., 2009, Blockholder trading, market efficiency, and managerial myopia,
Journal of Finance 64(6), 2481-2513.
Edmans, A. and Holderness, C.G., 2017, Blockholders: a survey of theory and
evidence, Finance Working Paper No. 475/2016, European Corporate Governance
Institute.
Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F. and Muslu, V., 2010, Shareholder activism and CEO pay,
Review of Financial Studies 24(2), 535-592.
Falkenstein, E.G., 1996, Preferences for stock characteristics as revealed by mutual
fund portfolio holdings, Journal of Finance 51(1), 111-135.
Fisman, R., Shi, J., Wang, Y. and Xu, R., 2017, Social Ties and Favoritism in
Chinese Science, working paper, NBER
Frazzini, A., 2006, The disposition effect and underreaction to news, Journal of
Finance, 61(4), 2017-2046.
112
Ferreira, M.A. and Matos, P., 2008, The colors of investors’ money: the role of
institutional investors around the world, Journal of Financial Economics 88(3),
499-533.
Ferri, F. and Maber, D. A., 2013, Say on pay votes and CEO compensation: evidence
from the UK, Review of Finance 17(2), 527-563.
Fos, V. and Jiang, W., 2015, Out-of-the-money CEOs: Private control premium and
option exercises, Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming.
Gantchev, N., 2013, The costs of shareholder activism: evidence from a sequential
decision model, Journal of Financial Economics 107(3), 610-631.
Gantchev, N. and Jotikasthira, C., 2016, Institutional trading and hedge fund ac-
tivism, Management Science, forthcoming.
Gao, M. and Huang, J., 2015, Capitalizing on capitol hill: informed trading by
hedge fund managers, Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Gompers, P., Ishii, J. and Metrick, A., 2003, Corporate governance and equity
prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 107-156.
Gompers, P.A. and Metrick, A., 2001, Institutional investors and equity prices,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (1), 229-259.
Gompers, P.A., Mukharlyamov, V. and Xuan, Y., 2016, The cost of friendship,
Journal of Financial Economics 119(3), 626-644.
Han, B. and Yang, L., 2013, Social networks, information acquisition, and asset
prices, Management Science 59(6), 1444-1457.
He, J. and Huang, J., 2017, Product market competition in a world of cross-
ownership: Evidence from institutional blockholdings, Review of Financial Stud-
ies30 (8), 26742718
He, Y. and Li, T., 2016, The benefits of friendship in hedge fund activism, Working
Paper, University of Warwick and University of Florida
Hirschman, A., 1972, Exit, voice and loyalty: responses to decline in firms, organi-
zations, and states, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Hochberg, Y.V., Ljungqvist, A. and Lu, Y., 2007, Whom you know matters: venture
capital networks and investment performance, Journal of Finance 62(1), 251-301.
113
Hong, H., Kubik, J. D. and Stein, J. C., 2005, Thy neighbor’s portfolio: word of
mouth effects in the holdings and trades of money managers, Journal of Finance
60(6), 2801-2824.
Iliev, P. and Lowry, M., 2015, Are mutual funds active voters? Review of Financial
Studies 28(2), 446-485.
Ivkovic´, Z. and Weisbenner, S., 2007, Information diffusion effects in individual
investors’ common stock purchases: covet thy neighbors’ investment choices., Re-
view of Financial Studies 20(4), 1327-1357.
Jackson, M. O., 2011, An overview of social networks and economic applications,
Handbook of Social Economics (edited by Benhabib, Bisin, Jackson), North Hol-
land.
Jackson, M. O., 2014, Networks in the understanding of economic behaviors, Journal
of Economic Perspectives 28(4), 3-22.
Jiang, W., Li, T. and Mei, D., 2017, Influencing control: jawboning in risk arbitrage,
Journal of Finance, forthcoming
Kedia, S., Starks, L. T. and Wang, X., 2016, Institutional investors and hedge fund
activism, Working paper, Rutgers Business School and UT Austin.
Klein, A. and Li, T., 2015, Acquiring and trading on complex information: how
hedge funds use the freedom of information act, Working Paper, New York Uni-
versity and University of Florida.
Klein, A., Saunders, A. and Wong, Y. T. F., 2014, Do hedge funds trade on private
information? Evidence from upcoming changes in analysts’ stock recommenda-
tions, Working Paper, New York University and Columbia University.
Klein, A. and Zur, E., 2009, Entrepreneurial shareholder activism: hedge funds and
other private investors, Journal of Finance 64(1), 187-229.
Klein, A. and Zur, E., 2011, The impact of hedge fund activism on the target firm’s
existing bondholders, Review of Financial Studies 24(5), 1735-1771.
Kumar, N., Mullally, K., Ray, S. and Tang, Y., 2017, Prime (Information) Brokerage,
working paper, University of Florida and University of Alabama
Li, T., 2016, Outsourcing corporate governance: conflicts of interest within the
proxy advisory industry, Management Science, forthcoming.
114
Maggio, M.D., Franzoni, F., Kermani, A. and Sommavilla, C., 2016, The relevance
of broker networks for information diffusion in the stock market, working paper,
NBER
Matsusaka, J.G., Ozbas, O. and Yi, I., 2016, Opportunistic proposals by union
shareholders, working paper, University of Southern California and Purdue Uni-
versity.
McCahery, J. A., Sautner, Z. and Starks, L. T., 2016, Behind the scenes: the
corporate governance preferences of institutional investors, Journal of Finance
71(6), 2905-2932.
Noe, T., 2002, Investor activism and financial market structure, Review of Financial
Studies 15, 289318.
Ozsoylev, H. N. and Walden, J., 2011, Asset pricing in large information networks,
Journal of Economic Theory 146(6), 2252-2280.
Paddrik, M.E., Park, H. and Wang, J.J., 2017, Bank Networks and Systemic Risk:
Evidence from the National Banking Acts, American Economic Review, forth-
coming.
Parrino, R., Sias, R. W. and Starks, L. T., 2003, Voting with their feet: Institutional
ownership changes around forced CEO turnover, Journal of Financial Economics
68(1), 3-46.
Pool, V. K., Stoffman, N. and Yonker, S. E., 2015, The people in your neighborhood:
Social interactions and mutual fund portfolios, Journal of Finance 70(6), 2679-
2732.
Prequin, 2017, Prequin Global Hedge Fund Report, London
Puckett, A. and Yan, X.S., 2011, The interim trading skills of institutional investors,
Journal of Finance 66(2), 601-633.
Pulliam, S., Chung, J., Benoit, D. and Barry, R., 2014, Activist investors often leak
their plans to a favored few, Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2014.
Romano, R., 1993, Public pension fund activism in corporate governance reconsid-
ered., Columbia Law Review 93(4), 795-853.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W., 2016, Large shareholders and corporate control,
Journal of Political Economy 94(3), 461-488.
115
Wong, Y.T.F., 2016, Wolves at the Door: a closer look at hedge fund activism,
Working Paper, University of Southern California.
Xu, G., 2017, The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire, Working
Paper, London School of Economics
116
